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PATENT BREAKING OR BALANCING?:
SEPARATING STRANDS OF FACT FROM
FICTION UNDER TRIPS
Cynthia M. Hot
ABSTRACT
This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of when compulsory
licensing of patents is permissible as a matter of international law under the
Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).
Thailand's recent compulsory licenses of patents on a variety of medications
provide a convenient vehicle to analyze the limits of compulsory licensing
under TRIPS. Thailand's actions are unique; most countries hesitate to issue
compulsory licenses in the wake of legal uncertainties regarding TRIPS
requirements as well as political pressure. This article capitalizes on the many
issues involved in Thailand's licenses to provide an authoritative interpretation
of the scope of compulsory licensing under TRIPS.
This article has three goals. First, it diffuses current misconceptions by
providing an accurate interpretation of TRIPS. Second, it explores key terms
regarding compulsory licenses that require further analysis. Finally, it provides
a new framework for understanding competing patent perspectives that
presently infiltrate discussions and interpretations of the law. Understanding
these competing perspectives is important not only to address current and future
controversies concerning compulsory licenses, but also for confronting broader
issues at the global and domestic intersection of patents and public health.
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I. Introduction
Accused of theft, stealing, and confiscation, Thailand captured
the attention of the world when it issued a series of compulsory
licenses on patented drugs.' Thailand issued the licenses with
little prior warning and at a royalty rate of only one-half percent of
the total sale price-far below the market price sold by the patent
owners.2  A compulsory license permits a nation to use (or
authorizes a third party to use) a patented invention without the
permission of the patent owner at a government-imposed royalty
rate that is likely below what the patent owner would freely
negotiate.3  The Thai licenses met this traditional definition.
However, the licenses were noteworthy because they involved
drugs for non-infectious diseases, such as heart disease and cancer
that have not been traditionally subject to compulsory licenses.4
Moreover, Thailand's status as a middle-income country also
captured the attention of critics. For example, the Financial Times
characterized Thailand's licenses as setting a "precedent that will
alarm other western pharmaceutical companies."5  Similarly, an
I See, e.g., Ronald Cass, Drug Patent Piracy, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2007, at 15
[hereinafter Drug Patent Piracy]; Editorial, Theft in Thailand, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,
2007, at A8; Christopher Homer, Thailand Stealing Out of WTO? WASH. TIMES, May
17, 2007, at 1; Amy Kazmin & Andrew Jack, Thailand Breaks Patent for AIDS Drug to
Cut Costs, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, at 9 [hereinafter Thailand Breaks]; Nicholas
Zamiska, Thai Ministry to Recommend Ignoring Patents on Cancer Drugs, WALL ST. J..
Mar. 11, 2008, at A16; see also Nirmal Ghosh, Thailand Breaks Patents For Heart and
AIDS Drugs, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 31, 2007, available at
http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/readcontent.asp?View,6405 (beginning the editorial by stating
that "Thailand has overruled the international patent system"); Jonathan Head, Thailand
Takes on Drugs Giants, BBC NEWS, Apr. 26, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6587379.stm (referring to Thailand's actions as
"breaking" patents while simultaneously stating that Thailand's action is "completely
legal" under international law); Nicholas Zamiska, Abbott Escalates Thai Patent Rift,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2007, at A9 [hereinafter Abbott Escalates Thai Patent Rift]
("[p]harmaceutical executives say the Thai government decision, . . .effectively steals
the drugs from the companies that own them"). Thailand's actions continue to attract
controversy. See, e.g., Compulsory Licensing Will Continue, Says Minister, BANGKOK
POST, Aug. 15, 2008, available at http://www.bangkokpost.com/150808_News/
15Aug2008_news96.php.
2 See infra notes 203-211, 242-244 and accompanying text (providing details of
compulsory license chronology and criticisms).
3 See, e.g., JEROME H. REICHMANN WITH CATHERINE HASENZAHL, NON-
VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS 10 (UNCTAD-ICTSD 2003)
(providing definition of compulsory licensing).
4 See, e.g., infra notes 249-254 (discussing controversy regarding license on
Plavix heart medication).
5 Thailand Breaks, supra note 1; see also Ronald Cass, Patent Remedy, WALL ST.
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editorial in the Wall Street Journal asserted that "there is growing
appreciation that trampling patents to allow a middle-income
nation to cut its spending on drugs seriously threatens the world's
system of protection for innovation.",6
An essential part of the story often given inadequate attention
or erroneous treatment is whether the Thai licenses were
permissible under international law. Global rules on intellectual
property expressly permit all member countries to the World
Trade Organization (WTO)-a group of nearly 200 countries at all
levels of economic development-to issue such licenses, but there
is presently widespread controversy on when compulsory licenses
may be issued under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), to which all WTO members are bound.7
Humanitarian groups, including the Nobel Prize winning Doctors
Without Borders' and the William J. Clinton Foundation,9 praise
Thailand for using "flexibilities" under TRIPS to ensure access to
medicine.1 0 Multinational drug companies, on the other hand,
J. ASIA, Aug. 28, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 118824874547610202.html?mod=googlenews wsj [hereinafter Patent Remedy]
(noting that the U.S. protests "Thailand's effective theft of pharmaceutical companies'
intellectual property"); The Thai Flu, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2007, at A14 (describing
Thailand's licenses as an "attempt to confiscate drug patents" as well as "seizing"
patents).
6 Patent Remedy, supra note 5; see also Darren Schuettler, Angered U.S. Firm
Excludes Thailand From New Drugs, REUTERS, Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/
article/europeCrisis/idUSBKK277146 (noting that an Abbott spokesman stated that
"Thailand has chosen to break patents on numerous medicines, ignoring the patent
system").
7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; see also infra notes 241-
264 and accompanying text (suggesting Thailand's actions were not compliant with
TRIPS).
8 This group is a humanitarian organization dedicated to helping people who are
victims of natural or man-made disasters with access to medical care as just one of its
goals. See Doctors Without Borders: About Us, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/
aboutus/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). The group is also known by its French name
Mddicins Sans Fronti&es (MSF). See id.
9 The Clinton Foundation was established by President Clinton at the end of his
second term to achieve a number of policy objectives, including increasing global access
to HIV drugs. For further information about the Clinton Foundation see
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/about-the-clinton-foundation/ (last visited Feb. 8,
2009).
10 See, e.g., Press Release, Mddicins Sans Frontires, MSF Welcomes Move to
Overcome Patent on AIDS Drug in Thailand (Nov. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.msfaccess.org/media-room/press-releases/press-release-detailU?tx-ttnews%5
Bttnews%5D=20&cHash=f8040f62f5&no_cache=l&print=l ("[MSF] welcomes this
important move and urges the government to issue such licenses for the production of
other essential medicines"); Letter from Ira Magaziner, Chairman, Clinton Foundation,
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assert that the Thai licenses are impermissible under TRIPS on a
number of grounds including the contention that there is no
national emergency" and that conditions such as heart disease and
cancer are "lifestyle" issues that should not be subject to
compulsory licenses.1
2
Determining the appropriate scope of compulsory licenses
under TRIPS is essential to the future of the TRIPS/WTO
system. 13  As the number of countries that must comply with
TRIPS continues to increase," the permissible exceptions to patent
to Mongkol Na Gonkhla, Minister of Public Health (Feb. 16, 2007), reprinted in THAI
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND THAI NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY OFFICE, FACTS AND
EVIDENCES ON THE TEN BURNING ISSUES RELATED TO THE GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS
ON THREE PATENTED ESSENTIAL DRUGS IN THAILAND 96 (Dr. Vichai Chokevivat ed.,
Sangsue Co., Ltd., Thailand, 2007), available at http://www.moph.go.th
/hotlWhite%20Paper/o2OCL-EN.pdf [hereinafter TEN BURNING ISSUES-GOVERNMENT
USE OF PATENTS] (stating that Thailand's actions are consistent with international law);
see also Clinton Backs Thailand, as AIDS Drug Deal is Signed, NATION, May 10, 2007,
available at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/05/10/headlines/headlines
30033839.php (noting support of former president Bill Clinton for Thailand's
compulsory licenses of HIV drugs).
II See, e.g., Bangkok's Drug War Goes Global, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Mar. 7, 2007, at
13 ("Thailand clearly doesn't have an HIV/AIDS epidemic and heart disease isn't a
'national emergency'); Ronald Cass, Thai Patent Turmoil, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Mar. 13,
2007, at 13 [hereinafter Thai Patent Turmoil] (suggesting that Thailand does not have an
HIV crisis relative to infection rates in other developing countries); Patent Remedy,
supra note 5 (noting that Thailand is a "relatively developed nation facing no
epidemic"); see also Juliano Froehner, Compulsory Licensing: Inevitable Failures of the
Thailand Strategy in the Global Fight Against HIV/AIDS, Jul. 20, 2007 (unpublished
exploratory paper, available at http://www.essentialinnovation.org/wordpress/
wpcontent/uploads/2007/09/clpaperfinalized.pdf) (asserting that neither Thailand nor
Brazil has an actual emergency that justifies a compulsory license for AIDS treatment).
12 See, e.g., Piya Wong, Thailand Backs off Threat to Break Drug Patents,
SCIDEV.NET, Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.scidev.net/en/news/thailand-backs-off-threat-to-
break-drug-patents.html (referring to Plavix as medication for a 'life-style disease'
because it is "not for AIDS or an epidemic").
13 This article acknowledges that there is a broader normative question concerning
whether compulsory licenses in general are good or bad policy, which are touched upon
in Part VI. However, a full discussion of such policy is not only beyond the scope of this
article, but also tangential to the existing international reality that permits such licenses
under TRIPS-an agreement to which most countries have agreed to be bound. Since
TRIPS is here to stay, a careful analysis of the scope of TRIPS provisions such as
compulsory licenses is appropriate and consistent with respect for the rule of law.
14 Recognizing that member countries have different levels of development and
that some WTO members never previously provided these patents, only some signatories
were required to bring their laws into immediate compliance with TRIPS; whereas
developing countries were provided additional time to come into full compliance. See
TRIPS, supra note 7, arts. 65-66. Currently, only "least-developed countries" do not
have to be in full compliance with TRIPS. See id. art. 66; Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the Transition Period under
Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain
Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, IP/C/25 (July 1, 2002), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips e/art66_le.htm [hereinafter Extension of
the Transition Period] (extending deadline for least developing countries until January
2016).
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rights are increasingly important not only to individual countries
desiring to provide low cost drugs to its citizens but also for the
global supply of medicine. Prior to TRIPS, countries could deny
patent protection for drug compositions 5 and thus legally make
unpatented generic versions for a mere fraction of their cost in
countries where they were patented. 16 These low-cost drugs could
be distributed not only within the manufacturing country but also
shipped to other countries without patent rights.17 Prior to TRIPS,
a market for generic HIV drugs flourished and became an essential
part of the arsenal against global HIV epidemics.18
However, the ability to contain HIV epidemics with low cost
drugs may be in jeopardy. As more countries must comply with
TRIPS, they must provide patents on new drugs such as new HIV
treatments. While countries can continue to provide generic
versions of older HIV drugs, they may be increasingly less
effective because HIV patients typically become resistant to drugs
over time. 9 Accordingly, compulsory licenses are important as a
15 Prior to TRIPS, about fifty countries did not grant patents on drugs and some
also excluded patents for methods of making drugs. See, e.g., United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, The TRIPS Agreement and Developing
Countries, Geneva, Switz., 30, UNCTAD/ITE/l (1996).
16 Although a patent does not mandate a high price, a patent legally entitles its
owner to exclude all others from making or selling the patented product, such that the
patent owner can and typically does charge a premium price. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §
271(a) (2000) (providing that a patent grants its owner the right to exclude all others
from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention for the
term of the patent). Although the costs of patented drugs are not the only factor
impacting access to medicine, such costs can often be a major barrier to developing
countries with minimal funds. See, e.g., World Health Organization, Intellectual
Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health, Report by the Secretariat, at 4, A56/17
(May 12, 2003), available at http://www.who.int/phi/A5617.pdf (noting that drug prices
are a highly significant factor determining lack of access to essential medicines in
developing countries); see also Jakkrit Kuanpoth, TRIPS-Plus Intellectual Property
Rules: Impact on Thailand's Public Health, 9 J. W. INTELL. PROP. 573, 580-81 (2006)
(noting the price of antiretrovirals (ARV) as a factor in the accessibility of HIV treatment
in Thailand).
17 For example, until recently India did not provide patents on medical products,
enabling it to legally make generic versions of drugs and sell them to other countries that
did not provide for patent protection. See also Janice Mueller, The Tiger Awakens, The
Tumultuous Transformation of India's Patent System and the Rise of Indian
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 PITT. L. REv. 491, 495 (2007). Compare The Patents
(Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005 (India), ch. II, 3, available at
http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patents.htm (not excluding all medical
inventions from the scope of patentable invention) with The Patent Act, No. 39 of 1970
(India), ch. II, 5, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/ (excluding patents "claiming
substances intended for use, or capable of being used, as food or as medicine or a drug").
18 See, e.g., M~dicins Sans Frontires, Will the Lifeline of Affordable Medicines for
Poor Countries be Cut?: Consequences of Medicines Patenting in India, Feb. 2005,
http://msf fr/drive/2005-02-01 -msf.pdf.
19 See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC,
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possible avenue to achieve lower-cost, but necessary HIV drugs in
a post-TRIPS world.2 °
Thailand's licenses provide a useful lens for considering
whether TRIPS permits middle-income countries not only to
utilize compulsory licenses as a general matter, but also to use
such licenses to treat non-communicable yet life-threatening
diseases. There is currently substantial opposition by drug
companies to the idea of middle-income countries using
compulsory licenses in general and especially for conditions
beyond HIV.2' The World Health Organization (WHO), however,
has noted that non-communicable diseases, such as heart disease
and cancer, are a leading cause of death in low- and middle-
income countries.22 Although there is a common perception that
middle-income countries that wish to use compulsory licenses are
getting a free ride when they could afford the full fare,23 this
SELECTION OF ANTIRETROVIRAL MEDICATIONS PROVIDED UNDER U.S. EMERGENCY PLAN
Is LIMITED 6 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05133.pdf; Marta
Darder & Andrew Boulle, Second-line ARV Treatment: Unaffordable Luxury?,
MtDICfNS SANS FRONTItRES, July 11, 2004, at 3, available at http://www.msf.org/
msfintemational/invoke.cfm?objectid=F510B9F6-920E-42A3-BF9C6FDC72A65DA8&
component=-toolkit.article&method=fullhtml&CFID=8240915&CFTOKEN=80683592.
In addition, in resource-limited countries, patients may be more likely to become
resistant to ARV drugs because of an inadequately potent initial drug or interruption of
treatment, although the WHO is working to achieve a unified global strategy to prevent
unnecessary resistance. See Diane E. Bennett et al., The World Health Organization's
Global Strategy for Prevention and Assessment of HIV Drug Resistance, 13 Supp. 2
ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY 1, at 2 (2008), available at https://www.who.int/
hiv/drugresistance/WHOHIVDR_ strategy.pdf.
20 Even if compulsory licensing is permissible, there are additional complications.
For example, not every country has the resources to manufacture generic versions of
drugs.
21 See infra notes 249-253 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to Thai
license of heart drug Plavix).
22 World Health Organization, Prevention and Control of NonCommunicable
Diseases: Implementation of the Global Strategy, Report by the Secretariat, at 1, EB
120/22 (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files
/EB120/bl20 22-en.pdf [hereinafter Prevention and Control of NonCommunicable
Diseases] (noting that chronic non-communicable diseases constituted eighty percent of
deaths in low- and middle-income countries in 2005 and are estimated to increase
seventeen percent in the next decade); see also Kevin Outterson, Should Access to
Medicines and TRIPS Flexibilities Be Limited to Specific Diseases?, 34 AM. J.L. & MED.
279, 283, 290-91 (2008) (noting that contrary to popular belief, non-communicable
diseases, including cardiovascular disease and cancer represent a significant and ever-
increasing role in developing countries).
23 See, e.g., Roger Bate & Kathryn Boateng, Drug Pricing and its Discontents,
HEALTH POL'Y OUTLOOK No. 9, Aug. 2007, at 2 (suggesting that middle-income
countries are generally unwilling to pay their share of the cost of research and
development); Drug Patent Piracy, supra note 1 (suggesting that Thailand is financially
well-off with a reasonably large economy, such that compulsory licenses are simply a
free-ride); Sally Pipes, Thailand's Misuse of Compulsory Licensing Allowed Corrupt
Officials to Steal Millions, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 13A (asserting that
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perception does not match reality. In most such countries, there is
a wide disparity in income, with a small percentage of the
population able to afford premium costs for drugs while the rest of
the population remains uninsured and therefore paying more per
capita than most citizens in wealthy countries.24 For example, in
Thailand, where the bottom twenty-five percent of citizens subsist
on less than two dollars a day, Plavix, one of the drugs subject to a
compulsory license, was initially priced at about two dollars per
day." Moreover, the assertion that compulsory licenses will
negatively impact innovation-even if true-is a red herring
because the pertinent question is what the parties agreed to in
TRIPS, which is the current rule of law.
Thailand has thus far maintained six compulsory licenses
despite retaliation from patent owners,26 and political pressure
from the European Union (E.U.) and the United States that
includes the possibility of trade sanctions.27 In addition, other
TRIPS was "never intended to be used by countries that could afford the medicines but
are simply choosing to pay less").
24 See, e.g., Peter Hammer, Differential Pricing of Essential AIDS Drugs: Markets,
Politics and Public Health, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 883, 888 (2002) (noting that only the
wealthiest ten percent of citizens in developing countries typically purchase drugs and
that these drugs are often sold at higher prices than in developed countries because of
lack of economies of scale); see also Ashwan Vasan et al., The Pricing and Procurement
of Antiretroviral Drugs: An Observational Study of Data from the Global Fund, 84
BULL. W. HEALTH ORG. 393, 396 (2006) (noting that lower middle income nations are
often as financially constrained as low income countries because of high levels of
inequality, such that access to antiretroviral therapy may be jeopardized).
25 See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2007/2008-THAILAND, available at http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/datasheets/
cty dsTHA.html; Shiao Yuasan, Thailand Threatens to Expand Generic Drugs for
Cancer, AIDS, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 18, 2007, available at http://www.aegis.
com/news/afp/2007/AF070337.html.
26 Patent owner Abbott responded to a compulsory license by withdrawing six
drugs from the Thai market, including a heat-stable HIV medication that would be
particularly suited to the Thai climate. See, e.g., Ambika Ahuja, Thailand: Abbott
Laboratories Won 't Introduce New Drugs in Thailand Due to Breaking of Patent,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.aegis.com/news/ap/2007/AP070327.
.html; Putting Meaning Back into TRIPS, BANGKOK POST, MAR. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.aegis.org/ news/bp/2007/BP070308.html; Abbott Escalates Thai Patent Rift,
supra note 1, at A9. In addition, patent owner Sanofi-Aventis has threatened legal action
against the Indian drug company Cadila that was to supply low-cost versions of Plavix to
Thailand. Rupali Mukherjee, Pharma Firms Under US Pressure to Stop Generic Sale,
TIMES OF INDIA, Feb. 13, 2008, available at http://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/
articleshow/2777692.cms; C.H. Unnikrishnan, Sanofi in Talks with Thai Govt to Protect
its Patent Right, LIVEMINT.COM, Mar. 13, 2008, http://www.livemint.com/2008/03/131
64842/Sanofi-in-talks-with-Thai-govt.html.
27 The United States has placed Thailand on the "priority watch list" of countries,
which may lead to unilaterally imposed economic sanctions. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVES, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 27 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 SPECIAL 301
REPORT]; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVES, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 36-37
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countries, including Brazil, Indonesia and India, have issued or
have taken steps to issue compulsory licenses of patented drugs to
promote access to medicines.28 Nonetheless, whether Thailand or
other countries may utilize compulsory licenses in the future
remains an important open question and one that is ripe for
objective scholarly inquiry.
This article will use Thailand's licenses to help illustrate the
appropriate scope of compulsory licensing under TRIPS.29 A clear
(2008) [hereinafter 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT]; see also infra notes 386-390 and
accompanying text (discussing Thailand's placement on the priority watch list in the
context of repercussion for compulsory licensing even when there is no actual violation
of TRIPS). In addition, although no other country has taken action towards retaliation,
Switzerland and the E.U. Trade Commissioner have publicly suggested that Thailand's
licenses were inappropriate. AIDE MEMOIRE: COMPULSORY LICENSES IN THAILAND ON
PHARMACEUTICALS UNDER PATENT PROTECTION (Feb. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/l/swiss2thailand cl.pdf [hereinafter Swiss AIDE
MEMOIRE]; Letter from Peter Mandelson, E.U. Trade Comm'r to Krirk-krai Jirapaet,
Thai; Minister of Commerce (July 10, 2007), available at http://www.wcl.
american.edu/pijipstatic/documents/mandelson07102007.pdf?.rd=1 [hereinafter Peter
Mandelson July 10 Letter].
28 See Andrew Jack, Brazil Overrides Merck Patent on HIV Drug, FN. TIMES, May
4, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/c7d3fl f4-fa78-11 db-8bdO-
000b5df10621.html (noting Brazil's compulsory license of Efavirenz); William New,
Indonesia Mulls Compulsory Licenses on Three More HIV/AIDS Drugs, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH, Nov. 26, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=841 (reporting
that Indonesia is contemplating issuing compulsory licenses of three second-line
antiretrovirals); William New, India Cancer Patients Seek To Use Courts For Access To
Patented Drugs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Apr. 3, 2008, http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=989 (noting that Cancer Patients Aid Association is
seeking to declare cancer a national emergency, as a first step towards issuing a
compulsory license of cancer drugs in India); see also Robert Weissman, Colombia
Health Organizations File For Compulsory License on Lopinavir/ritonavir, ESSENTIAL
ACTION, Jul. 17, 2008, http://www.essentialaction.org/access/index.php?/archives/166-
Columbia-Health-Organization-file-for-compulsory-license-on-lopinavirritonavir.html
(noting that Colombian health organizations are asking the Colombian government to
issue a compulsory license on Abbott's HIV drug Kaletra).
29 This article analyzes Thailand's compliance with TRIPS based on the current
TRIPS rules. Notably, actions cannot currently be brought against countries that do not
violate the literal language of the agreement, otherwise known as non-violation
complaints. TRIPS initially provided a moratorium on such disputes and the 2005 WTO
Ministerial Convention (Hong Kong) extended the moratorium. TRIPS, supra note 7,
art. 64(2) (noting a five year moratorium on non-violation complaints); World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, 45, WT/MIN(05)/DEC
(Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO-e/minist e/minO5 e
/final text e.htm (noting continued moratorium on non-violation complaints while
TRIPS Council continues to study issue); World Trade Organization, Ministerial
Declaration of 14 November 2001, 11.1, WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 20, 2001), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist e/ min01 e/min01 e.htm (stating that
members shall not initiate such complaints while the TRIPS Council continues to study
the issue); see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 340-41 (2d ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2003) (explaining non-violation
complaints). If the moratorium were lifted, there may be an argument that because some
member countries were so desirous of getting patent protection of pharmaceuticals, they
might find exceptions to granting patent protection, such as compulsory licenses, to
nullify or impair the benefit of patent protection. However, this provision was
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understanding of TRIPS is particularly important because despite
extensive criticism and political pressure, no country has formally
challenged Thailand under the WTO system; in addition, a
challenge seems unlikely because challenges are often the function
of political considerations.3 ° In the meantime, the lack of a
definitive interpretation of the appropriate scope of compulsory
licensing by a WTO panel leaves an interpretative vacuum that
may allow incorrect perceptions to flourish.3 Using the facts of
Thailand's licenses to help better define current controversial
terms and conditions, this article conducts a careful evaluation of
TRIPS requirements, especially with regard to when prior
contentious at the time TRIPS was signed and there seems to be continued resistance.
See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 488-49 (2007) [hereinafter CORREA 2007]; see also Haochen Sun, TRIPS and
Non-Violation Complaints-From a Public Health Perspective, available at
http://www.cid.harvard.edulcidtrade/Papers/Sun-TRIPS.pdf (noting particular concern
for implications on public health of permitting non-violation complaints).
30 Although the United States and the E.U. have pressured Thailand, they are not
intent on following the political pressure with a formal WTO challenge. Sarah
Rimmington, Briefing Note: EU Confirms The Legality of Thai Generic Medicines
Policy; Denies Threatening WTO Litigation, ESSENTIAL ACTION, Mar. 12, 2008,
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2008-March/012329.html; Sarah
Rimmington, Inside U.S. Trade: USTR Not Preparing Case Against Thailand For
Compulsory Licenses, ESSENTIAL ACTION, Feb. 29, 2008, http://lists.essential.org/
pipermail/ip-health/2008-February/0 1 2260.html.
31 Although there is an existing body of literature discussing TRIPS Article 3 1,
most of the scholarship focuses on an important but distinct issue from that posed by
Thailand; namely how the TRIPS requirement that compulsory licenses be used for
"predominantly domestic use" can be overcome so that least developed countries without
resources to manufacture generic drugs can effectively use compulsory licenses. See,
e.g., World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health of 14 November 2001, 6, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002)
[hereinafter Doha Public Health Declaration]. There is an existing, albeit complicated,
waiver of this provision of TRIPS, but there remains controversy. See, e.g., General
Council Decision of 30 August 2003, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003)
[hereinafter 2003 General Council Decision]; Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H.
Reichmann, The Doha Round's Public Health Legacy, 10 J. INT'L ECON. LAW 921, 956
(2007). Meanwhile the more general requirements of compulsory licenses that apply in
all cases have been largely overlooked. There are a few notable exceptions that provide
some analysis of aspects of Article 31, but none that provide a comprehensive
interpretation of all the requirements. See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Compulsory Licensing and
the Duty of Good Faith in TRIPS, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1553-54 (2003); Daniel
Cahoy, Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha, 42 GA. L. REV. 131,
138-47 (focusing almost exclusively on remuneration issue); Outterson, supra note 22,
passim (providing detailed explanation for why Article 31 is not limited to some types of
diseases); Daya Shanker, Korea, The Pharmaceutical Industry and Non-commercial Use
of Compulsory Licenses in TRIPS (Univ. of Wollongong Econ. Working Paper Series,
WP 03-15, December 2003), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=438880 (focusing exclusively on public non-commercial use
issue); Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: "Adequate Remuneration" For Non-
Voluntary Patent Licensing, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 927 passim (2008) (focusing on
meaning of adequate remuneration).
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negotiations with the patent owner may be waived. In addition,
this article highlights terms that need further clarification but have
thus far escaped serious consideration. This article also notes
some important considerations beyond the scope of TRIPS that
should be considered before issuing a compulsory license,
including retaliation by drug companies and nations where those
companies reside. The article concludes by suggesting that there
may be some fundamentally different perspectives of patents that
help explain the current controversy, as well as lay the foundation
for future solutions.
Part II begins by providing background to fundamental patent
law concepts, as well as the patent requirements that nations must
now provide under TRIPS. Part III introduces and interprets
Article 31 of TRIPS, the currently contested provision regarding
compulsory licensing. Part IV provides details on the contested
Thai compulsory licenses against the broader framework of the
Thai health care system, together with global criticism of
Thailand's actions. Part V then analyzes whether Thailand's
licenses are consistent with the TRIPS and also uses the licenses
as an illustrative vehicle to shed interpretive light on provisions of
TRIPS that are not directly pertinent to Thailand but nonetheless
subject to current confusion. Part VI moves beyond the TRIPS
analysis to consider additional issues involved with compulsory
licensing and concludes with suggestions for how to bring greater
clarity as well as global consensus to the issue of compulsory
licensing.
II. Background
A. Patent Fundamentals
A patent is an official document granted by a nation that
conveys certain legal rights. In particular, a patent owner typically
can exclude others from using the patented invention for a limited
time-usually less than twenty years.32 A patent does not grant an
absolute right to use an invention-other laws may restrict use or
impose additional regulations before an invention may be sold.33
32 See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 33 (noting that term of patent protection for
all WTO countries); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (providing term for US patents).
33 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (providing patent owners with the right to
exclude, but not an affirmative right to use the patented invention).
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For example, before a patented drug can be sold, a government
agency must typically determine whether it is safe and effective.34
Nonetheless, the ability to exclude others from an invention
usually enables a patent owner to charge a premium price for the
patented invention.35
Countries are more likely to grant patents when they achieve a
certain level of economic development; however, even then, there
is not uniformity.36 A frequently stated policy justification for
providing patents is that they provide a necessary incentive or
reward for research that ultimately benefits society by promoting
innovation that is shared with the public (because patents are
public documents) rather than kept secret.37 To help ensure that
patents promote social welfare, many nations utilize common
exceptions to the default patent rights to promote other social
goals. Compulsory licenses, for example, are commonly utilized
to promote public health and welfare.38
Although few consider patents a perfect tool for innovation,
even critics understand that they are legal and business realities,39
with criticisms focused on modifications of the existing system
rather than whole-sale elimination of patents altogether.4" Patents
34 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000) (approval of new drugs in the United States).
35 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (providing patent owners with the right to
exclude all others from patented invention). Although patented drugs are more
expensive than generics, the cost of even patented drugs may be mediated by a variety of
mechanisms, including price caps, reference pricing, as well as government-negotiated
lower prices. See, e.g., GRETCHEN A. JACOBSON, PHARMACEUTICAL COSTS: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON FOR GOVERNMENT POLICIES (Cong. Res. Service 2007)
(providing overview of strategies used by different governments to contain drug costs).
36 For example, some industrialized countries, including Japan, Switzerland and
Italy, did not provide patents for drug products until the late 1970s. See, e.g., F.M.
Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry and World Intellectual Property Standards, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2247-50 (2002).
37 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. ThunderCraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 149
(1989) (noting that patents are a "carefully crafted bargain" that encourages innovation);
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (noting that patent protection "may
determine whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by
want of incentives").
38 See, e.g., REICHMANN WITH HASENZAHL, supra note 3, at 11-12.
39 See, e.g., KEVIN RIVETrE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC 122-23
(2000); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 2 MGMT. SCI. 17,
176-77 (1986) (noting that patenting is common even for industries that do not consider
patents as crucial to commercialization).
40 A number of recent studies of the patent system have found flaws and suggested
reforms, but none have suggested entirely eliminating patents. See, e.g., FED. TRADE
COMM., To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT
LAW AND POLICY (2003); NAT'L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM
FOR THE 2 1sT CENTURY 18-39 (Merrill et al. eds. 2004); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH,
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are a legal reality under TRIPS as discussed in the next section. In
addition, patents are a business reality, as many businesses,
especially pharmaceutical companies, rely on patents as part of
their business plan.41 Such companies typically state that the high
costs of drug discovery make patent protection for the few
successful drugs critical because higher prices for patented drugs
are needed to subsidize the expensive development process.42
Accordingly, the question is not whether or not to grant patents in
general, but rather how patents can be balanced against other
socially desirable goals, such as access to medicine.43 A further
PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 9 (2006) [hereinafter
WHO COMMISSION STUDY]; see also S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN
ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, STUDY No. 15 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (reporting study
by Fritz Malchup) ("If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting
one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on
the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it."). In addition, in
response to public criticisms of the U.S. patent system, there have been bills to reform,
but not eliminate the system. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong.
(2008); Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 1908 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Committee on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. (2007).
41 See Mansfield, supra note 39, at 174-75; Richard Levin et al., Appropriating the
Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
DEV. 783, 796 (1987); Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting their Intellectual
Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why US Manufacturing Firms Patent (or not)
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, Feb. 2000).
42 See, e.g., PHRMA, WHAT GOES INTO THE COST OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 2-3
(2005), available at http://www.phrma.org/files/Cost of Prescription Drugs.pdf
(discussing cost of drug discovery); Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost
of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
469, 475 (2007) (reporting that the estimated cost of drug discovery is as high as $1.3
billion); Bruce Jaspen, Abbott Defends Price Boost on AIDS Drug at US Hearing, CHIC.
TRIB., May 26, 2004, at CI (noting that Abbott defended 400% price hike on AIDS
treatment Norvir by stating that it was undervalued in the market and that expected
revenues would help foster research of other drugs); cf Levin et al., supra note 41, at
783-90 (noting that patents are of particular importance to the pharmaceutical industry).
But see MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES 37-46 (2004) (suggesting
that the popularly recited numbers are over-inflated and only represent a small segment
of the most expensive drugs, rather than an average of all drugs); Donald W. Light, Book
Review, Misleading Congress about Drug Development, 32 HEALTH POL'Y & L. 895,
895 (2007) (criticizing Congressional Budget Office study for failing to critically review
DiMasi Study's contentions).
43 There are two principle points at which patents can be modified to promote
short-term access to medicine-either by limiting the scope of patentable subject matter
or by limiting patent rights. Countries have used both options in their patent laws. See,
e.g., 35 U.S.C. 287(c) (providing immunity to medical practitioners for infringement of a
patented medical activity); European Patent Convention, art. 53(c), October 5, 1973, 13
I.L.M. 268 (2000) (precluding methods of treatment of humans and animals from
patentability); The Patent Act, No. 39 of 1970 (India), ch. II, 5, available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/ (excluding patents "claiming substances intended for use, or
capable of being used, as food or as medicine or a drug"). See also REICHMANN WITH
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question addressed in the next section is how to achieve the
balance under the international rules of TRIPS.
B. Patents Under TRIPS
1. Overview of Requirements
Under TRIPS, all WTO members must provide minimum
levels of patent protection," enforceable through the highly
effective WTO dispute resolution procedure.45 While individual
nations still issue their own patents, they must generally provide
patents for inventions that are new, involve an inventive step, and
are capable of industrial application,46 subject to a few exceptions
not pertinent here.47  In addition to specifying the general
requirements for patentability, TRIPS prohibits countries from
excluding entire classes of inventions from the scope of
patentability-such as all drugs-because TRIPS requires patents
be provided without discrimination based upon technology.48 In
addition, TRIPS also requires that nations provide patent owners
HASENZAHL, supra note 3, at 33-34 (noting that in the past, Canadian laws only
permitted patents on drug processes but not products, and broadly allowed compulsory
licenses to manufacture drugs as a way to increase public access to low cost drugs).
44 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 27 (setting forth basic patent requirements); id. art. 1.1
(noting that members may provide more protection than required under TRIPS).
Although least-developed countries must eventually comply with all TRIPS provisions,
they do not have to fully comply until 2016. Extension of the Transition Period, supra
note 14.
45 If members fail to amicably settle the disagreement on their own, there is a
quasi-judicial process under the WTO for determining whether a violation has occurred.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M, 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
Even more importantly, decisions have "teeth" in that the breadth of WTO agreements
enables the WTO to enforce decisions by withdrawing privileges under other WTO
agreements. United States-Measures Affecting The Cross-Border Supply Of Gambling
And Betting Services, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007) (permitting Antigua to suspend
copyright provisions of TRIPS as retaliation against the United States who was
previously determined to violate a different WTO agreement-the General Agreement
on Trade in Services-and had failed to comply with a prior WTO panel decision).
Agreements under the WTO that are enforceable via the DSU are considered the most
effective means of enforcing international law. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss &
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and
Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 276-77 (1997); Laurence Helfer,
Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual
Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (2004).
46 See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 27(1).
47 Patents on living matter, methods of treatment and immoral inventions, may be
excluded. Id. art. 27(2)-(3).
48 Id. art. 27(1).
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with the right to exclude others from making, using, selling,
offering to sell, or importing the patented invention into the
country for the term of the patent.49
TRIPS provides a framework of patent standards, including
exceptions to the usual requirements. For example, although the
general rule is that patent owners have the right to exclude all
others, TRIPS provides two exceptions: one for "limited
exceptions" and another for compulsory licenses." The
compulsory license provision essentially provides a long list of
procedural requirements that must be satisfied for a TRIPS-
compliant license."
2. Impact on Public Health
Whether TRIPS provisions improve or limit access to
medicine is an important question. Proponents of TRIPS argue
that increasing patent protection is necessary to promote
innovation,52 that it will also improve the industrial development
49 Id. art. 28. However, TRIPS is unclear about whether the right to exclude others
from importation includes exports of products first sold under patent in another country;
in other words, does a nation consider patent rights to be internationally exhausted by the
first legitimate sale by the patentee anywhere in the world? Id. art. 6 (stating that the
question of exhaustion of rights is not the subject of disputes).
50 Id. art. 30 (providing for limited exceptions to patent rights); id. art. 31
(providing for exceptions other than those provided under Article 30); see also
CHRISTOPHER GARRISON, EXCEPTIONS TO PATENT RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 19-
41 (UNCTAD/ICSTD 2006), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/
Garrison%20-%2OPatent%2OExceptions%20DC%20-%20Blue%2017.pdf (providing
analysis of TRIPS Article 30).
51 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31.
52 See, e.g., Negotiating Group of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting of 24 March 1987, 4,
MTN.GNG/NG11/1 (noting that greater protection of intellectual property fights was
necessary to provide incentives to innovate); CORREA 2007, supra note 29, at 91 (noting
that proponents of TRIPS emphasized the importance of promoting intellectual property
fights to incentivize innovation); EDWIN MANSFIELD, PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 26 (World Bank 1989); Martin Adelman
& Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits Of The Patent Provision In The TRIPS Agreement:
The Case ofIndia, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 517, 530 (1996) (suggesting that
patent provisions of TRIPS will spur India to innovation). However, because discovery
of new drugs is resource-intensive, simply increasing the strength of patent protection is
unlikely to promote domestic innovation in developing companies. See, e.g.,
COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 22 (2002), available at
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/fmal-report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf (noting that
until a country has relatively high levels of per capita income, strengthening of IP laws
does not spur economic development). In addition, there is doubt as to whether
increasing the strength of patent protection globally will lead to increased global
innovation, or simply increase costs. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO AGREEMENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH: A JOINT STUDY
BY THE WHO AND THE WTO SECRETARIAT 91 (2002), available at
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of countries generally, and that it will increase foreign direct
investment because companies desire strong legal protection for
their inventions. 3  Opponents of TRIPS, on the other hand,
suggest that requiring patents worldwide will unduly increase the
costs of drugs in developing nations and inherently compromise
current access to necessary medication because patented drugs are
typically priced at a premium. 4
Of relevance to the current controversy over compulsory
licenses is that no consensus was ever achieved during the
negotiation of TRIPS concerning the desirability of increased
patent protection or the precise scope of protection-indeed
TRIPS is formulated as a "minimum standards" agreement for
which many required standards are not defined in the agreement.5
In addition, the conclusion of TRIPS does not represent an
agreement whose provisions were in the interest of all signing
countries; rather, developing countries agreed to TRIPS in part to
http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/bookspe/who-wtoe.pdf; Jayashree Watal,
Pharmaceutical Patents, Prices and Welfare Losses: Policy Options for India Under the
WTO TRIPS Agreement, 23 WORLD ECONOMY 733 passim (2000) (evaluating
implication of changes to Indian patent laws as a result of TRIPS and concluding that
prices will increase).
53 See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World.:
Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 698 n.16 (explaining argument that increased intellectual property
protection may increase economic development, while simultaneously critiquing its lack
of empirical basis); Michelle McGrath, The Patent Provisions in TRIPS: Protecting
Reasonable Remuneration for Services Rendered-Or the Latest Development in
Western Colonialism?, 7 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REP. 398, 400 (1996).
54 See Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Issues, the
Uruguay Round Agreement and its Economic Implications, in URUGUAY ROUND AND THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 341, 364-65 (Martin & Winter eds. 1996); Jean 0. Lanjou, The
Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: Heartless Exploitation of the
Poor and Suffering? 6-10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 775,
1997); see also Watal, supra note 52, at 747 (evaluating policy options for India to
minimize welfare losses in light of heightened patent requirements under TRIPS).
Developing countries also questioned whether intellectual property issues should even be
discussed within the context of the GATT/WTO framework. See, e.g., J.H. Reichmarm,
Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT
Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 765 (1989).
55 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 1(1) (providing that members may provide more
protection); id. art. 27 (providing that patents must be granted for "inventions," without
defining what constitutes invention). In fact, prior to the inclusion of intellectual
property standards in TRIPS, developing countries had attempted to revise the Paris
Convention to lower the standards of protection while developed countries attempted to
increase standards. See, e.g., Abdulqawi Yusuf, TRIPS. Background, Principles and
General Provisions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT 5 (Correa & Yusuf 2nd ed., Kluwer Law Int'l 2008); see also
Reichmann, supra note 54, at 817 (providing details of what developing countries hoped
to modify in Paris Convention that helped to move intellectual property from the arena of
WIPO to the WTO).
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obtain greater access to markets for goods and services through the
related WTO agreement. 6 Also, developing countries may have
believed that TRIPS would permit adequate flexibility for
domestic priorities based upon language within TRIPS addressing
the importance of social policy goals beyond promoting patent
rights as well as the inclusion of exceptions to both patentability
and patent rights. 7 For example, as discussed in the next section,
developing countries rejected language that would have
constrained the use of compulsory licenses to a narrow set of
situations. However, since TRIPS was concluded, WTO panels
have interpreted exceptions narrowly in formal dispute
resolutions. 8 In addition, countries such as Thailand face pressure
in defending whether they are within existing exceptions to TRIPS
outside of the formal WTO process. 9
III. Compulsory Licenses Under TRIPS
The pertinent inquiry for a TRIPS analysis should focus not on
the question of whether compulsory licenses might impede
56 See, e.g., Monique Cordray, Gatt vs WIPO?, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 121, 137-41 (1994) (describing effective strategy of moving intellectual property
discussions to the WTO in comparison to the failed attempts to revise the Paris
Convention because of disagreements over compulsory licenses of patents); Ruth L.
Gana, The Myth of Development, the Progress of Rights: Human Rights to Intellectual
Property and Development, 18 LAW & POL'Y 315, 334 (1996) ("[T]he TRIPS Agreement
accomplishes, through the potential threat of economic ostracism, what could not be
accomplished through negotiations independent of the international economic
framework"); Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties of
Adhesion, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 681, 724-38 (2006) (arguing that TRIPS is
analogous to a contract of adhesion of which developing countries had little choice to
accept); Arie Reich, The WTO As a Law-Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 321, 362 (noting that the WTO negotiations succeeded where prior WIPO
negotiations failed because TRIPS was presented as a package deal to which countries
could not resist if they wanted access to global markets).
57 See, e.g., CORREA 2007, supra note 29, at 102-03; Denis Borges Barbosa et al.,
Slouching Towards Development in International Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST.
L. REv. 71, 110 (2007). Another impetus for developing countries to agree to the TRIPS
provisions was a belief that they would no longer be subject to unilateral pressure and
economic sanctions by wealthier countries demanding increased protection of
intellectual property. See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11 (2000); Barbosa et al., supra note 57, at 124;
Reichmann, supra note 54, at 885.
58 See, e.g. Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS 114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents]; Appellate
Body Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products WT/D550/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997); Barbosa et al., supra note 57, at 112-13;
Robert Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in
Dangerous. Times, 3 J. W. INTELL. PROP. 493, 496-98 (2000).
59 See infra note 363-390 and accompanying text (discussing retaliation by drug
companies and countries against Thailand).
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innovation in the abstract, but on whether the licenses are
permissible under TRIPS. In other words, the relevant inquiry is
what TRIPS requires, as opposed to what patent owners desire.
Accordingly, this Part focuses on analyzing the existing and
appropriate legal framework of permissible compulsory licenses
under TRIPS.
This Part explains the appropriate method for TRIPS
interpretation and provides a detailed analysis of individual
requirements of TRIPS Article 31-the pertinent provision
governing compulsory licensing. Although there are a dozen
individual requirements to this provision, this Part will focus on
the most controversial points relevant to the Thai licensing
controversy. In particular, this Part will begin with what subject
matter may be subject to compulsory licensing under TRIPS,
followed by what it means to grant a license on "individual
merits," as well as the scope of the prior negotiation requirement
(including important exceptions to the requirement). In addition,
this Part will discuss certain procedural requirements to
compulsory licenses that are commonly misunderstood, such as
what constitutes "adequate remuneration."
A. Interpretative Framework for TRIPS
To assess whether Thailand is in compliance with the TRIPS
rules for compulsory licensing, it is first important to consider the
proper interpretative framework for TRIPS. If a formal dispute
was brought against Thailand, the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Rules would apply, which require that customary rules of
interpretation of public international law be used to interpret all
WTO agreements, including TRIPS.6" The customary rules, in
turn, apply the Vienna Convention's rules of interpretation, which
give primary weight to the text of a treaty, but also require that the
"ordinary meaning" of the treaty text be interpreted in its
appropriate "context," as well as in light of the treaty's "object and
purpose."61 The appropriate context includes the treaty preamble
60 DSU, supra note 45, art. 3.2; see also Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 7.23, WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24,
1998) (using customary rules of interpretation); Panel Report, United States-Anti-
Dumping Measures, 7.27, WT/DS 184/R (Feb. 28, 2001).
61 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), Mar. 21, 1986, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (stating that "[a] treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose"). Although
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and annexes,62 as well as subsequent agreements between all the
parties of the treaty.63 Unlike interpretation of U.S. statutes,
drafting history is not normally part of the initial context to be
consulted. Rather, such supplementary material may only be used
to confirm a meaning derived from the standard procedure, or to
provide meaning when the standard procedure results in an
ambiguous meaning or an unreasonable result.64
Before addressing the specific elements of Article 31,
clarification is needed about the appropriate "context" against
which Article 31 should be interpreted. Since the Vienna
Convention expressly considers the treaty preamble to be part of
the context, this is a useful starting point. The preamble places the
intellectual property requirements of TRIPS against the backdrop
of reducing distortions to world trade.65 In addition, the preamble
specifically notes the importance of recognizing domestic public
policy objectives that include development.66 The notion of a
balance between producers and users of intellectual property rights
is further discussed under Article 7, labeled "Objectives," which
states that intellectual property rights should be enforced "in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations. ' 67  The type of public policy
all seem to agree that this is the appropriate interpretive framework, a number of scholars
have suggested that in practice, the WTO dispute settlement panels have often
emphasized literal text and given inadequate weight to the broader context. See, e.g.,
Barbosa et al., supra note 57, at 101-02; Susy Frankel, WTO Application of the
Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law to Intellectual Property,
46 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 385 (2005-06); Howse, supra note 58, at 496-501.
62 Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 31(2).
63 Id. art. 31(3); see also Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 58, 7.14
(noting that the appropriate interpretive framework for TRIPS includes not only the
TRIPS agreement, but also any agreement between the parties according to the Vienna
Convention art. 31.2).
64 Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 32. However, some scholars have argued
for broader interpretations of TRIPS that would require interpretation of a disputed
provision in the context of the entire body of relevant international law. See Barbosa et
al., supra note 57, at 102-03; see also Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in
International Law: Praises for the Prohibition against Clinical Isolation in WTO
Dispute Settlement, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 87 passim (1999). Moreover, some scholars
have specifically suggested that an "evolutive interpretive" approach that considers the
changing context and a "vectorial" approach that acknowledges and balances competing
issues be simultaneously applied. Barbosa et al., supra note 57, at 104-13.
65 TRIPS, supra note 7, pmbl. ("[r]ecognizing the underlying public policy
objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including
development and technological objectives").
66 Id.; see also Maggie Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDozo L. REV. 2821, 2836-49 (2006).
67 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 7.
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objective that should be recognized is further clarified in Article 8,
labeled "Principles," which states that in formulating TRIPS-
consistent provisions, members may adopt "measures necessary to
protect public health and nutrition., 68 While Articles 7 and 8 seem
to clearly suggest some type of balance,69 the manner in which that
balance is to be achieved in any given case is less clear; thus far,
WTO panels have not consistently considered Articles 7 and 8, 7o
and the WTO Appellate Body has suggested that appropriate
interpretation and application of these provisions has not yet
occurred.71 Some scholars suggest that because there are multiple
objectives inherent in TRIPS, disputes over the appropriate
interpretation of open-ended TRIPS provisions should give
deference to national law when there is no clear international norm
since TRIPS only provides minimum standards.72
An important question is whether the 2001 Doha Public
Health Declaration (Declaration),73 which explicitly discusses
compulsory licenses, constitutes a subsequent agreement between
the parties that may be considered as part of the appropriate
context in interpreting TRIPS Article 31. 71 If pertinent, the
68 Id. art. 8.
69 See, e.g., CORREA 2007, supra note 29, at 102 (noting that although a WTO
panel has stated that Articles 7 and 8 are important, it failed to elaborate on the
specifics). On the other hand, some have tried to assert that these provisions are simply
hortatory and of no value. See, e.g., id. at 93.
70 See also Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO:
Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT'L L. Rev. 819, 914 (2003) (stating
the WTO panels and Appellate Body have not yet properly applied the preambular
statements, as well as Articles 7 and 8). Compare Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents,
supra note 58, at 51-52 (suggesting that the preamble and Article 7 of TRIPS were not
appropriate contextual guidance regarding the TRIPS article in dispute) with Panel
Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, 6.43, n. 49,
WT/DS 1 60/R (June 15, 2000) (suggesting that TRIPS must be read as a whole).
71 At this point, there is no definitive interpretation from WTO case law. While a
panel mentioned these provisions in Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, the WTO Appellate Body has since suggested that "those articles still await
appropriate interpretation." Appellate Body Report, Canada-Term of Patent
Protection, 101, WT/DS170/ABiR (Sept. 18, 2000).
72 Barbosa et al., supra note 57, at 109-12 (arguing that because Articles 7 and 8
reflect opposing interests, a proper interpretation according to these articles should not
exclude any single approach); Frankel, supra note 61, at 393-94 (noting that for open-
ended terms regarding opposing interests, deference should be given to a disputed
national law in the absence of an international norm, consistent with Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention).
73 Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 31.
74 The Declaration specifically addressed the tension between patents and public
health, including the scope of compulsory licenses. For example, the Declaration stated
that the "TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the
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Declaration provides important clarification that individual
countries have "the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency" with
regard to compulsory licenses.75 Some argue that the Declaration
is a mere political statement of no interpretive weight.76 On the
other hand, scholars who have analyzed this issue generally
conclude that the Declaration is, in fact, a subsequent agreement.77
TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health
and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all." Id. 4.
75 Id. 5(c); see also infra notes 126-132 and accompanying text (providing further
analysis of this phrase).
76 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-U.S. TRADE
POLICY GUIDANCE ON WTO DECLARATION ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES MAY NEED
CLARIFICATION 3 (GAO 2007) (noting that the United States considers the Doha
Declaration to be a political statement that does not modify TRIPS); Press Release,
Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs. of America, WTO Doha Declaration Reaffirms
Value of Intellectual Property Protection (Nov. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases///l4.11.2001.310.cfm (stressing that the
Declaration was a "political statement"); Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative,
Zoellick Says World Has Chosen Path of Hope, Openness, Development and Growth
(Nov. 14, 2001) available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/
2001/November/USTRZoellick SaysWorldHasChosenPathof Hope,_Openness_
DevelopmentGrowth.html (referring to USTR remarks on Doha Public Health
Declaration as a "political signal"). Even some who are sympathetic to the need to
accommodate public health and TRIPS have characterized the Doha Public Health
Declaration as a political statement. See, e.g., Walden Bello, Learning from Doha, Dec.
7-9, 2001, http://www.focusweb.org/publications/2001/leaming-from-doha.html
(suggesting that the importance of the Declaration should not be exaggerated in light of
the fact that some statements are merely political); James Love, Consumer Project on
Technology, Views on the Draft Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, Nov. 13, 2001, http://www.focusweb.org/publications/2001/views-on-draft-
declaration-on-trips-and-health.html (referring to Declaration as a "political statement
that did not modify in any way the TRIPS agreement").
77 See, e.g., CARLOS CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 45 (WHO 2002), available at http://www.who.int
/medicines/areas/policy/WHOEDMPAR 2002.3.pdf; Barbosa et al., supra note 57, at
131-32 (viewing the Doha Public Health Declaration as not only a subsequent
agreement, but one that establishes the right to health as an important right not to be
trumped by provisions of TRIPS in a call for a broader interpretation of evolving
international norms); Steve Chamovitz, The Legal Status of the Doha Declarations, 5 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 207, 211 (2002) (evaluating both the Public Health Declaration, as well
as the Ministerial Declaration and concluding that while their legal category is
ambiguous, they could be considered subsequent agreements by the parties); Frankel,
supra note 61, at 400-01 (using the Doha Health Declaration as an example of a
subsequent agreement between the parties, although also stating that the Declaration
does not necessarily provide more clarity to rules that were already clear); Carmen Otero
Garcia-Castrillon, An Approach to the WTO Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L., 212, 212 (2002) (noting that the
Declaration constitutes a supplementary means of interpretation); James Gathii, The
Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 291, 314-16 (2002)
(evaluating three possible legal categories of the Doha Public Health Declaration and
concluding that at a minimum the Declaration should constitute persuasive soft law and
at its maximum as a subsequent agreement of the parties that has the same status as
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There are a number of factors that support the Declaration's
status as a subsequent agreement. First, the Declaration was
issued after months of negotiations and several competing versions
were proposed.78 A number of scholars point to the fact that the
Declaration was adopted in accordance with proper procedures as
relevant to considering it a subsequent agreement of the parties.79
In addition, the TRIPS Council, an official organ of the WTO
system, has taken action in accord with the Declaration. For
example, the TRIPS Council has acted in accordance with
paragraph seven of the Declaration that requests extending the
compliance period for least-developed countries until January 1,
2016 for full protection of pharmaceutical products.8" Similarly,
the TRIPS Council has also answered the instruction in paragraph
six of the Declaration to find an "expeditious solution" to the
problem of WTO members with inadequate manufacturing
capacities, such that they cannot adequately utilize compulsory
licenses under TRIPS.81 In fact, the directive in paragraph six of
the Declaration has led to a formal amendment proposed by the
TRIPS Council in 2005 that is currently pending approval by
WTO member states.82 For all these reasons, the Declaration
seems to be a subsequent agreement that provides appropriate
context for interpreting Article 31. The remainder of this article
uses the Declaration as an appropriate subsequent agreement to
confirm the meaning of Article 31 .83
TRIPS itself).
78 See, e.g., Proposal from a Group of Developing Countries, Draft Ministerial
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/312 (Oct. 4, 2001),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/TRIPse/mindecdraftw312_e.htm; Council for
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Preambular Language for
Ministerial Declaration, IP/C/W/313 (Oct. 4, 2001); Press Release, World Trade Org.,
TRIPS Council Meeting on Access to Medicine (June 22, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/English/news-e/pres01 e/pr233_e.htm.
79 See, e.g., CORREA, supra note 77, at 24-25 (suggesting that because member
states adopted the Declaration based on their competence to interpret a WTO agreement,
it is immune from challenge); Gathii, supra note 77, at 300-01 (noting that the
Declaration emerged from appropriate and established practice of decision-making by
consensus).
80 Extension of the Transition Period, supra note 14; see also Press Release, World
Trade Org., Council Approved LCD Decision with an Additional Waiver (June 28,
2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres02_e/pr3O le.htm.
81 See 2003 General Council Decision, supra note 31; Doha Public Health
Declaration, supra note 3 1, 6.
82 See 2003 General Council Decision, supra note 31.
83 Even for those who dispute the legal status of the Declaration, it should be noted
that the Declaration is used simply to support interpretation of the actual treaty language
and not relied upon as the sole source.
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B. Article 31 Overview
This section provides an overview of the entirety of Article 31
to give appropriate analytic context for interpretation of specific
provisions of Article 31.84 As noted earlier, customary rules of
interpretation of international law require examining the ordinary
meaning of the treaty text in light of the appropriate context.85
While context extends beyond Article 31 to include the entirety of
TRIPS, it also includes the entirety of the Article 31 provision.86
Accordingly, before attempting to analyze individual aspects of
Article 31, a review of the full text of Article 31 is pertinent.
Article 31 states:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use
[than that permissible under TRIPS Article 30] of
the subject matter of a patent without the
authorization of the right holder, including use by
the government or third parties authorized by the
government, the following provisions shall be
respected:
(a)authorization of such use shall be considered
on its individual merits;
(b)such use may only be permitted if, prior to
such use, the proposed user has made efforts to
obtain authorization from the right holder on
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and
that such efforts have not been successful within a
reasonable period of time. This requirement may be
waived by a Member in the case of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.
In situations of national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder
shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as
reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-
commercial use, where the government or
contractor, without making a patent search, knows
or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid
84 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31.
85 Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 3 1(1).
86 TRIPS, supra note 7.
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patent is or will be used by or for the government,
the right holder shall be informed promptly;
(c)the scope and duration of such use shall be
limited to the purpose for which it was authorized,
and in the case of semi-conductor technology shall
only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy
a practice determined after judicial or administrative
process to be anti-competitive;
(d)such use shall be non-exclusive;
(e)such use shall be non-assignable, except with
that part of the enterprise or goodwill which enjoys
such use;
(f)any such use shall be authorized
predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market of the Member authorizing such use;
(g)authorization for such use shall be liable,
subject to adequate protection of the legitimate
interests of the persons so authorized, to be
terminated if and when the circumstances which led
to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. The
competent authority shall have the authority to
review, upon motivated request, the continued
existence of these circumstances;
(h)the right holder shall be paid adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case,
taking into account the economic value of the
authorization;
(i)the legal validity of any decision relating to
the authorization of such use shall be subject to
judicial review or other independent review by a
distinct higher authority in that Member;
(j)any decision relating to the remuneration
provided in respect of such use shall be subject to
judicial review or other independent review by a
distinct higher authority in that Member;
(k)Members are not obliged to apply the
conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f)
where such use is permitted to remedy a practice
determined after judicial or administrative process
to be anti-competitive... ;
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(1)where such use is authorized to permit the
exploitation of a patent ("the second patent") which
cannot be exploited without infringing another
patent ("the first patent"), the following additional
conditions shall apply... 87
Before addressing individual aspects of Article 31, a few
points may be helpful. First, the many provisions of Article 31
only apply where a member state permits a patent to be used
without authorization from the patent owner; in other words,
Article 31 does not require nations to impose compulsory licenses,
but does impose a number of requirements-noted in provisions
(a)-(1)-if a nation's laws permit such licenses. Second, the
preamble explicitly indicates that this provision applies to use by
either the government or a third party authorized by the
government.88  Therefore, TRIPS permits nations to issue
compulsory licenses not only for governmental manufacture of
patented inventions, but also for a government authorized third
party.89 None of the provisions (a)-(1) further discuss what type of
third party the government may authorize, thus suggesting that the
government is free to license any party.
The bulk of Article 31 relates to procedural requirements
nations must follow to grant TRIPS-compliant compulsory
licenses.9 ° Some provisions are likely to be non-issues in most
cases, including the Thai situation. For example, one requirement
is a compulsory license be non-exclusive, meaning the
government-imposed license does not prevent the patent owner
from licensing other entities; each of the compulsory licenses
issued by Thailand, while controversial on other grounds, were
provided on a non-exclusive basis.91 Similarly, the requirement
that the license be non-assignable is probably a non-issue in most
cases92 because the licensed entity was selected to manufacture a
generic version of the patented drug.93  In addition, the
requirement that patent owners be able to challenge compulsory
87 Id. art. 31.
88 Id.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3 1(d)-(e).
92 See id. art. 31 (e).
93 For example, in the case of Thailand, each of the licenses is to the Government
Pharmaceutical Organization. See, e.g., infra note 201.
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licenses is not an issue with the Thai licenses because national law
explicitly provides for such challenge.94  Moreover, the
requirement that the compulsory license be authorized
"predominantly for supply of the domestic market" is a non-issue
in Thailand's case since the licenses are to supply the Thai
domestic market,95 although it is a key issue for least-developed
countries without the capacity to manufacture their own generic
versions of patented products.96 Other Article 31 requirements are
not relevant for every compulsory license. For example, some
provisions relate to specific situations, such as semi-conductor
technology, compulsory licenses as penalty for anti-competitive
acts, and use of a second patent.97 None of these specific
situations are pertinent to the Thai licenses.
The following sections categorize the many requirements of
Article 31 into a logical order for analyzing the Thai licenses. The
next section addresses what subject matter may be appropriate for
a compulsory license because this is a frequent point of confusion.
Then, it explains Article 31 requirements for how licenses are
issued, including whether prior negotiation with the patent owner
is required. After clarifying the fundamentals of how a license
may be initiated, additional requirements such as requisite
remuneration and the duration of the license are discussed.
C. Permissible Subject Matter
The ordinary meaning of Article 31, the provision on
compulsory licensing, is the starting place for an analysis of what
may be subject to such a license.98 While this provision is quite
lengthy, having over a dozen sub-parts, there is no specific
provision that limits the scope of inventions that may be subject to
94 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31(g), (i), (j); Thai Patent Act B.E. 2322 § 50.
95 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31(f). If a substantial number of the drugs properly
made under compulsory license in Thailand were exported to other countries, there could
be a violation of this provision since the goods would no longer be predominantly for
domestic use. However, to date, this is simply a hypothetical. Nonetheless, it is a
significant concern for major drug companies since there is language concerning re-
importation in the waiver of compulsory license rules for countries without adequate
manufacturing capacities. See 2003 General Council Decision, supra note 31, 1 4
(noting that importing members must take "reasonable measures . . . to prevent re-
exportation").
96 See 2003 General Council Decision, supra note 31; see also Abbott &
Reichmann, supra note 31.
97 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3 1(c), (k), (1).
98 See id. art. 31.
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licensing.99 There is a single provision within this Article that
discusses the subject matter of licenses; however, subject matter is
only mentioned with respect to an additional requirement that
must be imposed only for licenses issued to remedy anti-
competitive action, or licenses on semi-conductor technology and
dependent patents. 100  Importantly, the segregation of these
separate areas suggests that there is no general restriction on what
subject matter may be licensed. 11
The negotiating history of this provision similarly confirms an
interpretation of Article 31 that does not impose any subject matter
restriction. 10 2  In particular, an earlier version contained an
enumerated list of permissible subject matter that could be subject
to licensing. 10 3 These limitations disappeared in the next draft of
the provision.0 4 Accordingly, subject matter limitations were
99 See id.
100 See id. art 3 1(c).
101 JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 321 (2001). In addition, the limitations on the licensing of
semiconductor technology were previously proposed by the United States to apply to all
compulsory licenses. Id.
102 One question raised by a minority of scholars is whether there is anything in the
requirements of the Paris Convention, a global treaty regarding some patent rules, that
would restrict the scope of subject matter that may be subject to compulsory licensing.
See Richard Rozek & Renee Rainey, Broad-Based Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceutical Technologies: Unsound Public Policy, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 463,
468 (2001). Pursuant to TRIPS Article 2, TRIPS does incorporate certain requirements
of the Paris Convention, but that agreement has only limited discussion of compulsory
licenses. The Paris Convention provides that all members "shall have the right" to
provide for compulsory licenses "to prevent the abuses which might result from the
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent." Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, art. 5A(2), July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 305. However, the Paris Convention neither limits licenses to abuses, nor
provides an exhaustive list of what constitutes abuse.
103 In contrast to the current Article 31, the 1990 draft stated that "compulsory
license may only be granted for the following purposes." GERVAIS, supra note 29, at
248. In particular, the six permissible subjects suggested as appropriate to compulsory
licenses include a remedy of an adjudicated competition law, to address a national
emergency, national security or critical peril of life, overriding public interest or the
possibility of exploitation by the government or third parties, dependent patent, or failure
to work an invention. Id. at 246-47.
104 The final version of Article 31 is notably different from prior U.S. proposals that
attempted to restrict compulsory licenses solely to adjudicated violation of competition
laws or to address a declared national emergency. See Draft Agreement on the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from the United States,
GATT Doc. No. MTN.GNG/NG1 l/W/70, at 11, art. 27 (May 11, 1990) [hereinafter
Communication from the United States] (proposing that members utilize compulsory
licenses "only to remedy an adjudicated violation of competition laws, or to address,
only during its existence, a declared emergency"). The United States attempted to limit
compulsory licenses, which it disfavored, from government use for which it wanted wide
discretion in subject matter. WATAL, supra note 101, at 320. The United States
negotiating position was intended to ensure that TRIPS would not require any
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previously considered and rejected in the final version of TRIPS
Article 31. The Doha Public Health Declaration, made subsequent
to the conclusion of TRIPS, confirms that Article 31 does not
impose any subject matter restriction. °5  In particular, the
Declaration clearly states that "[e]ach member has the right to
grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the
grounds upon which such licenses were granted."' 6
D. Individual Merits
A proper interpretation of this requirement begins with the
words of Article 31 itself-that the authorization of a compulsory
license be considered on its "individual merits."'0 7 In particular,
the question is the ordinary meaning of the term "individual
merits" against the broader context of TRIPS. "Individual merits"
suggest that a decision to grant a license should be decided based
on the merits of an individual case, such as a specific patented
drug, as opposed to an entire class of technologies.'0 8  The
remainder of Article 31 supports the concept that each grant of a
compulsory license should be evaluated separately.'0 9  In
particular, considering each license separately would make other
procedural requirements of Article 31 make sense in terms of
modification to existing United States law which enables the government-or those
authorized by the government-to use any patent without authorization of the patent
owner, subject only to subsequent suit for reasonable compensation. See 28 U.S.C. §
1498 (2000). During negotiations, the United States explicitly denied that its laws were
limited to government defense; rather, it stated that its laws' use was unlimited in subject
matter. United States Review of Legislation in the Field of Patents, IP/Q3/USA/I, quest.
4 (May 1, 1998) (asserting that the U.S. provision was not limited to national security).
After failing to persuade other members of any real distinction between government use
and compulsory licenses, both were combined in one text that provides no subject matter
restrictions. Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/W/8, 92 (June 8, 1995);
WATAL, supra note 101, at 320-21.
105 See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 28, 5(b).
106 Id. Indeed, part of the impetus for negotiating the Declaration was that some
developing countries were concerned that anticipated compulsory licenses would be
considered in contravention of TRIPS. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Submission on TRIPS and Public Health by the African Group,
IP/C/W/296 (June 29, 2001).
107 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3 1(a).
108 See, e.g., CORREA 2007, supra note 29, at 320 (noting that license cannot be
granted by subject matter or title-holder because of the requirement for individual
consideration); GERVAIS, supra note 29, at 165 (noting that a compulsory license cannot
cover an entire category of inventions); UNCTAD/ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS
AND DEVELOPMENT 468 (2005) [hereinafter RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS] (noting that
governments should review each application and avoid "blanket authorizations" for
entire technologies or enterprises).
109 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3 1(a).
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enabling legal challenges to a specific license, as well as
challenging the amount of remuneration granted for a given
license.
This interpretation is confirmed by examining the negotiating
history. In particular, India proposed that certain types of subject
matter viewed as especially important to developing countries,
such as patents relating to food and drugs, be automatically
granted a license without the need for individual review.11 '
However, this proposal was not adopted."11 Instead Article 31
requires that each patent be considered separately for compulsory
licensing. '12
E. Prior Negotiation
A licensee usually must engage in prior negotiation with a
patent owner prior to the issuance of a compulsory license.1
13
There are in fact two distinct but related requirements because
while TRIPS typically requires prior negotiation with the patent
owner, it explicitly permits waiver of this requirement in some
situations. 114 This section first explains the default rule of prior
negotiation and then the situations that permit waiver of the
general rule.
1. General Rule
Article 31 states that a compulsory license "may only be
permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts
to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not
been successful within a reasonable period of time." 15 In other
words, the general rule is that there must be prior negotiation with
the patent owner in an attempt to secure a voluntary license before
110 Standards and Principles Concerning the Availability Scope and Use of Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from
India, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/37, 15 (July 10, 1989) [hereinafter Communication from
India] (proposing licenses of right for food, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals separate
from individualized review of compulsory licenses, with no opportunity for
administrative or judicial review).
111 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31.
112 Id. art. 31(a).
113 Id. art. 3 1(b).
114 Id.
115 Id.
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the government imposes a compulsory license.
There are some important interpretive questions concerning
the scope of prior negotiations because key terms are undefined.
In particular, while it is clear that prior negotiation requires an
attempt to negotiate a voluntary license, TRIPS provides no
guidance on what would constitute "reasonable commercial terms
and conditions," or a "reasonable period of time" to negotiate.116
The ordinary meaning of the word "reasonable" suggests that it
depends on the facts of each case and that in emergencies, less
time is necessary to negotiate. However, the length of time that is
reasonable is still undefined." 7 Furthermore, the requirements of
this provision may be viewed differently by patent owners than by
countries interested in compulsory licenses. For example, a patent
owner may only consider terms similar to existing pricing
agreements to be "reasonable." However, even then, there are
questions regarding whether what constitutes "reasonable" should
be compared to all prices offered by a drug company, or the lowest
possible global price, or some other criteria.
2. Waiver of Prior Negotiation Requirement
TRIPS, however, provides an important exception to the
general rule. The subsequent sentence states that "[t]his
requirement [of prior negotiation] may be waived by a Member in
the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use."' 18 In
other words, prior negotiation with the patent owner is not
required by TRIPS in three situations-a national emergency, a
"circumstance of extreme urgency," or public non-commercial
use. 1 19  Any of these three situations permits waiver of
negotiations with the patent owner, contrary to often-cited
statements in the media. 2 0
a. National Emergency or Extreme Urgency
What constitutes a national emergency that would permit
116 Id.
117 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3 1(b).
118 Id. (emphasis added).
119 Id. When prior negotiations are waived, however, the patent owner must be
notified "as soon as reasonably practicable." Id.
120 See infra notes 241-250 and accompanying text (reporting confusion regarding
permissible waiver of prior negotiation).
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waiver of the prior negotiation requirement? TRIPS does not
define national emergency or situation of extreme urgency.
121
However, in this context, the emergency could suggest the need
for an abbreviated response where there is no time for negotiations
with the patent holder.
Another important issue is who assesses whether a national
emergency exists. There is nothing in TRIPS Article 31 to suggest
that anyone other than the country considering a compulsory
license should evaluate what constitutes a national emergency.
122
For example, nothing in the provision suggests that a member state
must seek permission from the WTO or any other authority to
determine whether a national emergency exists. 123 In the absence
of an explicit requirement, it seems appropriate that a member
state has authority to determine what constitutes a national
emergency; after all, this has been the accepted practice for other
TRIPS requirements that are undefined. 124 Of course, as with any
requirement, a nation's initial decision can be challenged within
the WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
125
The Doha Public Health Declaration, as a subsequent
agreement of the parties, confirms that assessing whether a
national emergency exists is solely within the discretion of each
nation. 2' The Declaration states, "each member has the right to
determine what constitutes a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme emergency."'127 Moreover, it states that
"public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national
emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency.' 2 8 In other
words, member states agreed that certain public health crises per
121 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31.
122 Id.
123 See generally id. (providing no requirement that member states seek outside
determination of what constitutes a national emergency).
124 For example, it is uniformly accepted that because TRIPS does not define what
constitutes an "invention," nations have flexibility to use their own interpretations. See,
e.g., CORREA 2007, supra note 29, at 317; see also Jerome H. Reichmann, Securing
Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement after US v. India, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 585, 597
(1998) (stating that the U.S. v. India panel decision "confirms that the developing
countries are free to adopt their own laws and policies with respect to all the intellectual
property issues that were not expressly harmonized in the TRIPS standards themselves").
125 DSU, supra note 45, art. 3(2).
126 Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 31, 5(c).
127 Id.
128 Id.
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se qualify as a national emergency or situation of extreme
urgency.'29
There is a question concerning whether national emergencies
should be limited solely to those conditions specified in the
Declaration. While some countries urge this narrow interpretation,
it is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the Declaration .
30
First, the noted conditions are listed in the same sentence that
declares that member states have the right to determine what
constitutes a national emergency.' Moreover, the sentence that
indicates certain diseases can represent a national emergency has
no words that limit national emergencies to this list; by using the
words "can represent," the list is inclusive.'32
b. Public Non-commercial Use
A currently ambiguous basis for waiving prior negotiations
with the patent owner before authorizing a compulsory license is
for "public non-commercial use.' 3'  TRIPS does not define the
phrase.'34 In addition, public non-commercial use is not given
further clarification in the Doha Public Health Declaration. 35
What is the plain meaning of "public non-commercial use?' 136
The phrase does not have a standard meaning within patent law. 13
Within the context of official disputes argued within the WTO
129 See id.
130 In particular, the United States has contended that these are the only possible
emergencies, while developing countries have argued for a broader interpretation. See,
e.g., MARY MORAN, M~dicins Sans Fronti~res, RENEGING ON DOHA (2003), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/msf052003.pdf; Brook K. Baker, Doha Redux-U.S.
Enters New Phase of Bad Faith Bargaining, CPTECH.ORG, July 2, 2003,
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/hgap07022003.htm; CPTech, Oxfam, & Third World
Network, Deadlock over Scope of Diseases Threatens to Kill Solution, CPTEcH.ORG,
Nov. 27, 2002, http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ngos1272002.html; Chakravarthi
Raghavan, TRIPS Consultations on Implementing Doha Recessed, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK, Nov. 29, 2002, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/5246a.htm.
131 Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 31, 5(c).
132 Id.
133 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3 1(b).
134 See id
135 See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 31 (providing no mention of
public non-commercial use).
136 TRIPS, supra note 7, art 31(b).
137 E. Richard Gold & Daniel K. Lam, Balancing Trade In Patents-Public Non-
Commercial Use and Compulsory Licensing, 6 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 5, 19 (2003)
(noting that the term is not defined under either patent or trade law and suggesting that
because many terms are "fundamentally political compromises," ascertaining a
consistent definition may be difficult).
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dispute settlement system, WTO panels and the Appellate Body
typically consult the Oxford English Dictionary for plain language
meanings of words in interpreting undefined terms of the WTO
and related agreements, such as TRIPS.'38 Accordingly, it is
reasonable to consider how this dictionary defines both "public"
and "noncommercial use." The word "public" is defined as "[o]f
or pertaining to the people as a whole; that belongs to, affects, or
concerns the community or nation; common, national, popular."' 3 9
This definition is sufficiently broad to cover nearly any use
relating to a nation's citizens. Next, the definition of non-
commercial must be defined by considering what would not be
''commercial." Since the word "commercial" means that
something pertains to business or profit, non-commercial would
likely require that the use not be for business or profit. 4 '
However, this does not necessarily end the inquiry. For example,
can a for-profit business be granted a license to make a drug that is
then distributed to the public without a profit?'4 ' In fact, such a
scenario was explicitly contemplated and intended to be covered
under Article 31 by the United States; in particular, the United
States wanted to ensure that it could continue to provide a defacto
license to any government contractor (which included for-profit
companies) to use any patented invention subject only to
subsequent payment.'42 Some scholars assert that a compulsory
license may be granted to a commercial party to use patents on
behalf of the government, citing U.S. practice as an example.' 43
138 See, e.g., United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
WT/DS176/R I, 8.49 (Aug. 6, 2001) [hereinafter United States-Section 211] (citing
New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary for definition of "subject matter"); United
States-Section 211, supra, 8.96 (citing same for definition of "substantiate");
Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 58, 7.30 (citing Oxford English
Dictionary to define meaning of "limited"); Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, supra
note 58, 7.54 (citing Oxford English Dictionary for definition of "normal"); Canada-
Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS170/R, 6.34 (May 5, 2000) (citing Oxford English
Dictionary for meaning of the word "subject matter").
139 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 778 (2d ed. 1989).
140 Id. at 552 (defining commercial as "engaged in commerce; trading").
141 WATAL, supra note 101, at 328; RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS, supra note 108, at
471.
142 See supra note 104 (noting United States attempt to distinguish government
authorized use of patents from compulsory licenses). One commentator suggests that the
phrase "public non-commercial use" was coined to encompass the type of use that is
permitted by the United States under section 1498. JACQUES GORLIN, AN ANALYSIS OF
THE PHARMACEUTICAL RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE WTO-TRIPS INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AGREEMENT 34 (1999).
143 CORREA 2007, supra note 29, at 317.
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The rationale is that the use is exclusively for the public, even if
production is by an entity that may be privately owned.144
Another consideration in the evaluation of "public non-
commercial use" is in connection with other terms that are not
defined under TRIPS. In particular, there is general consensus that
although TRIPS requires each nation to provide patents, nations
are granted freedom to define key terms such as what constitutes
"new," when the terms are undefined in TRIPS. 145  Using this
logic, the lack of a definition of "public non-commercial use"
would seem to suggest that each nation may define the term,
unless and until such definition is clarified in a WTO dispute
settlement proceeding. Indeed, some go so far as to say that the
phrase is a "flexible concept, leaving governments with
considerable flexibility in granting compulsory licenses without
requiring commercial negotiations in advance. 146
If public non-commercial use may be subject to definition by
individual nations, that may potentially encompass a broad range
of activity. On the other hand, this simply means that nations can
determine when to waive prior negotiations with a patent owner
before issuing a compulsory license and does not necessarily mean
that the license is TRIPS compliant. Even if the prior negotiation
requirement is waived for public non-commercial uses, the
compulsory license must still comply with a number of additional
procedural requirements to be consistent with TRIPS, as discussed
in the next section.
F. Procedural Requirements
1. Limited to Authorized Purpose
Another important requirement under Article 31 is that the
scope and duration of a compulsory license be limited "to the
purpose for which it was authorized."'47  Importantly, this
provision does not state that the license must be limited;'48 rather,
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., id. (describing flexibility of term "invention," as well as TRIPS criteria
of patentability); see also Reichmann, supra note 124, at 597 (stating that the U.S. v.
India panel decision "confirms that the developing countries are free to adopt their own
laws and policies with respect to all the intellectual property issues that were not
expressly harmonized in the TRIPS standards themselves").
146 RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS, supra note 108, at 471.
147 Id. art 31(c).
148 Notably, Article 31 does not state that compulsory license is a limited exception
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the license is to be limited to the purpose for which it was
authorized.'49 While this statement may seem obvious, it bears
repetition in light of the fact that some have suggested that
compulsory licenses should be generally limited-a proposition
that is not supported by a careful analysis of the text. 50
An examination of the negotiating history will confirm that
compulsory licenses are not to be limited as a general matter. An
earlier draft stated that "parties shall minimi[z]e the grant of
compulsory licenses in order not to impede adequate protection of
patent rights" as a general qualification on all compulsory
licenses."' 51 However, this language does not appear in the current
version of Article 31,152 suggesting that this language was
considered and rejected in negotiations of the final text; at a
minimum, the disappearance of this language from the final text
supports a conclusion that the final text should not mean
something that was proposed but not included. Accordingly, it
seems that there should be no general presumption against
compulsory licensing.
The important question thus becomes, when are licenses
limited-in scope and duration-with regard to their authorized
purpose? TRIPS does not state how to evaluate this issue or who
should decide. 5 3 Should any scope that is rationally related to the
purpose suffice? In addition, is a determination of appropriate
scope solely within national discretion-subject, of course, to a
challenge by another WTO member under the formal dispute
settlement rules?
One possible reading is that the scope and duration of a license
is limited to the authorized purpose so long as there are no
modifications to the scope or duration of the license after the
license is granted. In other words, if a license is issued initially on
an HIV drug to treat AIDS for two years, a country cannot
to patent rights, in contrast to Article 30. Compare TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31 with
TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 30.
149 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31 (emphasis added).
150 See infra notes 259-267 and accompanying text (noting that some suggest that
compulsory licensing should be generally limited, or only permitted as a matter of "last
resort").
151 See Status of Work in the Negotiating Group: Chairman's Report to the GNG,
GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NGI 11W/76 (July 23, 1990).
152 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31.
153 See id.
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thereafter modify the license by either using the drug to treat other
diseases or automatically extending the license beyond the initial
terms. Similarly, if the initial license specifies that 5000 tablets of
a patented drug may be made, the scope would be violated if a
nation made twice that amount. Such a reading should be fairly
easily satisfied or at least easy to assess since one could readily
compare the license terms with subsequent actions.
An alternative reading would give more substantive meaning
to this clause. In particular, requiring that the scope and duration
of the license be "limited to the purpose for which it was
authorized"'54 could suggest that an initial grant of a license is
only proper if the scope and duration of the terms are limited to
the purpose stated in the license. This requirement would allow a
nation's license to be challenged, for example, if the length of the
license seemed to be longer than the purpose for which the license
was authorized. Similarly, if a compulsory license was issued for
a limited viral epidemic, such as the periodically threatened avian
flu, a compulsory license might need to be limited in duration to
the period necessary to contain the disease.
While the second reading may at first blush suggest greater
scrutiny, even that reading provides substantial leeway to member
states. Importantly, there is nothing in the clause suggesting that
the license must use least restrictive means, or that the patent
owner's rights be balanced, unlike other provisions in the WTO.155
Similarly, the language states that the scope and duration is limited
to the purpose for which it was authorized, but does not suggest
that anyone other than the member state authorizing the
compulsory license be permitted to second guess that
authorization.156 A WTO panel could theoretically impose such an
interpretation based on its reading of TRIPS.'57 However, a plain
154 See id.
155 Compare id. with TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 30 (requiring that patent owners
rights be balanced against other interests); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Annex IA, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125, art. 2, 2.2-2.3 (1994); Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, art. 5 , 6 (1994) (requiring that
members take least trade restrictive actions).
156 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 30.
157 Although WTO panels are technically not permitted to create new law, their
interpretation of ambiguous terms can nonetheless permit the WTO some leeway in its
interpretation of laws pursuant to the DSU. See also supra note 64 (suggesting that
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reading of the clause does not suggest that the limitation should be
evaluated based upon an objective criterion.' For example, the
clause does not require that the license be limited to a "legitimate"
purpose-a term that does appear in the only other exception to
patent rights-which might suggest an independent assessment.159
Assuming that the lack of the use of "legitimate" in this clause was
intentional, presumably no such independent evaluation of the
"authorized purpose" is permissible. After all, the entirety of the
clause focuses on whether the scope and duration is limited to the
authorized purpose and not whether the scope and duration is
limited to a legitimate purpose.16 Permitting member states to
make their own assessment on whether a license is "limited to the
purpose to which it was authorized" seems consistent with other
TRIPS provisions, such as requirements for patentability, that do
not provide explicit definitions for member states. 161 In addition,
this interpretation would seem consistent with the balance of
interests expressed in TRIPS Articles 7 and 8.162
2. Adequate Remuneration
Another important issue is what constitutes "adequate
remuneration" for a compulsory license.163  As with the other
provisions of Article 31, the proper starting place is the ordinary
meaning of the TRIPS provisions. TRIPS provides that the patent
owner shall be paid "adequate remuneration in the circumstances
of each case, taking into account the economic value of the
authorization."'" TRIPS does not provide any further explanation
of how to evaluate this phrase. 165 Notably, the clause states the
economic value should be taken into account, but does not state
that the remuneration is based solely on the economic value. 166
The sparse language of this provision makes the definition of
WTO panels take a broader interpretation of TRIPS). See generally, DSU, supra note
45, art. 3(2).
158 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31.
159 Compare id. with id. art. 30.
160 Id. art. 31.
161 See id.; see also supra note 147 and accompanying text (explaining that nations
have flexibility to define terms left undefined in TRIPS).
162 See id. art. 7-8.
163 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3 1(h).
164 Id.
165 Seeid. art. 31.
166 See id. art. 31(h).
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"adequate" important. The ordinary meaning of adequate means
something that is acceptable or satisfactory; however, by
definition, "adequate" is not ideal, or even the most preferred
option.'67 In addition, what does it mean to take into account the
"economic value of the authorization?"' 6 8 Is the economic value
the value to the country imposing the license, or the value to the
patent owner?
Since the language here is ambiguous, consulting prior
negotiating texts seems appropriate. Earlier drafts proposed a
variety of different standards,'69 including the following:
''remuneration to the right holder adequate to compensate the
right holder fully for the license"' 7 °
"an equitable remuneration to the right holder corresponding to
the economic value of the licen[s]e"''
"payment commensurate with the value of the invention '
"appropriately compensated" '
"fair and equitable" or "adequate" remuneration."'
The choice of the term "adequate remuneration" in the final
text of TRIPS over the other terms suggests that the other
definitions were considered and rejected, or at a minimum that the
final language was chosen instead of other alternatives such that it
should not be interpreted as synonymous with language that was
167 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 139, at 150 (defining adequate as
"equal in magnitude or extent; commensurate; neither more nor less").
168 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3 1(h).
169 Some countries did not propose any language about what type of remuneration
should be provided the patent owner; rather, they simply required that the patent owner
be provided compensation that could be subject to legal review. See, e.g., Negotiating
Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Proposal by the Nordic Countries for the Negotiations on Standards
and Principles for the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
MTN.GNG/NG11 /W36, at 3 (Jul. 10, 1989).
170 See Communication from the United States, supra note 104, at 11, art. 27.
171 See Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property,
Communication from the European Communities, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG 11/W/68,
art. 26 (Mar. 29, 1990).
172 Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Standards and Principles Concerning the
Availability, Scope and Use of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights,
Communication from Switzerland, MTN.GNG/NG11 /W/38, at 4 (Jul. 11, 1989).
173 Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Suggestion by Japan for Achieving the
Negotiating Objective, MTN.GNG/NG 1 I/W/17, at 6 (Nov. 23, 1987).
174 GERVAIS, supra note 29, at 246 (language from Brussels Draft).
Vol. XXXIV
PATENT BREAKING OR BALANCING?
abandoned.175 It is possible to consider the meaning of the other
terms to help define how "adequate" is different than these
provisions. However, this task is still somewhat challenging
because these terms may have different interpretations depending
on who is analyzing them. For example, a "fair and equitable"
remuneration would likely be viewed differently by a patent owner
than by a country issuing a compulsory license.'76 Nonetheless,
the rejection of one proposed standard in particular may be
helpful-the suggestion that the remuneration compensate the
right holder "fully" for the license. Rejection of this standard may
suggest that the current provision is not intended to fully
compensate the right holder-at least at prevailing market rates in
the most profitable countries.
There seems to be a need to consider the value of the license to
both the licensee as well as the patent owner since Article 31
requires that the license take into account the "economic value of
the authorization., 177 However, this does not necessarily settle the
question since the economic value will be measured differently by
the patent owner compared to the country imposing the license.
With no clear limits, the interpretation of what constitutes
adequate remuneration seems left to the discretion of national
authorities, subject only to potential review within the WTO
system. 17' Because there is no definition in TRIPS, nations
arguably have discretion to choose from a wide variety of options
as noted in a thorough report prepared by James Love for the
175 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3 1(h).
176 Thailand provides an excellent example of differing perspectives. Thailand has
publicly announced its royalty scheme and seems to believe the amount provided is more
than adequate. See, e.g., TEN BURNING ISSUES---GVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra
note 10, at 11 (noting that the presumptive royalty rate has been set at between one-half
to two percent of sale consistent with the range in most developing countries for public
non-commercial use, and that the fees can be negotiated); see also id. at 6 (suggesting
that if patent holders voluntarily produce prices within five percent of generic
competitors, Thailand will not impose compulsory licenses to "reward the loyalty" of
patent owners). Drug companies and their supporters, on the other hand, seem to find
any compulsory license to be a problem. See, e.g., Drug Patent Piracy, supra note 1
(suggesting that no royalty would be adequate since "compulsory licenses . . . almost
always leave the rights holder with far less than a reasonable economic return").
177 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31(h). Although not directly relevant to
interpretation of remuneration under Article 31 generally, the General Council decision
regarding countries without adequate facilities to produce patented drugs under
compulsory license states that adequate remuneration should "take into account the
economic value to the importing member of the use." 2003 General Council Decision,
supra note 3 1, 3.
178 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3 1(h).
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WHO. 17 9 In addition, WTO panels cannot create new law.180 As
stated by one commentator, "no guidelines have been given under
TRIPS and none can be imposed arbitrarily by commentators in
interpretation."' 181 It seems that Article 31 may enable countries to
impose a price through compulsory licensing that the country
could not obtain through voluntary negotiations.'82
G. Recap ofArticle 31 Requirements
Before moving on to the case study of Thailand's licenses, a
brief recap of the relevant requirements of TRIPS provisions may
be useful. TRIPS permits any member state to issue a compulsory
license for any patented invention.8 3  Article 31 provides no
restrictions on the subject matter that may be licensed, as
confirmed by the Doha Public Health Declaration.8 4 Rather than
dictate specific inventions that may be licensed, TRIPS imposes
procedural requirements.'85 For example, a compulsory license
can only be issued based on consideration of its "individual
merits," such that broad licensing of classes of inventions would
be impermissible.'86  In addition, prior to imposition of a
compulsory license the patent owner must typically be consulted
first in hopes of securing a voluntary license.8 7 However, no such
consultation is required if there is a national emergency, other
179 WHO, REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, HEALTH ECONOMICS AND DRUGS 5 (WHO 2005) [hereinafter
WHO-REMUNERATION GUIDELINES].
180 See DSU, supra note 45, art. 3(2) (noting that rulings can not "add to or
diminish" rights and obligations under WTO agreements).
181 WATAL,SUpra note 101, at 326.
182 Professor Reichmann has argued that "any government that seeks to bring a
patentee's practices into line with its own policies, especially with regard to disciplining
the prices at which the patented articles are to be locally distributed, can achieve its aims
within the confines of Article 3 ." REICHMANN WITH HASENZAHL, supra note 3, at 15.
In addition, the UNCTAD Resource Book on TRIPS goes even further in suggesting that
a developing country granting a license to address a public health crisis affecting a
substantial portion of the population could justify payment of a "minimal royalty."
RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS, supra note 108, at 476-77.
183 See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text (explaining that a proper
interpretation of TRIPS provides no subject matter restrictions for compulsory licenses).
184 See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 31; see also supra notes 105-
106 and accompanying text.
185 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31.
186 See id. art. 31(a); see also supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text
(explaining requirement).
187 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31(b); see also supra notes 113-117 and
accompanying text (describing general rule).
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situations of extreme urgency, or public non-commercial use."'
The Doha Public Health Declaration verifies that member states
are within their rights to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or situation of extreme urgency. 8 9 What constitutes a
public non-commercial use is more ambiguous and subject to
differing views; critics assume a license to a for-profit entity could
fail to constitute public non-commercial use.19 °
Article 31 also requires that the scope and duration of the
license be limited to its authorized purpose, which is different than
requiring that licenses be limited.19' This provision has caused
some confusion, but if properly interpreted most licenses should
easily satisfy this provision. The appropriate royalty, on the other
hand, may be challenging to assess. TRIPS requires that the
patent owner be paid "adequate remuneration in the circumstances
of each case, taking into account the economic value of the
authorization," but with no guidance for how to do so.192
IV. Thailand's Compulsory Licenses
A. Chronology
Thailand has a national mandate to provide universal access to
essential medicine to all its citizens pursuant to the National
Health Security Act of 2002 and access to antiretrovirals for all
AIDS patients since 2003.193 While some suggest that universal
access to necessary drugs was a mere populist measure,' 94 others
including the WHO praise Thailand as a leader in providing
188 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31(b); see also supra notes 118-120 and
accompanying text.
189 See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 31; see also supra notes 122-
129 and accompanying text.
190 See infra notes 255-258 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 133-146
and accompanying text (discussing proper interpretation of requirement).
191 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31; see also supra notes 147-152 and
accompanying text.
192 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31(h); see also supra notes 148-152 and
accompanying text.
193 Thai National Health Security Act B.E. 2245; see also Thai Constitution B.E.
2250, § 51 (noting that "a person shall enjoy an equal right to receive standard public
health").
194 See, e.g., James Hookway & Nicholas Zamiska, Harsh Medicine: Thai
Showdown Spotlights Threat to Drug Patents, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2007, at 1
(suggesting that Thailand is using populist rhetoric and policies to curry favor with the
Thai people).
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treatment for HIV patients.'95 However, the WHO and the World
Bank predict that Thailand will face dramatic price increases in
treating their HIV population because HIV patients normally
become resistant to initial treatments and need to switch to newer,
patented drugs.'96 In fact the World Bank specifically notes that
compulsory licenses of second-line HIV treatment would be one
way for Thailand to provide cost-effective treatment, 197 although it
recognizes that it will require "high-level political commitment" to
deal with the implications.'98
Thailand issued compulsory licenses to achieve its mandate of
providing access to essential drugs, including antiretroviral drugs
that cannot otherwise be provided despite increases in the public
health budget 99 after years of negotiation with patent owners that
failed to yield price cuts beyond the level of currency
appreciation."' Although Thailand asserts that it engaged in prior
negotiations with the patent owners, each of its compulsory
licenses stated that it could grant compulsory licenses without
prior negotiations in the case of public use based on the "right to..
.protect•., public health" as supported by the Doha Public Health
Declaration. z"' The licenses were issued to cover only Thai
195 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, EXTERNAL REVIEW OF THE HEALTH SECTOR
RESPONSE TO HIV/AIDS IN THAILAND 35-36 (WHO 2005), available at
http://www.searo.who.intLinkFiles/News-andEventsThailandProgrammeReviewNE
W.pdf [hereinafter EXTERNAL REVIEW]. Doctors Without Borders described Thailand as
having "one of the gold standard treatment programs for the developing world." Kazmin
& Jack, supra note 1; see also Press Release, MSF, supra note 10 (praising Thailand's
action and suggesting that other nations follow suit).
196 See ANA REVENGA ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, THE ECONOMICS OF EFFECTIVE
AIDS TREATMENT: EVALUATING POLICY OPTIONS FOR THAILAND 169 (2006), available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICE
XT/EXTEAPREGTOPHEANUT/EXTEAPREGTOPHIVAIDS/O,,contentMDK:210248
79-pagePK:34004173-piPK:34003707-theSitePK:503157,00.html; EXTERNAL REVIEW,
supra note 195, at 36.
197 See REVENGA ET AL., supra note 196, at 36.
198 See id. at 15.
199 Thailand reports that it has increased the overall public health budget to more
than ten percent and that although its spending on antiretrovirals is highest among the
lower middle income developing countries, it still can not satisfy its mandate to provide
universal access. TEN BURNrNG ISSUES--GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note 10,
at 2. On the other hand, others noted that Thailand increased its military budget. See
infra note 264 (suggesting that Thailand's actions are suspect).
200 A division of the Thai government sought lower prices for patented
antiretrovirals, but with no significant price reduction. TEN BURNING ISSUES-
GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note 10, at 5. Although some patent owners
reduced prices in 2006, the reductions were less than twenty percent and reportedly
approximated the level of currency appreciation. Id.
201 Each license stated "member countries have a right to issue a safeguard measure
to protect public health, especially universal access to essential medicines using
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citizens who are supported by government funded insurance and
not the small percent of Thai citizens who are capable of paying
the premium patent prices for the drugs.2 °2 Accordingly, the
licenses should expand revenue for patent owners who can
continue to sell their drugs at a premium to wealthy Thai citizens
in addition to obtaining compulsory license royalties for the drugs
provided to low-income citizens.
On November 29, 2006, Thailand issued a compulsory license
to its Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) on
Merck's patented drug Efavirenz (sold by the patent owner under
the brand name Stocrin), an effective first line treatment for AIDS
that has fewer adverse side effects, including life-threatening side
effects, than the generic antiretroviral Nevirapine. 23  Thailand's
license stated that it was for non-commercial purposes and for the
public interest to help achieve its policy of universal access to
antiretrovirals for the 500,000 Thai citizens that need them for
long-term use. The compulsory license also stated that the high
cost of Efavirenz without a license resulted in many Thai patients
having inadequate access.20 4  The compulsory license was
expected to halve the treatment cost so that more patients could be
covered with the eventual goal of having all new patients treated
with Efavirenz initially, just as patients are treated in developed
205
countries.A Thai compulsory license on the AIDS drug Kaletra was
compulsory licensing on the patent of pharmaceutical products." Notification of the
Department of Disease Control, Ministry of Public Health, Re: Exercising of Right
Under Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Products Patent (Nov. 29, 2006), reprinted in TEN
BURNING ISSUES-GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note 10, at 39 [hereinafter
Efavirenz License]; Notification of the Department of Disease Control, Ministry of
Public Health Re: Exercising of Right under Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Products Patent
for Combined Formulation of Lopinavir and Ritonavir (January 24, 2007), reprinted in
TEN BURNING ISSuES-GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note 10, at 43 [hereinafter
Kaletra License]; Notification of the Ministry of Public Health Re: Exercising of Right
under Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Products Patent for Clopidogrel (Jan. 25, 2007),
reprinted in TEN BURNING ISSUES-GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note 10, at 45
[hereinafter Plavix License].
202 TEN BURNING QUESTIONS-GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note 10, at 1-
2,6.
203 Efavirenz License, supra note 201.
204 Id. In addition, some noted that the compulsory license also addressed the
problem of inadequate supply from patent owner Merck. See Press Release, MSF, supra
note 10 (noting that patent owner Merck's supply had been unreliable and resulted in
treatment interruptions).
205 See TEN BURNNG ISSUES-GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note 10, at 13-
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issued to the GPO on January 25, 2007.206 Kaletra is a patented
combination of two antiretrovirals that is often used for patients
that become resistant to basic formulations of HIV medications,
such as Efavirenz. The Thai government estimated that around ten
percent of patients require second-line treatments such as Kaletra
within the first few years, or else such patients will die.207 The
Kaletra license was designed to support an increasing number of
patients and thus save more lives. Prior to the compulsory license,
Kaletra was priced at $2200 per patient per year by patent owner
Abbott, a cost that is close to the yearly income of a Thai
citizen.0 8
On the same day, January 25, 2007, Thailand issued a
compulsory license to the GPO for Bristol Myers' anti-platelet
drug Plavix, a drug useful for treating heart disease.209 According
to the license, heart disease is one of the top three causes of death
in Thailand and although some non-drug preventative measures
could be taken there is a need for drug treatment to prevent
unnecessary mortality.210 Without the license only twenty percent
of government insured patients could access the medicine, which
is inconsistent with the Thai policy of providing universal
211
coverage of essential medicine.
In February 2007, Thailand issued a ninety page white paper,
entitled "Facts and Evidence on the Ten Burning Issues Relating
to the Government Use of Patents in Thailand," including
supporting documents to defend its three compulsory licenses. 212
In the white paper Thailand explained its health needs as well as
why its actions were consistent under TRIPS. 213 However, some
statements in this white paper likely induced additional concern.
In the context of explaining that Thailand was authorized to issue
licenses without first negotiating with patent owners in cases of
206 Kaletra License, supra note 201.
207 TEN BURNING ISSUES-GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note 10, at 14.
208 See, e.g., Robert Weissman, Cakewalk Ken Adelman Returns to the Stage,
MULTIN'L MONITOR, Mar. 1, 2007, available at http://www.multinationalmonitor.org
/mm2007/ 032007/weissman.html.
209 Plavix License, supra note 201.
210 Id. (stating that medicine is needed for "treatment and secondary prevention
from thrombosis which leads to morbidity and mortality").
211 Id.
212 TEN BURNING ISSUES-GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note 10.
213 Id. passim (providing ninety pages of comprehensive explanation and supporting
documents).
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public non-commercial use, the white paper asserted that issuing
compulsory licenses without prior negotiation is generally more
effective.214 The document also went beyond supporting the
existing compulsory licenses to telegraph Thailand's intent to
consider issuing additional licenses on up to fifteen percent of
patented drugs not only for epidemics but also when the market
price was considered too high to achieve Thailand's universal
access to essential drugs.215 In addition to making such claims in
its white paper, Thailand announced that it was considering
imposing compulsory licenses on eleven patents in a February
2007 press conference.216
Even though controversy never subsided regarding the initial
licenses, 217 Thailand continued to explore additional compulsory
licenses. In June 2007, Thailand established two exploratory
committees to consider possible compulsory licenses on cancer
medications considered necessary for the universal healthcare
scheme.218  At the same time, Thailand was pressured against
perceived broad use of compulsory licenses by E.U. Trade
Commissioner Peter Mandelson, as well as by the U.S.
214 Id. at 6 ("prior negotiation only delays improvement in access to patented
essential medicines and puts more lives in less healthy or even dangerous situations").
This statement is somewhat at odds with other assertions in the same document that
Thailand previously negotiated with patent owners. See id. at 5 (stating that the Thai
government sought lower prices in 2006, but the reductions only approximated the level
of currency appreciation). It is possible that although Thailand negotiated prices
generally with patent owners, it never explicitly mentioned the possibility of compulsory
licenses. Furthermore, it is possible that the TRIPS requirement of prior negotiation with
patent owners contemplates an express suggestion of a compulsory license if
negotiations fail.
215 Id. at 10. The criteria for consideration of a drug for compulsory license is
listing on the National Essential Drug List; or a need to solve public health problems, an
emergency, or an epidemic; or for life-saving where the price of the drug is too high to
be affordable by the government. Id. at 11. Thailand attempted to stem concern by
noting that "life-style" drugs, such as those to treat baldness, acne, or erectile
dysfunction would not be considered for compulsory licenses. Id.; see also Sinfah
Tunsarawuth, Thailand: 20 More Drugs in Pipeline for Possible Compulsory Licenses,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=806
(noting that Thailand would probably only issue ten licenses).
216 Hookway & Zamiska, supra note 194.
217 Indeed, controversy arguably increased as Abbott responded to the compulsory
license of its drug by withdrawing several drugs from the Thai marketplace in March
2007, including a heat-stable form of Kaletra particularly well suited for the Thai
climate. See infra notes 363-366 and accompanying text. During the same month, the
USTR elevated Thailand to Priority Watch status on its Special 301 list. 2007 SPECIAL
301 REPORT, supra note 27, at 27.
218 See, e.g., Beth Jinks & Haslinda Amin, Thailand Buying Three Generic AIDS,
Heart Drugs from India, BLOOMBERG.COM, June 22, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601203&sid=aRmSWtVJfJME&refer-insurance.
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Ambassador to Thailand, Ralph Boyce.219  Thailand began
negotiations for lower prices on patented cancer drugs in October
2007.220 Although initial signs were promising, the negotiations
eventually broke down in December 2007.221
Thailand then issued licenses on four cancer drugs in January
2008, on the eve of a change in government administration.22
Thailand asserted that they were necessary because cancer is
currently the number one cause of death in Thailand, and most
effective cancer treatments are patented, not covered on the Thai
List of Essential Drugs due to their high cost, and thereby
inaccessible to Thai citizens.223 Thailand asserted that cancer is no
less serious than HIV/AIDS, accounting for 30,000 deaths a year
with 100,000 new cases diagnosed each year.224 Moreover,
Thailand noted that the licenses were critical to prevent either
219 Peter Mandelson July 10 Letter, supra note 27 (noting concern about Thailand's
use of compulsory licenses and asserting that "neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the
Doha Declaration appear to justify a systematic policy of applying compulsory licenses
wherever medicines exceed certain prices"); Letter from Ralph Boyce, U.S. Ambassador,
to Surayud Chulont, Thai Minister (July 20, 2007), available at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermaillip-health/2007-August/011610.html (noting concern
about potential issuance of additional compulsory licenses).
220 THAI NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY OFFICE, THE TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON THE
GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS ON THE FOUR ANTI-CANCER DRUGS IN THAILAND 4 (Feb.
2008), available at http://www.moph.go.th/hot/Second white_paper on the
ThaiCL_%5BEN%5D.pdf [hereinafter TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS].
221 Id.; see also Sinfah Tunsarawuth, New Thai Minister May Review Compulsory
Licenses on Cancer Drugs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Jan. 31, 2008, http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=914 (noting that despite several months of negotiations,
Thailand was still contemplating licenses on several cancer drugs); Sinfah Tunsarawuth,
Thailand Avoids Compulsory License On Cancer Drug; 3 More Drugs Undecided,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=906
(quoting Thai FDA secretary general as noting positive results with drug companies and
suggesting that Thailand was near a deal with Sanofi-Aventis).
222 On January 4, 2008, licenses were issued on Letrozole, a breast cancer medicine
made by Novartis AG, Docetaxel, the breast and lung cancer drug by Sanofi-Aventis;
Erlotinib, a drug for treating, lung, pancreatic, and ovarian cancer by Roche; and
Imitinab, a cancer drug patented and sold by Novartis as Glivec. Notification of the
Ministry of Public Health Re: Exercising of Right on Pharmaceuticals Products Patent
for Docetaxel (Jan. 4, 2008), reprinted in TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS,
supra note 220, at 22-23 [hereinafter Docataxel License]; Notification of the Ministry of
Public Health Re: Exercising of Right on Pharmaceutical Products Patent for Letrozole
(Jan. 4, 2008), reprinted in TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 220,
at 24-25 [hereinafter Letrozole License]; Notification of the Ministry of Public Health
Re: Exercising of Right on Pharmaceutical Products Patent for Erlotinib (Jan. 4, 2008),
reprinted in TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 220, at 26-27
[hereinafter Erlotinib License]; Notification of the Ministry of Public Health Re:
Exercising of Right under Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Products Patent for Imatinib (Jan.
25, 2008), reprinted in TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 220, at
28-29 [hereinafter Imatinib License].
223 TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 220, at 2-3.
224 Id. at 2.
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severe economic hardship, including bankruptcy or certain death,
without treatment.225
However, unlike the initial compulsory licenses, Thailand
delayed implementation of the signed licenses to enable continued
negotiations. The continued negotiations yielded a successful
outcome in one case; patent owner Novartis agreed to provide its
drug Glivec at no cost to Thai citizens meeting certain income
requirements, and Thailand revoked the license on Glivec 26 On
the other hand, Thailand was not satisfied with the prices of other
patented drugs. Although the other patent owners offered
discounts of up to one third the original price, Thailand stated that
it would impose a compulsory license unless patent owners
offered prices no more than five percent higher than those offered
by generic competitors.227
On February 7, 2008, the first day of taking office, the new
Thai Public Health Minister announced that he would re-evaluate
the decision to issue licenses on the cancer drugs. 228 Also of
relevance was an attempt to clarify Thailand's position with the
United States in hopes of avoiding negative economic
repercussions, including loss of trade preferences under the
Generalized System of Preferences 229 as well as potential tradesanctions if listed on the Special 301 Report.230 Some American
225 Id.
226 Notification of the Ministry of Public Health Re: Exercising of Right on
Pharmaceuticals Products Patent for Imatinib,), reprinted in TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON
CANCER DRUGS, supra note 222, at 34-35; see also Novartis Wins Thai Battle, Setback
For Indian Firms, FIN. EXPRESS, Feb. 3, 2008, available at
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/novartis-wins-thai-battle-setback-for-indian-
firms/268596/; Thailand Health Ministry Change Could Mean Fewer CLs, PHARMA
MARKETLETTER, Feb. 18, 2008.
227 TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 220, at 4-6.
228 See, e.g., Ambika Ahuja, Thailand to Review Decision to Break Patents on
Cancer Drugs, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 9, 2008, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/09/asia/AS-GEN-Thailand-Cancer-Drugs.php;
Bangkok's Drug War, Round Two, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2008, at 13.
229 The Generalized System of Preferences [GSP] is a U.S. program that provides
preferential treatment to imports from certain member countries and is consistent with
the WTO rules. See also infra note 380 and accompanying text (noting that lack of
effective intellectual property protection may impact GSP status). See generally United
States Trade Representatives, GSP Program Sunmmary, http://www.ustr.gov/
Trade_Development/Preference Programs/GSP/GSPProgram Summary_(availablein
multiplelanguages)/SectionIndex.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2009); see also infra note
380 and accompanying text (noting that lack of effective intellectual property protection
may impact GSP status).
230 See infra notes 380-385 and accompanying text (explaining impact of being
listed as a "Special 301" country).
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pharmaceutical companies had requested that Thailand be given
Priority Foreign Country status, which is the most severe trade
category and is most likely to result in trade sanctions."'
While medical experts and health advocates criticized this
decision,232 patent owners welcomed the new approach.233 The
president of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
Association, representing many multinational pharmaceutical
companies, called for Thailand to cease issuing compulsory
licenses.234 Some governments also made statements discouraging
use of compulsory licenses.235 On the other hand, a number of
health advocates, including Oxfam, made public statements to
encourage continuation of the compulsory licenses.236 In addition,
a WHO group confirmed that the use of TRIPS flexibilities, such
as compulsory licenses, were a permissible means of cost
containment in providing essential medicines that were not
otherwise affordable.237
231 Letter from Lila Feisee, Managing Dir., Biotechnology Indus. Org., to Jennifer
Choe Groves, Dir. for Intell. Prop. and Innovation and Chair of the Special 301 Comm.,
at 3-4 (Feb. 11, 2008), available at http://www.pharmalot.com/wp-
content/uploads/2008/02/bio-letter-to-ustr.pdf [hereinafter BIO Feb 11 Letter];
PHARMA SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2007 2 (2007); see also Phusadee Arunmas, Thai
Traders Urge 'Extreme Caution' on CL, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 14, 2008, available at
http://www.biothai.org/cgi-bin/content/news/show.pl?0527 (suggesting that compulsory
licenses should be viewed with caution in light of the fact that Thailand could be placed
on the priority foreign country list, rather than the priority watch list).
232 See, e.g., Pradi Ruangdit and Nareerat Wiryapong, Minister Under Attack for
Plan to Reverse CL, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 19, 2008, available at
http://www.aegis.org/news/bp/2008/BP080213.html (noting that that the new Thai
Health Minister was criticized).
233 See, e.g., id.; see also Thailand Move to Reconsider Compulsory Licensing of
Drugs Faces Opposition, THAI PRESS REPORTS, Feb. 8 2008.
234 Nareerat Wiriyapong, Pharma: End Compulsory Licenses, BANGKOK POST, Jan.
30, 2008.
235 See Swiss AIDE MEMOIRE, supra note 27 (while stating general support for
Thailand's HIV program, nonetheless expressing concern that without patent protection,
the pharmaceutical industry will not have adequate incentive to develop new medicines
such that compulsory license be used only in exceptional cases).
236 See, e.g., Oxfam Urges Thailand to Keep Generic Drugs Program,
INQUIRER.NET, Feb. 19, 2008, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/
viewarticle.php?article id=l 19868; Letter to Samak Sundarevej, Thai Prime Minister,
and Chaiya Sasomsap, Minister of Pub. Health, from James Love, Knowledge Ecology
International (Feb. 19, 2008) (explaining that the Thai licenses are consistent with TRIPS
and that there should be no legitimate concern about placement on the U.S. Special 301
watch list); see also Letter to Ed. of the Wall St. J. from Virat Purahong, Chairperson of
the Thai Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS, Concerning the article: Bangkok's
Drug War, Round Two (Mar. 6, 2008) (rebutting criticism of prior editorial regarding
Thailand's licenses).
237 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, IMPROVING ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN THAILAND:
THE USE OF TRIPS FLEXIBILITiES 5 (2008). Although the WHO report technically
provides an overview of options for all developing countries, it explicitly states that it is
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Ultimately, Thailand decided not to revoke any of the
compulsory licenses issued on cancer drugs despite being told that
the continued imposition of licenses threatened to impact
Thailand's international trade.238 Some suggested that cancelling
the licenses would be inconsistent with the Thai Constitution and
other laws requiring the government to provide low-cost drugs.
239
Thailand has also resisted the suggestion that it promise to forgo
the option of compulsory licenses in the future, stating that to do
so would be considered a "neglect of duty or failure to exercise the
rights established by the law to safeguard public interest and
public health and incur a criminal charge.
240
B. Criticism of Thailand's Compulsory Licensing
This section provides an overview of common criticisms
concerning whether the Thai licenses violated TRIPS. 241  The
licenses are suggested as improper because of a lack of prior
negotiations with the patent owner, lack of a public emergency,
not intended to assess Thailand's compliance with TRIPS. Id. at 2.
238 See, e.g., Pongphon Samsamak, No Cancellation of CL for Cancer Drugs,
NATION, Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/03/03/
national/national 30067110.php; Nicholas Zamiska, Thai Ministry to Recommend
Ignoring Patents on Cancer Drugs, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, March 11, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 120515886199824251 .html.
239 Samsamak, supra note 238.
240 TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 220, at 13.
241 Other criticisms go far beyond the scope of either TRIPS or compulsory
licensing policy. In particular, some critics have suggested that the Thai licenses are
suspect because the licenses were issued to the GPO, which they allege to be historically
corrupt with facilities not authorized by the WHO. Roger Bate, Thai-ing Pharma Down,
WALL. ST. J., Feb. 9, 2007, at 13 [hereinafter Thai-ing Pharma Down] ("The only winner
will be Thailand's historically corrupt Government Pharmaceutical Organization, or
GPO, the state-owned pharmaceutical monopoly"). Others have suggested that licensed
drugs imported from India, rather than made from the GPO, are also suspect because
India is referred to as "the world's most prolific source of counterfeit generics." Theft in
Thailand, supra note 1. However, the rhetoric against the GPO and India ignore the fact
that an agency outside the patent system is designated to monitor safety of drugs.
Moreover, not all drugs made and sold from India are counterfeit generics-due to
compliance with TRIPS. The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, §10(c) (India),
available at http://indiacode.nic.in/ (permitting patent owners who filed applications
before India provided product patents only to recover "reasonable royalties" against
companies that were using the invention prior to January 1, 2005 and continue to do so).
241 See, e.g., Nicholas Zamiska, Thai Move to Trim Drug Costs Highlights Growing
Patent Rift, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at A8 (quoting Teera Chakajnarodom, president
of the Pharmaceutical differing patent laws, India may legitimately make some generic
drugs while remaining in compliance with TRIPS. The Patents (Amendment) Act, No.
15 of 2005, § 10(c) (India), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/ (permitting patent owners
who filed applications before India provided product patents only to recover "reasonable
royalties" against companies that were using the invention prior to January 1, 2005 and
continue to do so).
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and lack of public non-commercial use. In addition, Thailand was
also criticized for using compulsory licenses in a manner more
broadly than intended by TRIPS.
Lack of prior negotiation with patent owners was a frequent
complaint regarding the initial three licenses.242 A number of
patent owners noted that they were surprised to only learn about
the compulsory licenses after the fact and drug makers reported
that they were "stunned" to not receive prior warning.243 Dr.
Harvey Bale, the Director of the International Federation of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, noted that Thailand had "no
serious contacts" with patent owners regarding HIV drugs since
two years before its "aggressive action to undermine the
patents. 244
Contrary to the express language of TRIPS, patent owners
frequently misrepresented that TRIPS requires an emergency as a
pre-requisite to issuing a compulsory license.245 Some noted that
Thailand's official licenses fail to state a public emergency as a
basis for the license.246 Others asserted that licenses should only
be permissible if there is an emergency.247 Some even suggested
242 See, e.g., Nicholas Zamiska, Thai Move to Trim Drug Costs Highlights Growing
Patent Rift, WALL ST, J., Jan. 30, 2007, at A8 (quoting Teera Chakajnarodom, president
of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA), as stating that
"everything is negotiable," but Thailand's approach of "taking away their property, their
assets" without negotiation was inappropriate); PARMA Criticizes Thailand Compulsory
License for HIVAIDS Drug, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 8, 2006, available at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2006-December/O I 0327.html (quoting
PhRMA president Billy Tauzin as suggesting that Thailand's license without
concomitant attempt to negotiate was of "grave concern").
243 See, e.g., Darren Scuettler, Angered U.S. Firm Excludes Thailand from New
Drugs, REUTERS, Mar. 14, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/healthNews
/idUSBKK27714620070314 (noting in a single sentence both that the licenses are legal
and also that the drug makers were stunned to receive no prior warning).
244 Letter from Harvey Bale, Dir. of the Int'l Fed'n of Pharmaceutical Mfgrs., to
Wall. St. J., Untangling Thailand's Drug Policies (Mar. 14, 2007) available at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/random-bits/2007-March/001411 .html.
245 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (providing examples of
misconceptions that the Thai licenses were improper as inadequate emergencies). In
addition, confusion concerning whether a national emergency is "required" to issue a
compulsory license continued to appear in the press. See, e.g., Thailand to Review
Decision to Break Patents on Cancer Drugs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 9, 2008, available
at http://www.tmcnet.com/ news/2008/02/09/3259393/htm ("according to international
trade rules, a government may issue a compulsory license to manufacture a generic drug
only in the case of a national public health emergency").
246 See, e.g., PhRMA Criticizes Thailand Compulsory License for HIV/AIDS Drug,
supra note 242 (suggesting that without a public emergency, prior negotiation should
have been required).
247 See, e.g., Roger Bate, Thailand's Drug Wars, AMERICAN, Mar. 12, 2008,
available at http://www.american.com/archive/2008/march-03-08/thailand2019s-drug-
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that HIV is not an emergency in Thailand because it has done well
in reducing deaths from AIDS as well as reducing the rate of new
infections. 48
Thailand's license on Plavix drew particular attention from
patent owners as the first step on a slippery slope towards
licensing any and all patents if heart disease were considered an
emergency. 249 Although Thailand issued a license on Plavix based
on the ground of public non-commercial use, the Plavix license
was generally criticized for failing to constitute a public
emergency-a different issue that is not always required for
TRIPS-compliant compulsory licensing as further explained in the
next section. For example Roger Bate, an economist associated
with the conservative think tank, American Enterprise Institute,
250
noted that:
Plavix changes the debate entirely . . . it almost
certainly breaks WTO rules. Combating HIV has
always been seen by activists, if not others, as a
health emergency, and under WTO rules, patents
can be broken in emergencies. However, it's hard
for anyone to argue that heart disease meets such
wars/ (neglecting to mention public noncommercial use as a possible grounds for issuing
a license without prior negotiations); Bate & Boateng, supra note 23, at 4 (stating that
the "only condition" authorizing a country to issue a compulsory license without prior
negotiation is that there be a national emergency); Ashley Herher, U.S. Drugmaker
Abbott, Thailand Face Off in AIDS Drug Patent Stalemate, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 6,
2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/07/business/NA-FIN-US-
Thailand-Abbotts-AIDS-Fight.php (noting that "compulsory licenses are not illegal, but
their use in medicine typically involves treating public health emergencies"); Harish
Mehta, Cheap Life-saving Drugs: Thailand Shows the Way, Bus. TIMES SINGAPORE, Oct.
18, 2007, available at http://www.biotechsingapore.com/ttdBizenterprise/
Singlenews.aspx?DirlD=78&reccode=107882 (asserting that a national emergency is
the only grounds for issuing a compulsory license without prior consultation with the
patent owner); see also PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION,
PARTNERING FOR BETTER HEALTH: AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE 26 (April 2007)
[hereinafter PARTNERING FOR BETTER HEALTH] (suggesting by omission that the Doha
Public Health Declaration only affirms the right to use flexibilities for health crises and
emergencies); Bangkok's Drug War, Round Two, supra note 228 (mentioning only a
national emergency as a possible exception to prior negotiation).
248 Homer, supra note I (suggesting that Thailand can not qualify for the national
emergency exception because they have a "comparatively low rate of AIDS infection"
with less than one percent of the population infected, as opposed to other WTO members
with rates as high as twenty percent); Thai Patent Turmoil, supra note 11 (suggesting
that Thailand does not have an HIV crisis relative to other countries).
249 Thai Patent Turmoil, supra note 11.
250 See AEI's Organization and Enterprise, http://www.aei.org/about/filter.all'
default.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
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stringent tests.251
Some suggested that heart disease was a "life-style" condition
that could not be considered an emergency.252 Another editorial
suggested that if cardiovascular disease were considered an
emergency, what would constitute an emergency would be
limitless-even though the same editorial earlier admitted the
possibility of alternative grounds for issuing a compulsory
license.253 In addition, some went beyond the scope of TRIPS to
suggest that the compulsory licenses were improper; one editorial
critically asserted that "until now, governments have been careful
to define disease outbreaks as 'emergencies' primarily because
they don't want to dissuade drug companies from investing in their
government.,
254
Even the few articles that recognize that compulsory licenses
may be issued without a national emergency, such as for public
non-commercial use, nonetheless suggested that Thailand's
actions were inappropriate. Some suggested that because the
licenses were issued to a government agency that is for-profit and
possibly corrupt, the licenses would presumably be sold for
profit.255  For example, one editorial by a sympathizer of patent-
owning drug companies claimed that "only the most cynical
distortion of the text could conceivably cover Thailand's conduct
251 Thai-ing Pharma Down, supra note 241, at 13; see also Roger Bate, Thailand
and the Drug Patent Wars, HEALTH POL'Y OUTLOOK, Apr. 2007, at 2 [hereinafter
Thailand and the Drug Patent Wars] (arguing that Plavix is not an emergency and that
compulsory licenses under TRIPS should be confined to national emergencies and
epidemics).
252 See, e.g., Piya Wong, Thailand Backs off Threat to Break Drug Patents,
SCTDEV.NET, Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.scidev.net/en/news/thailand-backs-off-threat-to-
break-drug-patents.html; see also Roger Bate, Thailand's Patent Attack, N.Y. SUN, Feb.
13, 2007, available at http://www.nysun.com/opinion/thailands-patent-attack/48499/
(asserting that heart disease and leukemia are not epidemics); Ghosh, supra note 1
(asserting that heart disease afflicts the affluent, such that a compulsory license is not
needed).
253 Thai Patent Turmoil, supra note 11.
254 Theft in Thailand, supra note 1.
255 See, e.g., Abbott's Bad Precedent, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2007, at A14 (noting
that the GPO is for-profit); Homer, supra note 1 (noting that because the statute that
created the Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) states that it carries on
"business" and the GPO has previously worked with private pharmaceutical companies,
it will presumably use the licenses for commercial sale); see also Good Medicine for
Thailand, WALL ST. J, May 29, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB121199626353926559.html?mod=yahoo -buzz (suggesting that the GPO is
considered to be in competition with the pharmaceutical industry, such that a license by
the GPO can not be for non-commercial use).
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here" 256-in direct contradiction of the interpretations of legal
scholars without financial ties to the industry.257 Others assert that
public non-commercial use is inappropriate when the licenses
simply benefit the Thai budget, or that Thailand is exploiting a
vague term such that it is at least violating the spirit of TRIPS.258
Some critics of the Thai licenses suggested that TRIPS
requires licenses be limited in scope or issued under very limited
circumstances. Switzerland's public statement concerning the
licenses noted that TRIPS Article 31(c) requires licenses be
limited in scope and duration, thus suggesting that the Thai
licenses were inadequately limited in these respects." 9 Others,
such as the major pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline,
asserted that TRIPS only permits compulsory licensing in limited
circumstances such as national health emergencies and only after
lengthy efforts to first negotiate with patent owners.26 ° Still others
emphasize that compulsory licensing should only be permitted
under "extraordinary conditions," or as a "last resort," although
these terms are not used within Article 31 and are typically not
defined.261
Other critics suggest that while Thailand may not violate any
explicit provision of TRIPS, its actions were nonetheless
impermissible, or at least suspect. For example, one editorial
recognized that TRIPS "doesn't list specific causes" for which
governments can grant compulsory licenses-a condition which it
considered "regrettably vague"-but was convinced that Thailand
has clearly "breached the spirit, if not the letter" of the relevant
provision.262  Others suggested that Thailand's action was
256 Thai Patent Turmoil, supra note 11.
257 See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
258 Simon Montlake, Thailand Takes On Drug Patents, FAR E. ECON. REv.,
July/Aug. 2007, at 41 (noting that only Thailand's public health care system benefits);
The Thai Flu, supra note 5 (alleging that Thailand is "taking advantage of vague
language" and that it is "turning its state-owned pharmaceutical monopoly into a regional
drug store").
259 See, e.g., Swiss AIDE MEMOIRE, supra note 27.
260 A Gathering Storm, THE ECONOMIST, June 9, 2007, at 71; see also Patent
Remedy, supra note 5 ("[C]ompulsory licensing . . .is permitted under extraordinary
circumstances, such as to produce essential goods," which also suggests that the HIV
drugs must not be essential).
261 See, e.g., Drugs in Thailand, FIN. TIMES, Jan 31, 2007, available at http://www.
fl.com/cms/s/0/37500f5c-b0cf-1 ldb-8a62-0000779e2340.html?nclick_check=1; Patent
Remedy, supra note 5.
262 Theft in Thailand, supra note 1; see also Commentary, Lonely Thailand, WALL
ST. J., May 23, 2007, at 11 (suggesting that Thailand is "exploiting vague language"
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inappropriate under TRIPS because TRIPS does not specifically
permit use of licenses to address budgetary constraints,263 with
some further suggesting that any budgetary constraint were likely
only a result of an increase in defense spending by a military-
imposed Thai government.264
Some have also suggested that the clarifying statements in the
Doha Public Health Declaration are of dubious value, or
inapplicable to Thailand's situation. Critics of the Thai licenses
tend to characterize the Declaration as prompted by activists trying
to alter TRIPS.265 Moreover, these criticisms allege that Thai
sympathizers unduly rely on the declaration to claim that TRIPS
authorizes compulsory licenses on "any patent, especially any
drug patent, for any reason., 266 In addition, some suggest that the
Doha Declaration was intended to be limited to health
emergencies, but not budgetary shortfalls.267
V. TRIPS Analysis of Thai Licenses
A. Licenses Covered Permissible Subject Matter
Although the earlier analysis establishes that there is no
limitation on what may be licensed consistent with Article 3 1, it is
important to consider whether there is any merit to the contention
that some subject matter such as cancer and heart drugs should not
be subject to compulsory licenses. As noted earlier, the
under TRIPS).
263 See, e.g., PARTNERING FOR BETTER HEALTH, supra note 247, at 26-27.
264 See, e.g., The Impact of Coup-Related Sanctions on Thailand and F'i: Helpful
or Harmful to U.S. Relations?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Asia, the Pac., and the
Global Env't, 110th Cong. 7-9 (2007) (testimony by Mark Stevin Kirk) (asserting that
Thai military leaders have increased the military budget by over $1 billion, given
themselves a pay raise of $9 million while cutting health care by at least $12 million);
Hookway & Zamiska, supra note 194 (suggesting that Thailand is using populist rhetoric
and policies to curry favor with the Thai people); Pipes, supra note 23; Thai Patent
Turmoil, supra note 11 (suggesting that any potential budget shortfall was self-imposed
when the military leaders cut the public health budget by $12 million while increasing
the military budget by $1.1 billion).
265 Typically, such articles suggest that those sympathetic to the ability of countries
to use compulsory licenses are activists that oppose all property rights in addition to
trying to alter TRIPS. See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 1 (referring to "health activists" as
supporting Thailand's decision as legal); Patent Remedy, supra note 5 ("some groups
have worked hard to alter the meaning of the TRIPS agreement and to encourage
governments to use compulsory licensing to break IP protections").
266 Patent Remedy, supra note 5.
267 See, e.g., BIO Feb. 11 Letter, supra note 231, at 3 (asserting that the Doha
Declaration was intended for use with "acute crises," but "not meant as an expedient to
facilitate budgetary planning").
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appropriate interpretation of TRIPS requires that the clear meaning
of the text control. Here, the text does not provide any restriction
on the type of subject matter that may be subject to compulsory
licensing.268 Indeed, other scholars support this view as well.26 9
Similarly, while some suggest that permitting compulsory licenses
on typically high-profit drugs such as cancer drugs will reduce
incentives for future development, this argument is not relevant to
what the parties agreed to in TRIPS Article 3 1. Although some
WTO countries have suggested that any compulsory license
reduces incentives for patent owners to develop drugs, that fails to
change what all member states agreed to under TRIPS.27°
Additionally, the oft-stated fear that compulsory licenses will
undermine innovation is likely an overstatement, as further
discussed in Part VI.
B. Individual Merits
The question in the case of the Thai licenses is whether the
compulsory licenses were permissible under the criteria that the
licenses be granted on their "individual merits." In particular,
some suggest that Thailand has engaged in an impermissible
system of authorizing compulsory licensing for drugs viewed as
too expensive for the national budget.27 ' As noted above,
individual merits simply require that the decision be made for
individual drugs. If Thailand had a policy of granting compulsory
licenses for all drugs once it exceeded a certain budgetary level
268 See supra Part III.C (discussing the text of TRIPS).
269 See, e.g., Abbott & Reichmann, supra note 31, at 956 ("the suggestion that
treatments for heart disease exceed a state's right to grant a compulsory license conflicts
directly with the TRIPS Agreement"); Outterson, supra note 22, at 283 ("for all the
bluster in the Wall Street Journal, it is clear that the controlling legal texts do not limit
the use of TRIPS flexibilities to any particular set of diseases").
270 See Swiss AIDE MEMOIRE, sulra note 22, 2-4 (suggesting that compulsory
licenses should only be used in "exceptional cases"); Peter Mandelson July 10 Letter,
supra note 22, 3 (stating that the Thai Licenses are "a matter of concern to the E.U. and
would be detrimental to innovation and development of new drugs.").
271 Peter Mandelson July 10 Letter, supra note 27 (suggesting that Thailand is
engaging in a systemic imposition of licenses); see also PARTNERING FOR BETTER
HEALTH, supra note 263, at 20 (asserting that Thailand will use compulsory licensing "as
a routine way of accessing innovative medicines"). Others have raised a related
argument against the use of compulsory licenses to address budgetary issues, but
grounded the argument not in TRIPS, but in general policy as if TRIPS did not exist.
See, e.g., Global Insight, Thai Government Expands Scope of Patent-Breaking Strategy
Amid Unrest in Asia (2007), http://www.globalinsight.com/SDA/SDADetail8346.htm
(warning that the Thai licenses are dangerous because if "compulsory licensing in effect
becomes a valid form of cost containment ... that entirely sidelines the core meaning of
intellectual property").
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that policy would likely be in violation of this provision.
However, Thailand's approach is more nuanced. Thailand has no
law to license all pharmaceuticals.272 According to Thailand, there
is a committee that evaluates what patented drugs might possibly
be considered for compulsory licensing and then negotiations are
first attempted before any license is actually issued; however, it is
unclear whether the negotiations were always made against an
explicit threat of a compulsory license-especially with respect to
the initial three licenses. 273 Each license was nonetheless based on
individual merits as Thailand had a specific rationale for each.274
Determining whether the licenses were granted on their
"individual merits" may also raise a related but distinct issue of
whether the licenses are inconsistent with TRIPS Article 27 that
bars discrimination of subject matter. TRIPS Article 27 states
"patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to . . . the field of technology. 275  While
criticisms of Thailand have not directly raised this issue, there is
nonetheless a question of whether this requirement of non-
discrimination applies to compulsory licenses issued under Article
31.276 The WTO panel in Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents
previously noted that the non-discrimination requirement governs
Article 30-a provision similar to Article 31 in that it also
provides an exception from the usual requirements of Article 27-
such that the provision would seem to equally apply to Article
272 Contra Communication from India, supra note 110, 15 (suggesting
compulsory licenses of right for all drugs).
273 TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 220, at 9 (noting that a
subcommittee evaluates each drug and considers both whether the drug is necessary on a
health level, as well as if there are access problems, or a financial burden on the
government health insurance scheme).
274 Efavirenz License, supra note 201, at 38-39; Kaletra License, supra note 201, at
41-42; Plavix License, supra note 201, at 40; see also TEN BURNING ISSUES-
GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note 10, at 11-12 (explaining process for deciding
whether to issue a compulsory license).
275 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 27(1).
276 Thailand and other developing countries are unlikely to raise this problem given
that during the negotiation of TRIPS, developing countries insisted that compulsory
licenses were not limited by the non-discrimination provision. See Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Submission from the African Group et
al., TRIPS and Public Health, 8, IP/C/W/296 (June 29, 2001) (stating that "in no way
do articles 27.1 ... limit the right of Members to issue compulsory licenses."); see also
Letter from Brook Baker et al. to Samak Sundaravej, Thai Prime Minster, and Chaiya
Sasomsap, Minister of Public Health 4 (Feb. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.cl4life.net/th/media/legal.pdf (suggesting that Article 27 of TRIPS is not a
problem for the Thai compulsory licenses because each license has been considered on
its own merits).
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31.277 However, the question remains as to whether Thailand's
compulsory licenses discriminate as to the field of technology
because all licenses thus far have been issued in the area of
pharmaceuticals. The prior WTO panel noted that a law would not
be de jure discriminatory unless its language limited its scope to
only pharmaceuticals and that it would not be de facto
discriminatory unless there was evidence of a discriminatory
purpose. Even where the statute applied more to pharmaceuticals
than other fields of technology, the panel found that it was not
discriminatory unless the broader possible application was a
sham.278 Here, the compulsory license provision utilized is not
limited to pharmaceuticals, so there is no de jure discrimination.
In addition, there is no evidence of a discriminatory purpose
against pharmaceuticals in general, such that there is no de facto
discrimination. Notably, not all pharmaceuticals have been
subject to compulsory licenses.
C. Prior Negotiation
This section analyzes whether Thailand complied with the
requirement of prior negotiation-an issue of great importance to
patent owners, yet also often misunderstood. More specifically,
this section analyzes whether Thailand's actions constitute prior
negotiation or fall within a permissible exception to the prior
negotiation.
1. Prior Negotiation
There are two groups of Thai licenses that can be analyzed
with respect to the requirement of prior negotiation. The first
group consists of the licenses for Efavirenz, Kaletra, and Plavix,
which were admittedly issued with little prior warning to the
patent owner. The second group of licenses was for cancer drugs.
Although Thailand's first three licenses were explicitly
premised on an exception to the requirement of prior negotiation,
public non-commercial use, a brief analysis of whether they could
comply with the prior negotiation requirement is nonetheless
instructive for analyzing future cases. Thailand's negotiations
277 Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 58, 7.91-7.93.
278 Id. 7.98-7.104.
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with patent owners highlight the questions of whether prior
negotiation with patent owners must occur immediately before the
license is issued and whether owners must be informed that a
license is being contemplated if negotiations fail. In particular, the
question is whether negotiations with patent owners for lower
prices years before the licenses are issued should constitute prior
negotiation. If the goal of the prior negotiation provision is to
avoid compulsory licensing, this would not seem to suffice since
patent owners would not be on notice that a license was being
contemplated. Accordingly, Thailand was probably wise not to
rely on past negotiations.
Perhaps reacting to criticism regarding its initial licenses,
Thailand engaged in a more substantial period of negotiation with
patent owners before imposing licenses on cancer drugs.
Discussions began in mid-October, and there were reported to be
more than twelve rounds of negotiations before the licenses were
issued.279  In addition, even after the licenses were signed,
Thailand deferred implementation of the licenses to continue
negotiations.280
Even though Thailand engaged in longer negotiations, there
may nonetheless be an issue of whether Thailand was seeking
reasonable commercial terms and conditions. Thailand stated that
it would continue to negotiate with patent holders even after the
licenses were signed and would be willing to buy direct from the
patent holders if they offered to sell at a price within five percent
of generic competitors. While Thailand has suggested that this
five percent is "meant to reward the loyalty of the patent holders,"
patent holders are more likely to see this as an unreasonable
royalty rate in light of the fact that cancer drugs are typically high-
profit drugs.28'
279 TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 220, at 4, 20-21.
280 Id. at 5-6.
281 Id. at 6; see also infra note 436 and accompanying text (noting that cancer drugs
are one of the most profitable for drug companies). In addition, the prospect of
compulsorily licensing cancer drugs could loom large considering that cancer drugs
represent a disproportionate number of the current pipeline of drugs under development.
See PhRMA, Profile 2008, at 8, http://www.phrma.org/files/2008%2OProfile.pdf (last
visited Feb. 8, 2009) (noting that there are nearly 600 drugs being developed for late
stage cancer, versus only seventy-three for arthritis and fifty-seven for Alzheimer's
Disease).
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2. Exception to Prior Negotiation
As noted earlier, a country can impose a compulsory license
without prior negotiation with the patent owner if the patent owner
is notified as quickly as possible and one of three conditions
exists: national emergency, situation of extreme urgency, or public
non-commercial use. z82 This section analyzes whether the Thai
licenses qualified for an exception to prior negotiation.283
Although Thailand's licenses all stated that they were for public
non-commercial use, 84 they will be analyzed under this provision
as well as the national emergency provision to help define these
terms.
3. National Emergency or Situation of Extreme Urgency
In Thailand's case, was there a national emergency regarding
any condition that could have justified imposition of a license
without prior negotiation with the patent owner? To answer this
question, the licenses on HIV treatment should be considered
separately from the licenses for heart disease and cancer
medication. Thailand could have asserted a national emergency
regarding the need to provide treatment for HIV using more
effective second-line antiretrovirals. Treating HIV is generally
considered an emergency.285  However, some suggest that
Thailand had no HIV emergency on several grounds: that
Thailand's situation was less severe than South Africa, that
Thailand had effectively limited a potential threat such that there
was no emergency, or that any epidemic that exists is somehow
inappropriate on the assumption that it is related to Thailand's sex
industry.286 Regardless of whether these accusations are true,
282 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31(b).
283 This section does not analyze whether the patent owner was notified as quickly
as possible because of lack of available information. There might be an issue as to
whether patent owners must be given direct notification, but in all cases the patent
owners were immediately aware as soon as the licenses were authorized since the
licenses were public.
284 Efavirenz License, supra note 201; Kaletra License, supra note 201; Plavix
License, supra note 201.
285 See, e.g., Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 3 1, 5(c); see also United
Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Res. 2005/23, Access to
Medication in the Context of Pandemics such as HIVAIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,
1 (recognizing access to medication for HIV/AIDS as part of the fight to health).
286 See, e.g., Bate, supra note 251, at 2 (noting that Thailand's AIDS epidemic is
"fueled by its notorious sex industry"); Theft in Thailand, supra note 1 ("it's hard to
argue that Thailand has an AIDS epidemic, when its incidence is a little over one percent
and countries such as South Africa are well over twenty percent").
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Thailand's situation raises the question of whether a national
emergency or situation of extreme urgency exists under Article 31
when non-action would result in an imminent emergency, even if
one does not presently exist.
A tougher question is whether conditions such as heart disease
and cancer can ever be considered a national emergency or
situation of extreme urgency. Although Thailand did not rely on
this basis, analyzing this exception is nonetheless important in
evaluating the potential scope of a national emergency. The
criticism from drug companies clearly indicates strong opposition
to the concept that heart disease could be a national emergency." 7
However, if a substantial number of citizens are likely to die
because of the inability to pay the patent owner's desired drug
price, does that constitute a national emergency or situation of
extreme urgency? The current criticisms underscores that there is
presently a lack of consensus on whether these conditions should
be considered national emergencies. However, as previously
noted, deciding what constitutes a national emergency is within
the discretion of an individual nation.2 8 In addition, the Doha
Public Health Declaration explicitly notes that AIDS is only one
example of when compulsory licenses can be issued-the
document refers to "other epidemics," thus opening the door for a
country to declare other conditions to be national epidemics.289
Some may suggest that an epidemic must be highly infectious and
similar in nature to the listed diseases such as HIV and malaria.29 °
On the other hand, if the number of citizens afflicted by heart
disease or cancer is equivalent to HIV, why should a country be
precluded from considering that a national epidemic? While drug
companies and even the general public may see distinctions
between communicable and non-communicable diseases, there
should be no difference from a public health perspective if each
impacts a large population similarly. Beyond what an individual
country considers an epidemic, it is important to note that the
global consensus may also change: at one time HIV epidemics in
Africa and other countries were not considered situations to which
287 See supra notes 249-254 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
289 Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 31, T 5(c).
290 See generally supra note 130 (discussing dispute concerning whether the Doha
Public Health Declaration is limited to the explicitly listed diseases, all of which are
highly infectious).
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compulsory licenses should be applied whereas now there is
generally no question that HIV is a legitimate emergency.2 9' The
infectious nature of HIV may have helped in promoting the
perception of HIV as a national emergency, but the ability of
global perception to change is nonetheless notable. However,
Thailand was probably wise not to rely on the national emergency
exception.
4. Public Non-commercial Use
Based upon the above discussion, another examination of
some of the criticisms of the Thai license on Plavix suggests that
the criticisms are not well founded under TRIPS. For example,
some suggest that the Plavix license was suspect because it was
issued by a military-based government to a for-profit entity.
292
However, the appropriate question is not whether a licensed third
party is generally a profit-making company, but whether the
licensed party is making the patented drug for public non-
commercial use. The fact that the authorized party is a for-profit
entity would not necessarily preclude its license use from
qualifying as public non-commercial use if done for the benefit of
the public, as previously discussed.293  In addition, TRIPS
291 When South Africa first amended its laws to enable broad-scale compulsory
licenses, the pharmaceutical industry urged the USTR to take action. South African
Medicines & Related Substances Control Act Amendments 90 of 1995 s. 15(c);
PHRMA, SUBMISSION OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF
AMERICA FOR THE 'SPECIAL 301' REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BARRIERS (1998)
(requesting that South Africa be named a priority foreign country). In 1998, the USTR
placed South Africa on its "priority watch list," urged the country to repeal its laws and
suspended its GSP benefits. See, e.g., L.J. Davis, A Deadly Dearth of Drugs, MOTHER
JONES, Jan. 1, 2000; South African Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, U.S. Announces Reports of Special 301 Annual Review (Apr. 30, 1999),
available at http://www.techlawjournal.com/intelpro/19990430s30l1.htm. The
pharmaceutical industry also brought suit in South Africa to halt implementation of the
law. Notice of Motion, PhARMA v. Republic of South Africa, No. 4183/98 (High
Court, Transvaal Provincial Division, (1998), available at http://www.cptech.org
/ip/health/sa/pharmasuit.html. However, after substantial public pressure, the United
States enacted an executive order stating that South Africa would no longer be pressured.
Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 C.F.R. 30,521 (2000) reprinted in 17 U.S.C. §105 (2000);
see also SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW 152-53 (Cambridge University Press
2003) (describing public protests that targeted not only pharmaceutical companies, but
also Al Gore's presidential campaign).
292 See, e.g., Commentary, Lonely Thailand, supra note 262 (suggesting that
Thailand was "exploiting vague language" in the context of suggesting that use by a
military-based government can not constitute public non-commercial use); see also notes
255-258 and accompanying text (describing objections to Thailand's licenses as
constituting public noncommercial use).
293 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31; see also supra notes 136- 146 (analyzing meaning
of the term public non-commercial use).
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expressly permits the government to authorize a third party to use
a compulsory license and makes no distinctions based upon the
type of government.2 94 There is nothing under the terms of TRIPS
Article 31 referring to the type of government entitled to use a
compulsory license, let alone any suggestion that use of licenses
by a military-based government should be subject to increased
scrutiny.2 95  In fact, other provisions of Article 31 suggest that
discretion is given to the national authority without regard to how
it is organized.296 For example, the decision of what constitutes
permissible subject matter is one that is within the province of the
national government.297
D. Procedural Requirements
1. Scope and Duration Limited to Authorized Purpose
The next question is whether the Thai licenses were
appropriately limited in scope and duration to the authorized
purpose.298 While critics tend to assert that licenses must be
generally limited,2 99 the actual TRIPS requirement is that "the
scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for
which it was authorized."3 ' The qualifying language about what
must be limited indicates that there is no general limit on
compulsory licenses.3"' As noted earlier, this clause could be
interpreted in two ways. First, it could mean that the licenses only
permit use of a patent for the stated purpose such that a licensed
entity cannot make the patented invention for an unstated purpose.
The alternative view is that the clause requires the scope and
duration of the initial license be limited by the authorized purpose;
294 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31.
295 See id.
296 See also notes 122-124 and accompanying text (explaining that member
countries have discretion to assess what constitutes an emergency); note 156 and
accompanying text (explaining that no one is permitted to second guess whether a
license is appropriately limited under art. 31(c)). See generally id. (providing no
mention or distinction of rules for compulsory licensing based on the type of
government).
297 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31; see also notes 98-106 and accompanying text
(explaining that national authorities have discretion to decide what subject matter should
be subject to compulsory license).
298 Id. art. 31 (c).
299 See supra notes 259-261 and accompanying text.
300 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3 1(c) (emphasis added).
301 id.
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in other words, how long the license lasts and the breadth of its
coverage could be limited by the authorized purpose.
This section analyzes the Thai licenses based on both of the
above interpretations. The analysis will focus first on licenses of
patented drugs for the antiretrovirals Efavirenz and Kaletra, the
heart medication Plavix, and finally, cancer drugs. Under the first
interpretation, all of the licenses would seem fine thus far since
there have been no reports that Thailand has made or imported
more of the licensed quantities than permitted; in addition, issues
with duration remains to be seen since the duration of the licenses
has not yet expired.3 °2 The second interpretation requires a bit
more analysis but will ultimately indicate that the Thai licenses
still meet this slightly more stringent requirement.
Thailand stated that the antiretroviral licenses were important
to satisfy its mandate of universal access to HIV drugs within
existing budget constraints. The Efavirenz license notes that it is
necessary because it is not only effective but has fewer toxic side
effects than some unpatented treatments.30 3 The Kaletra license
states that it is necessary for the 500,000 Thai patients that are or
who will become resistant to more basic formulations of
antiretrovirals.3 4 The licenses also note that the budget available
for treating HIV infected patients was limited and that the price for
the drugs from the patent owners was substantially higher than the
prices of generic equivalents available from some countries; for
example the price of Efavirenz in Thailand was twice as high as
the generic drug in India. 0 5  The licenses were intended to
increase accessibility by enabling the government to finance drugs
for a greater number of people.30 6 The Efavirenz license was for a
maximum of 200,000 citizens, whereas the Kaletra license was for
no more than 250,000 afflicted citizens; in both cases the licensed
drug was only available to the poorest citizens covered by one of
several national health insurance plans.30 7  The licenses are
intended to last until 2011 for Efavirenz and until 2012 for
302 Efavirenz License, supra note 201; Kaletra License, supra note 201; Plavix
License, supra note 201.
303 Efavirenz License, supra note 201.
304 Kaletra License, supra note 201.
305 Efavirenz License, supra note 201.
306 See id.; Kaletra License, supra note 201.
307 Efavirenz License, supra note 201; Kaletra License, supra note 201.
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Kaletra, the end of the patent term for each drug.30 8
The antiretroviral licenses are the least controversial with
respect to the requirement that scope and duration be limited to the
authorized purpose. The number of patients covered is relatively
limited-given that there are 500,000 HIV affected Thai citizens,
only half would be granted access under the compulsory
licenses.3"9 In addition, duration for the remainder of the patent
term seems reasonable since HIV is a long-term condition and
without such treatment patients will succumb to opportunistic
infections and also infect additional citizens.3"' The need to
contain HIV infections is generally understood as critical to avoid
an epidemic that once established is much more difficult to
control.
One important question is the extent to which the existence of
a national mandate to provide access to antiretrovirals should be
relevant to determining whether use is limited to the authorized
purpose. On one hand, if a nation has a national policy, or even
legal mandate to provide access to medicine, a compulsory license
designed to help achieve that purpose would seem to provide a
legitimate reason to help justify a license. However, some might
suggest that any nation could claim a policy to promote health and
proceed to then license any and all drugs. While this approach
would clearly not be endorsed by major pharmaceutical patent
owners, developing countries that never had patents prior to
TRIPS might consider this approach a reasonable accommodation
of agreeing to provide patents. TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 do suggest
that policies other than the economic interests of the patent owner
must be considered.311  Moreover, the Doha Public Health
Declaration clarifies that TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 must be
considered in interpreting all provisions of TRIPS.3"2 While an
argument can be made that this provision of TRIPS permits a
country to license a number of drugs that are deemed necessary for
the "purpose" of providing universal access to drugs, it is likely
that a country that aggressively pursued this option would face a
308 Efavirenz License, supra note 201; Kaletra License, supra note 201.
309 Efavirenz License, supra note 201; Kaletra License, supra note 201.
310 See, e.g., Bertozzi et al., HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment, in DISEASE
CONTROL PRIORITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 351, 353-55 (Dean T. Jamison et al.
eds., Oxford University Press 2d ed. 2006).
311 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 7-8.
312 Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 31, 5(a).
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WTO panel dispute. Unless and until that happens, there may be
other issues that mitigate against aggressive use of compulsory
licenses beyond the TRIPS arena, as further discussed in Part VI.
The next question is whether the license for Plavix, which was
strongly criticized by patent owners, is limited to its authorized
purpose. The license states it is necessary to address the cost
involved in treating Thai patients who would otherwise be subject
to high mortality and disability because heart disease is one of the
top three causes of death.313 Despite acknowledging that some
non-drug preventative measures can be helpful, the license notes
that Plavix is nonetheless necessary and an effective treatment to
prevent undue morbidity and mortality.314 In addition, the license
suggests that whereas only twenty percent of currently covered
patients can access the drug, a compulsory license should
dramatically increase accessibility to six or twelve times the
current coverage.3" 5 Unlike the initial antiretroviral licenses, the
Plavix license states that it is to be provided to an "unlimited
number of patients" who are covered by government health
insurance, which are typically the lowest income citizens, for the
duration of the patent or until "no essential need" exists.316
Although there is no specific number of patients noted in the
license, the fact that only patients who are covered by the
governmental plan intended for lower income citizens does
provide a limit.3 7 Moreover, on the important question of whether
the license is limited with regard to its purpose, the license does
seem to be limited to the purpose of ensuring greater access to
Plavix.3"8
Whether Plavix is the most effective treatment or even
necessary in light of other available treatments raises the question
of whether TRIPS permits nations to decide whether patented
drugs may be compulsory licensed when alternatives exist.
Arguably, any compulsory license would seem to achieve the
purpose of lowering costs. While most of the criticism concerning
313 Plavix License, supra note 201 ("myocardial ischemia and cerebro-vascular
accident are the most serious public health burden because of high mortality and
disability," with morality rate among the top three).
314 Id. (noting that Plavix is necessary for secondary prevention of thrombosis).
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 See id.
318 See id.
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Plavix focused on the fact that heart disease is not an
"emergency, ' a better question is likely whether a patented drug
is necessary to treat heart disease when unpatented alternatives,
including aspirin, exist."z The Thai White Paper did not attempt
to suggest that Plavix was superior to other alternatives; rather, it
stated that it was "at least as effective as or more effective than
Aspirin."32' There is notably nothing in TRIPS that requires that
less restrictive options be pursued, but it is likely to nonetheless be
expected by patent owners.322
The final question is whether the Thai licenses for cancer were
adequately limited to their authorized purpose. Each license
declares it is necessary because cancer is a leading cause of death
that results in a serious economic burden and even financial
catastrophe for patients and their families who have low- or
middle-income status.323 Three of the four licenses were for drugs
noted as effective treatments for lung and breast cancer, which are
stated to be of highest incidence among Thai men and women
respectively.3 4 The licenses each state they will last either until
the patent expires or until there is "no essential need. 3 25 As with
the Plavix license, there is no absolute number given on the
number of Thai citizens to be covered but the licenses state that
they will only be for lower income citizens covered by
government insurance.326
This analysis suggests that almost any license can meet the
requirement that it be limited in scope and duration to its purpose.
In each of the above cases, the licenses met their stated purpose: of
providing universal access to antiretrovirals in light of a limited
319 See supra notes 249-254 and accompanying text.
320 TEN BURNING ISSUEs-GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note 10, at 14.
321 Id.
322 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31.
323 Docetaxel License, supra note 222; Erlotinib License, supra note 222; Imatinib
License, supra note 222; Letrozole License, supra note 222. In addition, the Thai White
Paper notes cancer has been a leading cause of death for more than a decade and is no
less serious than HIV/AIDS. TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note
220, at 2.
324 Docetaxel License, supra note 222; Erlotinib License, supra note 222 (noting
that lung cancer is highest among Thai men); Imatinib License, supra note 222;
Letrozole License, supra note 222 (noting that breast cancer is highest among Thai
women).
325 Docetaxel License, supra note 222; Erlotinib Licence, supra note 222; Imatinib
License, supra note 222; Letrozole License, supra note 222.
326 Docetaxel License, supra note 222; Erlotinib Licence, supra note 222; Imatinib
License, supra note 222; Letrozole License, supra note 222.
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budget, of providing cheaper heart medication that is at least as
effective as unpatented aspirin, and of providing cheaper cancer
treatment to limit a leading cause of death. However, each group
of licenses pushes the boundaries of what limit, if any, exists in the
TRIPS requirement that the license be limited in scope to its
purpose. The literal language does not require that the purpose be
one that is globally accepted; rather the key TRIPS language is
that it be "authorized," thus suggesting a bona fide government
action but not an action subject to second-guessing by other
countries. 27 Accordingly, the fact that only Efavirenz is listed on
the WHO list of essential drugs and no cancer drugs are listed on
the WHO list is technically irrelevant to a TRIPS analysis.32 8
Indeed, prior scholars suggest that this particular TRIPS
requirement could be easily satisfied by developing countries
wanting to use TRIPS flexibilities,329 with some even suggesting
that compulsory licensing could be a tool to enable governments to
exercise price control.33 While some might suggest that this
flexibility indicates that TRIPS is overly permissive with regard to
compulsory licensing, it could also be interpreted as an appropriate
deference to national decisions regarding health priorities, an area
that has traditionally been within the scope of national
discretion.33' Moreover, it should be noted that this is only one of
327 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31.
328 World Health Organization, WHO Model List of Essential Medicines (2007),
http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/essentialmedicines/en/.
329 See, e.g., CORREA 2007, supra note 29, at 320 (noting that a compulsory license
may be limited, but also suggesting that it may nonetheless cover all claims of the patent
for the duration of the term); NuNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT
RIGHTS 327 (Kluwer Law International 2d ed. 2005) (stating that the duration must be
tailored to the needs); WATAL, supra note 101, at 321-24. Others, however, have not as
fully analyzed the possibilities of this provision. See, e.g., RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS,
supra note 108, at 472-73 (noting briefly that the duration may be limited and that there
may be restrictions on the use).
330 REICHMANN WITH HASENZAHL, supra note 3, at 15. Professors Abbott and
Reichmann have further asserted that there is no real difference between price controls of
drugs-something that industrialized countries often use-and compulsory licenses of
drugs when the price is too high. Abbott & Reichmann, supra note 31, at 955.
331 One scholar has suggested that in interpreting other WTO agreements, WTO
panels have indicated some deference to national health policies. M. Gregg Bloche,
WTO Deference to National Health Policy: Toward an Interpretive Principle, 5 J. INT'L.
ECON. L. 825, 835-37 (2002). In addition, other scholars have suggested interpreting
TRIPS in the context of broader international norms, such as the norm of the right to
health, together with the subsidiary right to health. See Barbosa et al., supra note 57, at
118-20. However, thus far, WTO panels have actually been criticized for interpreting
TRIPS too literally to the detriment of public health. See, e.g., Howse, supra note 58, at
496-501; see also Okediji, supra note 70, at 84 (criticizing panels for giving inadequate
weight to social considerations).
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the many requirements of TRIPS Article 3 1.332
2. Adequate Remuneration
There has been extensive discussion that the licenses are
financially detrimental to pharmaceutical companies as well as
their general incentive to innovate,333 but little discussion of
whether the royalties provided in each of these cases are adequate.
Some comments suggest that reasonable royalties would be
inherently inadequate because they would "almost always leave
the rights holder with far less than a reasonable economic
return. 334 While it may be true that a compulsory license provides
below market rates and even inadequate economic returns, there is
no requirement that compulsory licenses provide market rates. 335
Rather, this objection seems to be to any compulsory license-in
direct contravention of what TRIPS permits.336
The question is whether the royalty rate provided in each of
the licenses satisfies the TRIPS requirement that the amount be
"adequate . . . taking into account the economic value of the
authorization. ,33' As noted earlier, adequate in this case means
satisfactory but not ideal, such that it must be lower than the patent
owner's generally preferred price.338 The initial Thai licenses for
the antiretrovirals and Plavix provide a royalty of one-half percent
of the total sale price.339  Thailand's white paper on the
compulsory licenses explained that it was establishing a royalty
rate of between one-half to two percent of sale value based upon
the range used in most developing countries for public non-
commercial use with the lower and upper limits being used for
high and low retail value drugs respectively. 340 Despite setting
two percent as the maximum, Thailand's licenses on the cancer
332 Id.
333 See infra notes 391-397 and accompanying text (noting concerns of
pharmaceutical companies, as well as some nations that Thailand's licenses are
inconsistent with innovation policy).
334 Drug Patent Piracy, supra note 1.
335 See generally TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31 (providing for reasonable
compensation, but not mentioning market rates).
336 Id.
337 Id. art. 31(h).
338 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
339 Efavirenz License supra note 201; Kaletra License, supra note 201; Plavix
License, supra note 201.
340 TEN BURNING ISSUES-GoVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note 10, at 11.
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drugs each provided three percent of the sale value of the drug.341
Whether the amounts are adequate may be one of the least
clear issues with respect to a TRIPS analysis. There are no prior
WTO panel decisions. In addition, it is unclear whether a member
country would bring a dispute before the WTO, given that disputes
thus far have been based upon clear violations rather than
ambiguous terms. Moreover, unlike most other TRIPS disputes
there is an ability to challenge the remuneration amount in
domestic courts since TRIPS already requires that member states
provide a means to challenge both a compulsory license as well as
any remuneration decision.342 There has been little discussion of
this issue with regard to Thailand's actions. Even criticisms of
Thailand's licenses rarely discuss the amount of remuneration, and
there are not any alternative royalty rates proposed; rather, the
alternative discussed is always simply not imposing a license.343
Even amidst the lack of clarity, there is a question about
whether the amounts of remuneration are proper in light of the fact
that TRIPS requires that the level of remuneration take into
account the economic value of the authorization. Is it possible that
the economic value of the authorization for two HIV drugs is
equivalent to the value of the heart treatment drug Plavix? In
addition, what is the economic value of the cancer drugs? On the
341 Compare id. with TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 220.
342 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31.
343 See, e.g., Bate & Boateng, supra note 23, at 7 (arguing that prices set by drug
companies are required for continued research and development without any
consideration of an appropriate royalty under a compulsory license and in fact
characterizing compulsory licenses as "theft"); Patent Remedy, supra note 5, passim
(arguing that compulsory licenses are only permitted under "extraordinary
circumstances" and suggesting that Thailand failed to comply without mentioning any
specific violation, let alone any discussion of what amount of remuneration would be
adequate); Thailand and the Drug Patent Wars, supra note 251, passim (suggesting
Thailand's licenses were not compliant with TRIPS because they were granted in an
inadequate emergency situation, but never addressing appropriate level of remuneration);
Benjamin Krohmal, Knowledge Ecology International, Notes from March 16th 2007 U.S.
Capitol Briefing on Thailand's Compulsory Licenses, Statement of Richard Kjeldgaard,
of PhRMA (Mar. 16, 2007) http://www.keionline.org/index.php?option=
com content&task=view&id=37 (avoiding discussion of whether Thailand's licenses
were consistent with TRIPS by characterizing such issues as "legal technicalities" and
instead generally arguing that compulsory licenses are destructive to drug development).
The lack of discussion of appropriate remuneration is widespread. See, e.g., Robert
Steinbrook, Thailand and the Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz, Perspective, 356 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 544, 544 (Feb. 8, 2007) (mentioning the amount of remuneration provided
in the licenses, but not discussing the actual TRIPS requirement or whether the Thai
licenses would comply with TRIPS); A Gathering Storm, supra note 260, passim
(providing an overview of concerns about compulsory licensing, but no mention of
remuneration requirement, or what it means).
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one hand, an argument could be made that the economic value was
taken into account since the royalty rate provided for the cancer
drugs (three percent) was substantially higher than the HIV drugs
(one-half percent). On the other hand, even amongst the HIV
drugs some may suggest that the economic value was not taken
into account since the royalty is identical, yet Kaletra is a second-
line HIV treatment whereas Efavirenz is a first-line HIV
treatment. 34
While the earlier discussion suggests that national assessments
of adequate remuneration should be given deference, additional
discussion and clarification on this issue would be valuable.
Perhaps additional detail on royalty rates for compulsory licenses
that have previously been issued in both developed and developing
countries would be pertinent for both general discussions.
Canada's recent amendment to its patent act to allow compulsory
licenses for exports to developing countries provides one model
where the royalty is set as a function of the country's standing on
the United Nations Human Development Index, with rates ranging
from two-hundredths of a percent to a maximum of four percent.345
In addition, the WHO has already compiled detailed information
regarding remuneration amounts in a variety of different countries
and contexts; however, this additional information has thus far not
yielded a productive discussion.346 Rather, drug companies
dispute what constitutes a compulsory license, do not provide
alternative rates, and instead seem to focus on trying to eliminate
compulsory licenses. 347  Accordingly, while disputes over the
definition of "reasonable remuneration" may not seem the most
likely candidate for WTO panel resolution, some action at the
WTO level may eventually be necessary whether through an
344 Kaletra License, supra note 201; Efavirenz License, supra note 201.
345 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Use of Patents for Humanitarian
Purposes, http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/en/wrOO 119e.ht
ml (last visited Feb 8, 2009) (noting that royalties are calculated by multiplying the
monetary value of the supply agreement between the holder of the authorization and the
importing country by an amount that fluctuates on the basis of that country's standing on
the United Nations Human Development Index, with a maximum royalty rate of four
percent).
346 WHO-REMUNERATION GUIDELINES, supra note 179 (providing a variety of
approaches to remuneration based upon guidelines by the Japanese Patent Office,
Canadian Export Guidelines, and the UNDP Human Development Report).
347 The lack of productive discussion may be based on drug company concerns that
extend the remuneration rate of a single compulsory license to related issues, such as if a
low rate in one country were to be used by a wealthier country that engages in reference
pricing.
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official dispute settlement panel report or a declaration along the
lines of the Doha Public Health Declaration.
E. Conclusion
While there are interpretative issues regarding whether the
Thai licenses are appropriate, they are not the same issues raised
by critics. All of the licensed drugs-for HIV, heart disease, and
cancer-were appropriate subject matter under TRIPS because
TRIPS does not limit the use of compulsory licenses to any
specific list of diseases and that approach was rejected during
negotiations.348 Moreover, contrary to public opinion, there is no
requirement that licenses be limited to emergencies.349
Accordingly, criticisms that heart disease is not an emergency are
simply irrelevant to compliance with current TRIPS requirements;
how these issues should be considered as a matter of policy is
addressed in Part VI.
The real issue is what constitutes public non-commercial use,
such that prior negotiation with the patent owner before issuance
of a compulsory license can be waived. The default rule is that
parties should first engage in an attempt to reach a voluntary
license before a compulsory license is issued.35 However, TRIPS
clearly states that this requirement can be waived for an
emergency, a situation of extreme urgency, or a public non-
commercial use.35" ' Thailand's initial three licenses were imposed
without prior negotiation-at least not with specific notification of
the possibility of a compulsory license-and the licenses each
stated that they were for public non-commercial use.352 There are
two issues here. First, does prior negotiation under TRIPS require
that the patent owner be informed that a license is imminent? Or
does any negotiation with a patent owner, even years before a
license is issued, qualify as prior negotiation? Arguably prior
negotiation under Article 31 requires the patent owner be informed
that a license is a possibility.353 However, even with that issue
resolved, other aspects of the prior negotiation requirement remain
348 See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
349 See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
350 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3 1(b).
351 Id.
352 Efavirenz License, supra note 201; Kaletra License, supra note 201; Plavix
License, supra note 201.
353 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3 1(b).
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unclear. For example, what constitutes negotiation for a
reasonable time and under reasonable terms? The patent owner is
likely to have a very different view than the country desirous of a
compulsory license.
There is a reasonable argument that Thailand's first three
licenses to provide drugs without profit to its citizens were for a
public non-commercial use-especially since the negotiating
history indicates that some member states, namely the United
States, wanted a broad interpretation of this provision and that
interpretation was not opposed by others.354  Because what
constitutes public non-commercial use is currently unclear, this
rationale might be the weakest aspect of Thailand's license
justification, but yet not a situation where Thailand clearly
violated TRIPS.
Thailand also satisfied the procedural requirements under
TRIPS with regard to issuing compulsory licenses. Importantly,
because TRIPS only requires licenses to be limited in scope with
regard to the authorized purpose and not limited in the abstract,
each of the licenses seems appropriate.355  Whether this
requirement is interpreted as simply using the license for the
initially designated purpose, or whether the scope and duration are
substantively limited to the stated purpose, the licenses should
satisfy the requirement. The amount of HIV drugs was limited
with respect to only treating a fraction of HIV patients.356 In
addition, the scope of the license in terms of its duration was
arguably limited with regard to the purpose-all the licensed drugs
were to treat long-term conditions, such that the license was
necessary for the duration of the patent term.357 Similarly, the
number of patients covered was also limited in all cases because
only Thailand's poorest citizens were covered and not the ones
who could afford the market-price of drugs offered by the patent
owner.
358
A possible unresolved issue generally ignored by patent
354 See supra note 104 (noting that the United States wanted to ensure that TRIPS
permitted the United States continued use of a law allowing use of any patent without
authorization of the patent owner when the use was by the U.S. government or those
authorized by the U.S. government).
355 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31.
356 Efavirenz License, supra note 201; Kaletra License, supra note 201.
357 Efavirenz License, supra note 201; Kaletra License, supra note 201.
358 Efavirenz License, supra note 201; Kaletra License, supra note 201.
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owners is whether Thailand's remuneration was adequate under
TRIPS as opposed to adequate based on desired profitability. The
initial licenses only offered one-half percent of the net sales, with
the cancer licenses offering two percent of the net sales.359 The
patent owners never challenged these numbers directly, but instead
made statements suggesting that any compulsory license would be
inadequate. The patent owners could have challenged both the
license, as well as the royalty rates under the Thai law-legal
options required by TRIPS Article 31-but declined to do SO.360
The question of what rate is appropriate for compulsory licenses in
general is likely to be an issue even if it has thus far not been an
issue with the Thai licenses. There are already ample resources
that provide various mechanisms.3 6' However, whether patent
owners are willing to discuss actual royalty rates rather than
challenge compulsory licenses in their entirety is yet to be
determined.
VI. Concerns Beyond TRIPS
Although Part V concluded that Thailand's licenses could be
reasonably considered within the scope of TRIPS Article 3 1, there
are important related issues that must be considered by Thailand,
as well as any other country interested in considering compulsory
licenses. In particular, retaliatory acts against Thailand cast a
troubling shadow over TRIPS' legitimacy that needs to be
addressed. This Part provides an overview of retaliatory actions
and also explores underlying issues that may fuel not only the
present controversy regarding TRIPS, but also the retaliation.
A. Retaliation and Repercussions Beyond TRIPS
1. Drug Company Retaliation
One important problem with issuing compulsory licenses is
that patent owners may retaliate by withdrawing other drugs from
the marketplace. Thailand, like most countries, requires drug
manufacturers to establish that new drugs are safe and effective
359 Docataxel License, supra note 222; Efavirenz License, supra note 201; Erlotinib
License, supra note 222; Imatinib License, supra note 222; Kaletra License, supra note
201; Letrozole License, supra note supra note 222; Plavix License, supra note 201.
360 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31(i)-(); Thai Patent Act B.E. 2322 §§ 50-51.
361 See discussion supra notes 179-182 and accompanying text.
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before they can be sold.362 After Thailand issued a compulsory
license on Abbott's HIV drug Kaletra, Abbott announced that it
was withdrawing its application to sell seven new drugs in
Thailand including its new HIV drug, Aluvia, that was well-suited
to Thailand's climate.363 Abbott's action is believed to be the first
such retaliation by a drug company to a compulsory license;364
prompting substantial criticism, calls for boycotts, and protests at
Abbott's shareholder meeting.365 Although Abbott eventually
decided to register Aluvia and offer it at a discounted rate to
Thailand, it has not changed its position on the other drugs.366
362 Thailand Drug Act B.E. 2510 (1967); see also Thailand Food and Drug
Administration, Pre-marking Control-licensing, http://www.fda.moph.go.th/eng/
drug/pre.stm (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (discussing pre-marketing registration
requirements).
363 See discussion supra note 26 and accompanying text. Besides the new heat-
stable version of Kaletra, sold under the market name Aluvia, Abbott withdrew painkiller
Brufen, antibiotic Abbotic, blood clot drug Clivarine, arthritis drug Humira, blood
pressure drug Tarka and kidney disease drug Zemplar. See, e.g., Abbott Pharmaceuticals
in Thailand: Fact Sheet (OxFam America), Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.oxfamamerica
.org/whatwedo/campaigns/access to medicines/newspublications/Abbott%20in%2OTh
ailand [hereinafter OxFam America Fact Sheet].
364 See, e.g., Marwaan Macan-Markar, Thailand: U.S. Pharma Giant Faces Public
Boycott, IPS, Mar. 21, 2007, http://www.aegis.com/news/ips/2007/IP070310.html;
Schuettler, supra note 243; U.S. Drugmaker Abbott, Thailand Face Off in AIDS Drug
Patent Stalemate, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 6, 2007, at 2; see also Hookway & Zamiska,
supra note 194 (noting that some referred to Abbot's action as the "nuclear option").
365 See, e.g., Nirmal Ghosh, Battle Rages Over Thai Actions on Aids Drugs, STRAITS
TIMES, May, 28, 2007, available at http://www.tillekeandgibbins.com/
Publications/pdf/interview thai actions-on aids drugs.pdf; Macan-Markar, supra note
364; Bruce Jaspen, AIDS Controversy Dominates Abbot Labs' Annual Meeting, CHIC.
TRIB, Apr. 27, 2007, available at http://www.abbottsgreed.com/index.php?
title=AIDS controversy dominates AbbottLabs%27_annual meeting; Tan Ee Lyn,
AIDS Activists Call for Boycott of Abbott Products, Apr. 25, 2007,
www.abbottsgreed.com/index.php?title=AIDS-activists-call for boycott of Abbott
products (noting calls for boycotts of Abbott products); OxFam America Fact Sheet,
supra note 363.
366 See, e.g., Doubts Over Abbott's Latest AIDS Drug Claim, NATION, Apr. 24,
2007, http://www.actupny.org/reports/abbottgreed.html (reporting Abbott's decision to
introduce Aluvia in the Thai market at a lower price in reaction to public controversy);
Hookway & Zamiska, supra note 194 (noting that in response to criticism, Abbott is
offering to sell the new version of Kaletra if its patent is respected, but that Abbott
remains unwilling to reinstate the other six applications); Nicholas Zamiska, Abbott's
Thai Pact May Augur Pricing Shift, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2007, at A3 (quoting Abbott
Chief Executive Miles White as stating that "in the name of access for patients," Abbott
had decided to sell Aluvia at a new price that Abbott asserts is lower than any generic if
it is not subject to compulsory licensing, but that it will continue to withhold the other
six drugs from the Thai market); see also Press Release, Abbott Laboratories, Abbott
Agrees with WHO Director-General to Expand Access to Kaletra/Aluvia (April 10,
2007) (noting that Abbott will offer Kaletra/Aluvia to more than forty low- and middle-
income countries at a new price of $1000 per patient per year, which is allegedly lower
than any generic price available and a reduction of fifty-five percent from the prior price,
but without stating which specific countries are included).
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Abbott's decision not to introduce certain drugs in Thailand is
beyond the reach of TRIPS. TRIPS requires nations to patent
certain drugs but does not require patented drugs to be sold.367
Accordingly, despite the fact that TRIPS provides the flexibility of
using a compulsory license, that flexibility may be illusory if
patent owners can respond by withdrawing other drugs from the
market. After all, what good is a compulsory license of one drug
for a relatively small population of 50,000 (the number for which
Kaletra was licensed),368 if it results in half a dozen other drugs
being unavailable to all citizens of a country? The scope of the
risk may be a function of what drugs are at issue-although
Abbott remains steadfast in declining to sell certain drugs in
Thailand, most of the drugs were not unique.3 69
Abbott's action underscores that whether patients have access
to medicine does not solely depend on patent issues, but also on
whether a patent owner elects to seek permission to sell the
patented drug. Technically, any entity that has a compulsory
license could seek permission to sell a patented drug. However,
the relevant laws to approve the sale of a new drug entail a
substantial investment of time and resources; multiple stages of
clinical testing of the drug in the laboratory, in animals, as well as
in humans must be completed-a process that generally takes
years and millions of dollars.370 A company launching a newly
patented drug can recover these expenses by charging more for the
new drug.37' However, if a second company seeks to sell a drug
367 TRIPS, supra note 7.
368 Kaletra License, supra note 201.
369 Most of the drugs that Abbott withdrew from the Thai marketplace have analogs
offered by competitors. Two exceptions are the arthritis drug Humira, and the HIV drug
Aluvia. However, Abbott notably bowed to public pressure in reversing its decision on
Aluvia. See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
370 See, e.g., U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 19-20 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf, DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 42 (estimating
cost of developing one drug to be as high as $1.3 billion); PhRMA, Innovation,
www.phrma.org/innovation (suggesting that the average period of drug development is
fifteen years) (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
371 Patricia Danzon & Adrian Towse, Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals:
Reconciling Access, R&D and Patients, 3 INT'L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 183, 185
(2003) (noting that drug companies sell drugs at more than marginal cost to subsidize
research costs). But see ANGELL, supra note 42, at 51 (quoting president and CEO of
Merck as stating that "the price of medicines isn't determined by their research costs");
Donald W. Light & Joel Lexchin, Foreign Free Riders and the High Price of U.S.
Medicines, 331 BRIT. MED. J. 958, 959 (2005) (stating that the claim of drug companies
that prices must be set fifty to a hundred times production costs to recover research and
development costs is unsubstantiated since such companies have not made underlying
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already on the market, the second company can often rely on the
safety and efficacy studies of the first company's drug and then
simply establish bioequivalence to the first drug, entailing minimal
cost and time.372 This bioequivalence is important with respect to
compulsory licenses because licenses are generally issued for
drugs already sold, such that the approval costs are low.373 On the
other hand, if a compulsory license is issued for a drug that has
never been previously sold, the license may be ineffective in
reducing final costs to consumers because the necessary market
approval tests may be expensive enough that the licensed company
cannot sell drugs at a price that is both accessible to consumers
and yields a profit.374
The costs involved in research and development of a drug,
including the clinical tests necessary to obtain approval to sell a
drug, are often a backdrop to discussions of compulsory licensing
policy. Patent owners typically suggest that compulsory licenses
threaten the patent system by removing research incentives with
the implicit assumption that patents are necessary to recoup the
costs of not only marketed drugs, but also the many drugs that are
investigated but ultimately deemed unmarketable.375 While this
data available for public inspection). Nonetheless, drug companies continue to price
patented drugs at a premium and to even steeply increase drug prices. See, e.g., Julie
Appleby, Prices for Some Drugs Skyrocket, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2008, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/drugs/2008-08-07-costlydrugs -N.htm
(noting that some companies have increased prices by a hundred percent and more in a
single year).
372 See, e.g., U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM
GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY xii, 44 (1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/
pharm.pdf (noting that the process to establish bioequivalence only takes a few years and
a cost of $1-2 million); Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 58, 2.5 (noting
that the approval time for a new drug is eight to twelve years, whereas the approval for a
generic drug that is based on the original drug is three to six and half years).
373 U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 372, at 44.
374 Brook Baker noted that Abbott's withdrawal of Aluvia from the Thai registration
process would make the approval of generic versions of Aluvia more difficult. Posting
of Brook Baker to IP Disputes in Medicines blog, Standing Up to Abbott's Decision to
Withhold Registration and Marketing of Life-Saving Medicines-A New Variant of
Pharmaceutical Apartheid, http://www.cptech.org/blogs/ipdisputesinmedicine/2007/03/
standing-up-to-abbotts-decision-to.html (March 13, 2007, 11:48 EST).
375 See, e.g., Abbott Press Release, supra note 366 (noting that patents must exist so
that there are incentives for research into new drugs); Press Release, Merck, Statement
on Brazilian Government's Decision to Issue Compulsory License for Stocrin (May 4,
2007) (asserting that compulsory licenses ultimately hurt patients by eroding the
incentive for research into new therapies) [hereinafter Merck Press Release]; see also
Bate & Boateng, supra note 23, at 6-7 (suggesting that compulsory licenses or
discounted prices for middle income countries will erode incentive for research).
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may seem at first blush a convincing argument, it neglects the fact
that drug manufacturers obtain substantial profits in a relatively
small number of markets, such that additional sales in middle-
income and developing countries are de minimus. 76 In addition,
although drug companies do finance clinical testing, they are
among the most profitable businesses. 7 The financial well- being
of drug companies is fostered not only by the high prices of
patented drugs, but also by government subsidies through tax
incentives, as well as by patent rights for federally funded
inventions.378
2. Unilateral Trade Sanction-Retaliation by Individual
Countries
Another very real implication of compulsory licenses is that
countries may be subject to unilateral economic sanctions, or at
least political pressure, imposed by individual countries even if a
license is TRIPS-compliant.379 Economic implications are a major
376 See, e.g., Richard M. Scheffler & Vikram Pathania, Medicines and Vaccines for
the World's Poorest: Is There Any Prospect For Public-Private Cooperation?, 1
GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH 10 (2005), available at http://www.globalizationandhealth.
com/content/l/l/10 (noting that the United States, Europe and Japan accounted for
nearly eighty percent of the market in 2002); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE
WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION 32 (2004) [hereinafter WHO, WORLD MEDICINES
SITUATION] (noting that high income countries consume over ninety percent of world
medicine, despite only comprising fifteen percent of the global population); Outterson,
supra note 22, at 285 n.34 (noting that SEC filings confirm that between seven and a half
and ten percent of global revenues are from developing countries).
377 See, e.g., Fortune 500-2008 Report, http://money.cnn.com/magazines
/fortune/fortune5OO/2008/perforners/industries/profits (noting that the pharmaceutical
industry is the third most profitable industry). In addition, although the current business
model has drug companies providing for clinical testing, that business model is not
necessarily immutable. Indeed, one scholar has suggested that because of the importance
of clinical testing to society, as well as the potential for bias, such studies should be
publicly funded. See, e.g., Tracy R. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding and
Public Oversight of Clinical Trials, 4(1) ECONOMISTS' VOICE 1, 1-2 (2007), available at
http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/issl/art3/.
378 See, e.g., David Henry & Joel Lexchin, The Pharmaceutical Industry as a
Medicines Provider, 360 LANCET 1590, 1593 (2002); Outterson, supra note 22, at 287-
88.
379 Some have also suggested that compulsory licenses will also cause economic
hardship if businesses are reluctant to invest in a country where they fear their rights will
not be protected. PHRMA SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2008 35 (2008), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeSectors/lntellectualProperty/Special 301 Public Sub
missions_2008/asset upload file 109_14495.pdf (asserting that Thailand's licenses are of
concern to the entire business community because the environment is perceived as
"harmful to international investors and which will ultimately work to disadvantage Thai
citizens"); Anuchit Ngyuyen, Thailand Risks Losing Investments from U.S. on Patents
Dispute, Mar. 20, 2007, BLOOMBERG.COM (quoting Daniel Christman, of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce as stating that "the vast majority of companies that have been
surveyed by us have expressed serious concern about future investment climate in
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problem since any cost-saving from issuing a compulsory license
may be dwarfed by more substantial economic sanctions.
The United States, for example, has enacted a number of trade
laws that permit it to investigate other countries and potentially
impose economic sanctions for a variety of perceived infractions,
including intellectual property laws that are viewed as inadequate.
In particular, the United States can withdraw trade benefits or
impose duties on goods for a country that fails to provide
"adequate and effective" protection for U.S. intellectual property
rights.38° By statute, the U.S. Office of Trade Representatives
(USTR) must issue an annual report, called the "Special 301"
report that lists countries with inadequate levels of intellectual
property protection.381 The worst offenders are labeled priority
Thailand"); Peter Mandelson July 10 Letter, supra note 27 (suggesting that Thailand's
use of compulsory licenses "could lead to the isolation of Thailand from the global
biotechnology investment community); Merck Press Release, supra note 375 (asserting
that Brazil's compulsory licenses "will have a negative impact on Brazil's reputation as
an industrialized country seeking to attract inward investment"). But see Letter from Dr.
Mongkol Na Songkhla, Minister of Pub. Health to the Hon. Peter Mandelson, Member of
the European Commission (Aug. 21, 2007), available at http://www.keionline.org/misc-
docs/thai/07082 1 -MoPH-PM.pdf (stating that Thailand "would like to learn, as implied
in your letter, examples of . . . the isolation of any European Country that have
implemented the CL on some medicines, from the global biotechnology investment
community").
380 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2497, § 2411 (2000). Imposition of trade
sanctions is technically discretionary. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d). In addition, the United
States can remove trade preferences that are usually provided under the GSP based upon
similar perceptions of inadequate intellectual property rights. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(5)
(permitting consideration of "the extent to which [a] country ... provide[s] adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights"). Although being listed on the
Special 301 report is considered the worst penalty, withdrawal of preferences under GSP
is also an issue. See, e.g., Phusadee Arunmas, Thailand Could Face Sanctions after
lobbying by drug firms, BANGKOK POST, Jan 31, 2008, available at
http://www.thailandwto.org/Doc/News/5817.pdf; Robert Weissman, Compulsory
Licenses Are the Right Medicine, NATION, Feb. 23, 2008, available at
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/02/23/opinion/opinion_30066217.php (noting
that that PhRMA has suggested that Thailand's GSP status could be threatened). On the
other hand, Thailand may be liable to lose some of its GSP status regardless of its
compulsory licenses because it has become a more prosperous nation. See, e.g.,
Weissman, supra; Letter from Professor Brook Baker et al. to Samak Sundaravej, Thai
Prime Minister (Feb. 19, 2008), available at http://www.cl4life.net/th/media/legal.pdf
Indeed, Thailand's White Paper concerning its cancer compulsory licenses suggests that
reductions in GSP thus far have not been a problem. See TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON
CANCER DRUGS, supra note 219, at 11.
381 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a). In addition, the report is not an independent assessment by
a government agency; the statute explicitly permits the USTR to consider information
submitted by interested persons. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(2)(B) (permitting input from
interested parties in determining priority foreign countries); see also PETER DRAHOS
WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE., INFORMATION FEUDALISM 94-99 (New Press 2002) (discussing
close cooperation between USTR and companies in determining countries to include on
Special 301 list). Accordingly, a major drug company and patent owner can not only
directly retaliate against a country such as Thailand, but also suggest that the U.S.
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countries and are automatically subject to investigations that may
result in the withdrawal of trade benefits.382 Countries can and
have been listed on the Special 301 report even if they are in full
compliance with TRIPS and other international commitments.383
Typically, once a country is listed as a priority watch country, it is
forced to enter into a trade agreement with the United States that
imposes heightened standards of intellectual property.384 Such an
agreement may ensure that a country does not issue any further
compulsory licenses by placing additional restrictions on
compulsory licenses in the agreement.385
Thailand provides a useful illustration-Thailand's
compulsory licenses were noted as an issue in the 2007 and 2008
Special 301 reports, but Thailand was not alleged to have violated
any specific provision of TRIPS.386 Indeed, the United States may
impose additional economic sanctions.
382 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1) (2000) (providing that priority foreign countries have the
"most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices" that either deny "adequate and
effective intellectual property rights" or deny fair and equitable market access to US
persons that rely on intellectual property rights); 19 U.S.C. §2242(e).
383 19 U.S.C. § 2242(d)(4) (2000) (noting that a foreign country may be determined
to deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights "notwithstanding
the fact that the foreign country may be in compliance" with TRIPS).
384 For example, the United States has offered to remove Thailand from the Special
301 Priority Watch List if Thailand promises to increase protection of intellectual
property rights along the lines of a prior proposed Free Trade Agreement. See Pennapa
Hongthong, U.S. Action Plan Must be Opposed, Groups Tell Government, NATION, May
9, 2007, available at http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id article=8268; Posting of
Brook Baker to Healthcaregap.org, U.S. Action Plan for Thailand Comes Straight from
Pharma, http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2007-May/011145.html (May 9,
2007, 12:49 EST). Thailand had previously rejected a Free Trade Agreement with the
United States on ground that it would be inconsistent with national sovereignty and
human rights. See, e.g., Third World Network, Thai Human Rights Commission
Criticises FTA with U.S., Jan. 26, 2007, BILATERALS.ORG, http://www.bilaterals.org
/article.php3?idarticle=7012.
385 The United States has entered into a number of bilateral and regional trade
agreements that are more restrictive than TRIPS. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Singapore, art. 16.7(6)(a)-(b), May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 (requiring "reasonable and
entire" compensation, rather than the adequate compensation required under TRIPS);
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Korea, June 30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 642 (providing no
provision analogous to TRIPS Article 31 for compulsory licensing); see also Cynthia M.
Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health, 82 CHICAGO-
KENT L. REv. 1469, 1499-1500 (2007) (providing additional examples of free trade that
limit compulsory licenses).
386 See 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 27, at 36-37; 2007 SPECIAL 301
REPORT supra note 27, at 27. Some members of Congress have suggested that
Thailand's priority status is unwarranted. See Letter from Henry A. Waxman et al.,
Members of Congress to Ambassador Susan Schwab, United States Trade
Representative (June 20, 2007) available at http://www.house.gov/waxman/
pdfs/thailand%201etter/ 20to%20ustr%/o2006-20-07.pdf (providing perspective of thirty-
five Congressmen opposed to Thailand's priority watch status).
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have no interest in asserting that Thailand violates TRIPS because
the WTO rules concerning disputes for all WTO agreements
require that individual nations not impose unilateral economic
sanctions for violations of TRIPS; rather, nations are to use the
WTO dispute settlement proceedings to settle any alleged
violations of TRIPS." 7 However, as the Thailand case illustrates,
a nation may be in compliance with TRIPS yet nonetheless
vulnerable to unilateral trade sanctions-or, at least the threat of
such sanctions, which includes pressure to enter into bilateral trade
agreements that are likely unfavorable to Thailand. This situation
may seem particularly unfair to developing countries because
many of them entered into TRIPS with the assumption that the
agreement would end unilateral trade sanctions.388 Prior drafts of
the WTO dispute settlement rules had broader language
prohibiting any use of unilateral trade sanctions.38 9 However, the
final wording is much more limited, thus subjecting a country such
as Thailand to the potential whim of other countries' rules.3 90
B. Underlying Issues
1. Are Compulsory Licenses Bad Policy?
One theme underlying the criticisms of the Thai licenses and
even characterizations of the TRIPS issue is whether compulsory
licenses are bad policy such that they should not be used even
when permissible under TRIPS. This article began with the
387 DSU, supra note 45, art. 23.2(a).
388 See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Commentary, The International Intellectual
Property Order Enters the 21st Century, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 472-73 (1996);
Barbosa et al., supra note 57, at 124; James Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and
the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 261, 316-17 (2001-02).
389 Draft Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Revision, Dec. 3, 1990, MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev. 1, at 226 ("Parties shall not
have recourse in relation to other parties to unilaterally decided economic measures of
any kind."); RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS, supra note 108, at 661-63 (noting that the
express reference against unilateral measures in the Brussels draft was absent from the
next draft, the Dunkel draft).
390 There has actually been a prior proceeding against the United States for its use of
Section 301 actions, which are related to, but separate from the Special 301 annual
report. Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). Since then, the United States has not imposed trade
sanctions under Section 301 for any situation covered by the WTO, although it has
continued to publish Special 301 Watch Lists. In addition, while the there have been
Congressional resolutions proposed to advocate that countries should not be placed on
the Priority Watch List for exercising flexibilities under TRIPS, this apparently has not
prevented Thailand from being placed on the list. See H.R. 525, 110th Cong. (2007);
S.R. 241, 110th Cong. (2007).
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premise that TRIPS represents the current rule of law and is
therefore the appropriate starting point for analysis. This article
has established the appropriate legal interpretation of TRIPS, but
because differing perceptions of compulsory license policy may
subject countries, such as Thailand, to threat of retaliation, a brief
review of policy issues is appropriate.
The majority of criticism invoked against Thailand focuses on
compulsory licenses as inappropriate policy with respect to their
impact on long-term innovation, rather than on whether they are
permissible under TRIPS.39 Patent owner Merck, for example,
warned that the "expropriation of intellectual property sends a
chilling signal to research-based companies." '392 In addition,
countries where multi-national drug companies reside have also
criticized the compulsory licenses. The United States, home to
Abbott, has referred to the compulsory licenses as "indications of
a weakening respect of patents." '393 Similarly, Switzerland, home
to patent owner Novartis, issued a public "Aide Memoire"
warning that research will be undermined if licenses are not used
solely for "emergencies and other exceptional cases." '394 In
391 See, e.g., U.S. Drugmaker Abbott, Thailand Face off in AIDS Drug Patent
Stalemate, INT'L HERALD TRIB, June 6, 2007 (quoting PhRMA President Billy Tauzin as
stating that Thailand's "misguided focus on short-term 'budget fixes' could come at a far
greater long term cost, potentially limiting importance incentives for research and
development"); Suttinee Yuvejwattana & Beth Jinks, Thailand Would Buy Abbott Drugs
if Prices Were Reduced, CHIC. TRIB., June 6, 2007 (noting that PhRMA suggests
compulsory licenses remove the incentive to invest in research); accord Benjamin
Krohmal, Knowledge Ecology Studies, Notes from March 16th 2007 U.S. Capitol
Briefing on Thailand's Compulsory Licensing, http://www.keionline.org/
index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=37 (noting that a representative of
PhRMA "began by stating that he would not focus on the legal technicalities" and argued
instead that compulsory licenses destroyed incentives for innovation). Although the
primary policy issue is innovation, some also comment that compulsory licensing is a
dangerous policy because patent-owning drug companies are better suited to provide not
only safe drugs, but also appropriate medical care and training. See, e.g., Bate, supra
note 252 (asserting that drugs from patent owners are higher quality than those of
Thailand's GPO); Thai-ing Pharma Down, supra note 241 (commenting that Western
pharmaceutical companies provide training which ensures proper patient compliance and
suggests that the costs are far greater than the costs of the drugs themselves). This
objection seems to suggest that patented drugs are necessarily safer and ignores the fact
that there is a separate agency in Thailand, as in the U.S., to investigate the safety and
efficacy of any drugs sold to the public. Moreover the objection would extend beyond
compulsory licenses to even generic drugs legally made after a patent expires.
392 Brazil, Thailand Override Big Pharma Patents, 316 SCIENCE 1, May 11, 2007
(emphasis added).
393 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 27, at 27; see also 2008 SPECIAL 301
REPORT, supra note 27, at 37 ("Thailand's recent policies and actions concerning the
compulsory licensing of patented medicines have contributed to continuing concerns
regarding the adequate and effective protection of IPR in Thailand").
394 Swiss AIDE MEMOIRE, supra note 27, 4. The document further suggests that
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addition, E.U. Commissioner Peter Mandelson has written to the
Thai Health Minister to state his view that Thailand's licenses
were "detrimental to the patent system, and so too innovation and
the development of new medicines" '395 despite dissension among
other E.U. officials.396 In addition, Professor Richard Epstein has
suggested not only that compulsory licenses will "cripple
incentive[s]" necessary to invest in new drugs, but that there is a
serious risk that drug companies will abandon the field of HIV
research if other nations "follow Thailand's lead" in exercising
compulsory licenses.397
There are two assumptions lurking underneath these
statements. First, compulsory licenses are assumed to be
inappropriate and inconsistent with innovation, even though most
nations historically permitted them-and many nations, including
the United States, continue to grant them. Second, these
statements suggest that maximum patent rights (without any
compulsory licenses) in all countries are required for innovation.398
Both of these propositions deserve further scrutiny.
The actual empirical data is equivocal on whether compulsory
licenses dampen innovation. As noted recently by Professor
Reichmann, a leading expert in the global debate about access to
medicine, the "customary assertion of some economists that the
"broad use of compulsory licenses" might negatively impact foreign direct investment in
Thailand. Id.
395 Peter Mandelson July 10 Letter, supra note 27, 4. He also noted that the
licenses "risk forcing more drug companies to abandon their patents and could lead to
the isolation of Thailand from the global biotechnology investment community." Id. at
3. In addition, Mandelson wrote another letter to the new Ministry of Commerce. See
Letter from Peter Mandelson, Member, European Commission to Mingkwan
Saengsuwan, Minister of Commerce, Thail., 6 (Feb. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/thai/08022 1 -PM-MoC.pdf (suggesting that Thailand
review the recent compulsory licenses on cancer, as well as concern that compulsory
licenses only be used as an "exceptional measure").
396 David Cronin, European Parliament Set to Reprimand Mandelson for
Pressuring Thailand, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, May 9, 2008, http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=1032; David Cronin, EU Split Over Thai Effort to
Obtain Cheaper Patented Drugs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=732.
397 Richard Epstein, AIDS Drugs: Are Property Rights and Human Rights in
Conflict?, FT.COM, May 7, 2007, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft
?news id=fto051520070841096219&page = 1; Richard Epstein, Thailand' Actions have
Long-Term Consequences, FT.COM, May 7, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/540bec3c-
fcbb- I 1 db-997 1 -000b5df1 0621 .html.
398 See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on
Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 283,
288-89 (2008) (explaining that patent holders are able to "extract monopoly rents" which
promote investment).
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use of compulsory licensing will depress investment in research
and development requires careful and skeptical evaluation. 39
9
There are few studies concerning the impact of compulsory
licenses on innovation, but in the studies that exist, innovation was
not shown to be negatively impacted.4 °0 In particular there are
suggestions that compulsory licensing in a smaller market, such as
Thailand, is less critical to influencing innovation.4 °1
More specifically, there is the question of whether a
compulsory license in one country will negatively impact global
innovation, especially if the compulsory license is issued in a
country that has a limited market.4"2 Historically, many countries
did not provide patents on drugs, such that any innovation
prompted by patents was generated by a smaller group of
countries.4"3 Although TRIPS requires all member states to
provide patents, drug companies continue to obtain most of their
sales from financially wealthy countries, such as the United
States.40 4 Indeed, some have suggested that sales to developing
countries are more akin to "windfall rents."4 5 Professors Abbott
and Reichmann have suggested that so long as companies continue
to recoup research costs in OECD markets, developing countries
should simply pay marginal costs of production plus a five percent
399 REICHMANN WITH HASENZAHL, supra note 3, at 6.
400 See Donald McFetridge, Intellectual Property, Technology Diffusion, and
Growth in the Canadian Economy, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY 65 (Anderson & Gallini eds.,
1998); Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. 853 passim (2003);
F.M. Scherer, The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing, in FINANCE AND
ECONOMICS 1997, 84-88 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. Bus., Monograph Series No.1977-2, 1977).
The studies, however, do not replicate the identical conditions. In particular, the studies
involve licenses imposed as penalties for antitrust violations, as opposed to licenses
imposed on the grounds of public health. Thus, there is a question as to whether
companies will be less inclined to conduct research and development on drugs if they are
more routinely subject to licensing on the grounds of public health, as opposed to
penalties for antitrust violations which may seem more within the control of the
company.
401 See, e.g., Chien, supra note 400, at 893-94; WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION &
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 52, at 91.
402 Chien, supra note 400, at 883-95.
403 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting that prior to TRIPS, fifty
countries did not permit drug compounds to be patented).
404 See, e.g., Abbott & Reichmann, supra note 31, at 971 (noting that companies
typically recoup their costs plus profits in OECD markets); see also supra note 376 and
accompanying text (noting that wealthy countries provide for eighty to ninety percent of
global sales).
405 REICHMANN WITH HAZENSHAL, supra note 3, at 6.
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royalty and that this would already constitute "generous
compensation. 41 6  Based on their reasoning, patent-owning
companies would still stand to reap substantial revenue even if
multiple developing countries issued compulsory licenses.
There are no definitive studies that patents or increased patent
rights promote innovation-contrary to often-stated assertions of
the importance of strong patent rights." 7 Some assert that there is
a correlation between strong intellectual property rights and
expenditures on research, or that countries with strong patent
rights are more globally competitive.408  However, correlation is
not causation. In addition, history informs us that when nations
have increased patent rights more innovation does not necessarily
follow; on the other hand, the data is ambiguous because there
could be many intervening factors, including the fact that in a
global economy, stronger patent rights in one country may offset
weaker rights in another country. 4°9 A number of policy studies
suggest that increased patent rights do not necessarily improve
domestic innovation if a nation is not at a level of economic
development to benefit from patent rights.410 Stronger patent
406 Abbott & Reichmann, supra note 31, at 971 (quoting letter from Al Engelberg);
see also Peter M. Gerhart, The Tragedy of TRIPS, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 163-67
(2007) (arguing that TRIPS extracts wealth for innovation that has already been
incentivized under national frameworks).
407 See Chien, supra note 400, at 883-92.
408 See, e.g., Robert Evenson & Sunil Kanwar, Does Intellectual Property
Protection Spur Technological Change? 6-8 (Yale Economic Growth Center Discussion
Paper, No. 831, June 2001); Froehner, supra note 11, at 7.
409 There is conflicting information about whether innovation increased in Canada
once it ceased a policy of issuing compulsory licensing on drugs. See, e.g., HARVEY
BALE, TRIPS, PHARMACEUTICALS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
HEALTH CARE ACCESS, DRUG QUALITY AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT 13 (2000) (providing a
graph that shows significant increase in Canadian pharmaceutical research and
development spending after compulsory licensing policy eliminated in 1992); PAUL K.
GORECKI, REGULATING THE PRICE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN CANADA: COMPULSORY
LICENSING, OTTAWA ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA 159-62 (1981) (concluding that
there is a decline in the absolute level of research and development, but that the decline
is relatively slight when considered in the context of overall GNP and that it is unclear
the extent to which compulsory licensing contributed to decline, given other existing
variables). Similarly, the introduction of stronger patent protection in Italy did not
increase pharmaceutical innovation. F.M. Scherer & Sandy Weisburst, Economic Effects
of Strengthening Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Italy, 26 INT'L. REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 1009, 1017-23 (1995). However, some have noted that there may be
other intervening factors, such as the fact that Italy imposed stringent price controls.
Scherer & Weisburst, supra, at 2014.
410 COMM'N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 79-89 (2002), available at http://www.iprcommissio
n.org/graphic/documents/final report.htm (noting that increased patent rights may or
may not be the best means for protecting traditional knowledge in developing countries
because of economic consideration); Carlos M. Correa & Sisule F. Musungu, WIPO
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rights may simply provide an opportunity for the same repeat
patent players to reap additional revenue without increasing
innovation. 411 Even for countries at a sufficient economic level of
development to benefit from patents, increased protection may
yield more modest gains than popularly asserted. 12  In fact,
concurrent with a trend towards increasing global patent rights is a
growing skepticism of the extent to which patents promote
domestic innovation.413
In addition, even if patents promote some innovation, the
innovation promoted by patents may be socially sub-optimal.
Many suggest that the current patent system fails to promote
innovation because despite a substantial increase in research
expenses, the number of new drugs has decreased.414 In addition,
patent protection may encourage more development of similar
drugs that are patentable, yet of little benefit to patients because
most patent laws do not require that a drug be a substantial
improvement over existing therapies.4 5 Indeed, recent reports
suggest a decline in the number of clinically significant new
drugs.416  Furthermore, patent protection only helps to promote
innovation in areas that are profitable; it does not help promote
innovation to treat conditions that primarily afflict individuals and
Patent Agenda: The Risks for Developing Countries 23 (South Centre, Trade-Related
Agenda, Development and Equity, Working Papers No.12, 2002) (noting that
industrialized countries had varying evolutions of their patent systems that enabled them
to take into account the competitive strength of their industries).
411 For example, in the ten years since Mexico enacted stronger patent protection,
the number of patent applications from domestic applicants actually dropped by half.
See CORREA 2007, supra note 29, at 96-97.
412 See id. at 96 (citing Richard Levin et al., Appropriating Returns from Industrial
Research & Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (1987).
413 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 327 (2003) (noting that "incremental increases in patent
protection are unlikely to influence inventive activity significantly"); Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125-27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that patents can impede research); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388, 393-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that patents may
serve as a tool not for innovation, but to generate licensing fees).
414 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT:
SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS
HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 34 (2006).
415 See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 27 (noting requirements that a patentable
invention be new, useful, and nonobvious).
416 See, e.g., WHO COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 40, at 66; see also Light &
Lexchin, supra note 371, at 959 ("[o]nly ten to fifteen percent of new drugs provide
important benefits over existing drugs").
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countries with poor financial resources.4 17
While no single system, including patents, is likely to be an
ideal mechanism for all types of innovation, the shortcomings of
the patent system should nonetheless be kept in mind against the
prevalent rhetoric that any limitation to patent rights, such as
compulsory licensing, would spell disaster. For example, although
pharmaceutical companies assert that Thailand's licenses will
thwart research and development of neglected diseases that
predominantly effect countries with poor financial resources, this
claim seems empty given that patents traditionally do not provide
incentives for unprofitable diseases. Indeed, companies are
currently investing little funding in such diseases, such that the
impact of a compulsory license on these areas is likely to be
minimal. 8 A compulsory license on a drug to treat a neglected
disease might threaten incentives for further research in neglected
diseases because the license would deprive a substantial market
for revenuer.4 9  However, all the compulsory licenses issued by
Thailand are for global drugs that generate most of their profits in
wealthy countries, such that Thailand's licenses should have
minimal impact on innovation.42 0
In addition, even if compulsory licenses were to negatively
impact innovation the impact is likely more nuanced than current
criticisms. While pharmaceutical companies seem uniformly
opposed to compulsory licenses, the crux of their complaint
actually focuses on revenue loss, which could be addressed by
focusing on the TRIPS-required element of "adequate
417 This is often referred to as the drug gap, or ten-ninety problem, which stands for
the fact that only ten percent of global spending on health research is for conditions that
impact ninety percent of global disease burdens. See, e.g., SECRETARIAT OF THE GLOBAL
FORUM FOR HEALTH RESEARCH, THE 10/90 REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH 2003-2004,
ch. 2, §1, at 35 (2004); Michael R. Reich, The Global Drug Gap, 287 SCIENCE 1979
(2000) (highlighting the discrepancy between the availability of new drugs on the market
for the world's affluent and the unavailability of drugs that are needed by a majority of
world's population in developing countries).
418 See, e.g., Chien, supra note 400, at 892 ("[A] 2001 Harvard School of Public
Health survey of twenty large pharmaceutical firms found that '[o]f 11 responders, eight
had done no research over the past year in tuberculosis, malaria, African sleeping
sickness, leishmaniasis, or Chagas disease; seven spent less than 1% of their research
and development budget on any of these disorders."').
419 id. at 894.
420 See generally supra note 376 and accompanying text (noting that developing and
middle income countries comprise only ten to twenty percent of global sales). But see
Thai Patent Turmoil, supra note 11 (nothing that Thailand's use of compulsory licensing
may "threaten the precarious balance that promotes investment and trade in IP-intensive
goods").
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remuneration," rather than eliminating all compulsory licenses.42
Other scholars note that the remuneration provided by a
compulsory license is important for evaluating the potential impact
on innovation, with one scholar even suggesting that rates be set to
provide full market compensation.a2
2. Should TRIPS Be Interpreted In Light of Policy
Considerations?
A related question to policy concerns about compulsory
licenses is a consideration of how such concerns impact prevailing
beliefs about TRIPS, as well as whether such concerns should be
relevant to TRIPS interpretations. Although this article provides
an interpretation of TRIPS based upon customary rules of
interpreting international law, considering whether any of the
policy considerations are legitimate may help to explain resistance
to the proper interpretations of TRIPS.
An important initial issue is the premise for why middle-
income countries should not be permitted to use compulsory
licenses, separate from the fact that TRIPS permits this as a matter
of international law. Some of the controversy may stem from the
fact that middle-income countries are perceived as having
adequate funds to pay the prices set by patent owners.423
However, there is a wide range of income levels among middle-
income countries and also wide disparities of income within
countries. 424  For example, Thailand is a lower-middle-income
country, whereas Brazil is a higher middle-income country, 425 but
critics of compulsory licenses refer to middle-income countries
421 See Chien, supra note 400, at 859-62. PhRMA's current criticism of the Thai
licenses also likely represents the fear of an extrapolated effect from the current
situation. In other words, PhRMA is likely concerned that if other countries followed
Thailand's lead there would be a substantial aggregate impact. While this may seem
compelling, it should also be considered that revenue from all low and middle income
countries constitute a mere fraction of worldwide sales. See supra note 376 and
accompanying text.
422 See Cahoy, supra note 31, at 177-79; Chien, supra note 400, at 873 (suggesting
that the royalty rate will likely determine innovation).
423 See, e.g., A Gathering Storm, supra note 260, at 71 (noting that middle income
countries use the threat of compulsory licensing to gain drug discounts and therefore get
cheaper drugs than low income countries).
424 See generally World Bank, Country Classifications, http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/O,,contentMDK:20421402-pagePK:641331
50-piPK:64133175-theSitePK:239419,00.html#Lowincome (last visited Feb. 8, 2009)
(providing statistical data on income levels for several countries).
425 See, e.g., id.
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generically as if they are identical.426 Moreover, while the
wealthiest Thai population can pay for drugs at the rate set by
patent owners, the population to which the compulsory licenses
apply cannot afford such rates because the poorest twenty-five
percent of Thai citizens subsist on less than two dollars a day.427
South Africa, which often is viewed as more deserving of reduced
rate drugs and compulsory licenses, has thirty-four percent of its
citizens at the same income level.428
Another issue is whether compulsory licenses should be
permitted for chronic diseases. While there were many aspects of
the Thai licenses that provoked criticism, the use of the
compulsory licenses for non-infectious diseases seemed to prompt
the strongest reactions-the license on Plavix repeatedly prompted
criticism that heart disease was not an emergency.429  The
"requirement" of an emergency to issue a compulsory license is
only a requirement desired by patent owners, rather than one
actually imposed by TRIPS.43 °  As a policy matter, there is
nonetheless a question of whether drugs to treat chronic diseases,
such as heart disease and cancer, are medications that are
necessary for developing countries because there is an assumption
that such diseases affect the rich at a higher level.431 Recent data
from the WHO indicates that these are popular misconceptions
unsupported by the facts; the majority of deaths from heart disease
426 See, e.g., A Gathering Storm, supra note 260, at 71 (referring to middle income
countries versus the poorest countries, without recognition that Brazil and Thailand have
different economic situations); Drug Patent Piracy, supra note 1 (referring to Thailand
and Brazil as "relatively well off nations" and considering them similar based upon gross
domestic production).
427 U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN AND INCOME POVERTY: DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 238 tbl.3, No.78 (2007/2008). Of course, income inequalities within
countries may also suggest that comparing entire countries is inappropriate and that
focusing on low income populations is more accurate. See id.
428 Id. On the other hand, some countries on the African continent are plagued by
much higher rates of poverty. For example, in Haiti and Rwanda, around eighty percent
of the population is at this level of poverty. Id.
429 See supra notes 249-253 and accompanying text (describing criticism of Plavix
license). Although criticism of the licenses on cancer drugs was relatively muted, that
may be more a function of the lack of surprise, as well as a belief that a leadership
change would revoke the licenses, such that criticism was not necessary.
430 Compare supra notes 11, 245-246 and accompanying text (providing perspective
of drug companies) with supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text (explaining that
although an emergency situation may waive the usual requirement of negotiating with a
patent owner, TRIPS does not require an emergency as a pre-requisite to issuance of all
compulsory licenses).
431 See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 1 (suggesting that heart disease afflicts the affluent
disproportionately to lower income individuals).
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actually take place in developing countries.432 While it is true that
developing countries' citizens suffer from HIV, they also suffer
from some of the same chronic diseases that plague wealthier
countries.433 Moreover, the WHO estimates that deaths from non-
communicable diseases are likely to account for more than twice
the number of deaths from communicable diseases by 2015. 434
The question then becomes whether such countries and their
citizens are entitled to the same medical treatment. The question
is not simply an issue of what is a chronic disease that may have
no finite end for a compulsory license. After all, HIV treatment is
similarly chronic in that treatment of every infected person must
continue for his or her lifetime.435 Rather, an underlying issue
may be that drugs to treat chronic diseases have traditionally
reaped enormous profits for drug companies.436 While they are
also sold in developing countries, public pressure has thus far not
required drug companies to sell these drugs at a discount to
developing countries. The marketing model for most drugs sold
by major pharmaceutical companies has been to sell them at a high
price in most countries even if that means fewer sales in countries
such as Thailand where there are fewer people who can afford the
high prices.437 If companies are required to provide the drugs at
432 See Prevention and Control of NonCommunicable Diseases, supra note 22, at 1.
433 See id.; see also MARC SUHRCKE ET AL., THE OXFORD HEALTH ALLIANCE,
CHRONIC DISEASE: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 12 (2006), available at
http://www.oxha.org/knowledge/publications/oxha-chronic-disease-an-economic-
perspective.pdf (noting that chronic diseases account for the majority of deaths in all
countries outside of sub-Saharan Africa); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PREVENTING
CHRONIC DISEASES: A VITAL INVESTMENT 43 (2005), available at
http://www.who.int/chp/chronicdisease report/contents/part I .pdf [hereinafter
PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASES] (noting that eighty percent of deaths from chronic
disease occur in low and middle income countries).
434 See PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASES, supra note 433, at 57.
435 See, e.g., MtDICNS SANS FRONTItRES, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF
ANTIRETROVIRAL PRICE REDUCTIONS 8 (2008), available at http://www.msfaccess.org/
fileadmin/user upload/diseases/hiv-aids/Untangling the Web/Untanglingtheweb July
2008 English.pdf (noting that HIV is a life long condition requiring continuous access to
drugs) .
436 See generally WHO, WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION, supra note 376, at 18
(noting that in 1999, over sixty percent of research was directed at drugs for cancer,
metabolic, and cardiovascular disease).
437 See, e.g., TEN BURNING QUESTIONS-GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note
10, at 1, 6 (noting that patented drugs were only purchased by two percent of the
population prior to issuance of the compulsory licenses because they were not affordable
to most citizens); Hammer, supra note 24, at 888 (noting that the small percentage of
citizens in developing countries that are able to purchase drugs do not pay a discount and
may in fact pay even higher prices than in developed countries); Carsten Fink,
Intellectual Property and Public Health: An Overview of the Debate with a Focus on
U.S. Policy 20 (Ctr. For Global Dev., Working Paper No. 146, 2008) (noting that
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lower costs, or forced to do so through compulsory licenses, that
poses a fundamental challenge to an existing profit-maximizing
438strategy. On the other hand, the same was once true for HIV
medication and companies today often provide substantial
discounts to developing countries-at least for first generation
HIV treatments that are off patent.439
Another thorny question relates to the potentially limitless
boundaries of compulsory licensing under TRIPS. After all, if
TRIPS permits nations to issue a license for any drug, limited only
with respect to the stated purpose of the license, a license could
issue for any condition.44 There is nothing in TRIPS that limits
licenses to conditions that are life-threatening.44' Furthermore,
while Thailand did not issue licenses for what it considers to be
unnecessary conditions, such as acne or baldness treatment, TRIPS
would arguably not preclude such licenses, although even if
permissible under TRIPS, countries might be vulnerable to
political pressure and retaliation.442  Even if cosmetic conditions
are excluded, drug companies nonetheless have a justifiable fear
that TRIPS could permit any country to claim health care is a
priority sufficient to justify imposing a compulsory license
whenever a country wishes to provide more medical treatment
than it can afford at regular prices.443
companies often target wealthier citizens of lower income countries).
See Fink, supra note 437, at 20.See, e.g., Bertozzi, supra note 316, at 357 (noting that the price of antiretrovirals
have dropped by two orders of magnitude for some countries, although the pricing is not
consistent). However, the discounted prices on HIV drugs were also prompted by
competition from generic manufacturers-a fact not applicable to newer HIV drugs for
which no generics currently exist. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 437, at 20.
440 See supra notes 327-332 and accompanying text (explaining that the TRIPS
requirement that licenses be limited in scope and duration to the authorized purpose
provides substantial discretion to countries).
441 See also Outterson supra note 22, passim (explaining that TRIPS does not limit
the types of drugs that may be subject to compulsory licensing). See generally TRIPS,
supra note 7, art. 31 (outlining the conditions that must be met before a country can
obtain a compulsory license without authorization from the patent holder).
442 See supra Part VI.A (discussing retaliation against Thailand after licenses
issued). Granting a compulsory license for what is considered cosmetic could be seen as
extreme. On the other hand, requiring nations to grant patents in the first instance is seen
by some as extreme. See, e.g., supra note 15 (noting that a number of countries did not
provide patent protection on drug compositions prior to TRIPS).
443 Indeed, in Thailand's case, cancer drugs were not on the essential drug list and
thus not part of the universal access plan. See generally TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON
CANCER DRUGS, supra note 220, at 2 (noting that the cancer drugs which were not listed
as essential drugs because of their high cost and thus inaccessible to most Thai citizens
without the compulsory licenses).
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An important question is whether the policies for using
compulsory licenses pursuant to TRIPS should be considered
anew. While it is tempting to focus on the concerns of major drug
companies, TRIPS Article 31 should be considered as part and
parcel of an overall package of patent rights agreed upon by all
WTO members. Policy issues concerning compulsory licenses
were considered during the negotiation of TRIPS. For example,
whereas some countries wanted broad authority to issue
compulsory licenses, the United States was strongly opposed to
compulsory licenses.444 An early proposal limited the types of
subject matter that could be subject to compulsory licenses.445
However, the member states ultimately agreed not only to
compulsory licensing as a permissible exception but also to omit
any restrictions on the type of invention that could qualify.446 In
other words, some of the positions being strongly advocated by
patent owners and governments today were previously considered
but rejected in the overall negotiation of TRIPS. Not only were
they rejected, but TRIPS as a whole likely would not have been
concluded without the broad flexibilities encompassed by Article
3 1. After all, countries wanting to maintain broad flexibility for
compulsory licenses previously granted only limited patents or no
patents at all such that they were unlikely to agree to a scheme
where licenses were severely restricted.447
The prior consideration and rejection of issues, such as
whether compulsory licenses should be limited to certain
conditions or diseases, raises the question of whether there is a
444 See Communication from the United States, supra note 104, at 11, art. 27
(setting out several provisions which limits the issuance of compulsory licenses and
outlining situations in which compulsory licenses may be revoked); Communication
from India, supra note 110, 15 (proposing that all pharmaceutical patents be subject to
automatic compulsory licenses). Although the United States generally asserts that it is
opposed to compulsory licensing and does not provide for compulsory licensing, the
United States in fact insisted on language in what has become TRIPS Article 31 that
essentially enables the United States to continue to use a law that provides a de facto
compulsory license of patents for any government use by the government, or by
government contractors. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498; see also supra note 104 and
accompanying text (discussing Article 31 negotiations).
445 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
446 See supra text accompanying notes 102-106 (discussing negotiating history).
447 See, e.g., Thiru Balasubramaniam, Knowledge Ecology International, March 8,
2007 Geneva Q&A Session on Thai White Paper (Mar. 8, 2007),
http://www.keionline.org/index.php?option=com-content&task-view&id=31 (noting
that Brazil's representative to the U.N. has suggested that developing countries would
not have accepted the TRIPS patent terms without compulsory licenses because of the
need for balance).
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proper basis for revisiting TRIPS Article 31. While patent owners
and powerful governments may be effectively doing so through
retaliatory acts, there is no legitimate basis for ignoring the clear
language of TRIPS to resurrect previously rejected positions.
First, it is unfair to consider compulsory licenses under Article 31
separate from the entirety of the TRIPS agreement because
countries negotiated for the entire package of TRIPS rules;
developing countries would not have agreed to the default
requirement under TRIPS of providing patents without exceptions
to patent rights, such as compulsory licenses.448 Second, any
attempt to resurrect rejected approaches to compulsory licenses
reflects a lack of respect for international law.
3. Do Competing Policy Perspectives of Patents Account
for Disagreements Over Compulsory Licenses?
Another important issue is why Thailand's actions, as well as
Article 31, are frequently misunderstood and mischaracterized.
For example, why do some insist that compulsory licenses are
only permissible in the case of an emergency when the plain
language of TRIPS lists an emergency as simply one of several
criteria for waiving a procedural requirement of first negotiating
with the patent owner? Similarly, why do some insist that middle-
income countries cannot use compulsory licenses when there is
nothing about developmental status mentioned under TRIPS?
Also, why do some believe that compulsory licenses are only
appropriate for some types of drugs when TRIPS does not include
any criteria and the Doha Public Health Declaration explicitly
states "each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses
and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such
licenses are granted?"
449
There are a few possible explanations. First, Article 31 is
notably a lengthy provision that may be difficult to understand,
although this does not explain interpretations that defy the clear
language of the Doha Health Declaration. 4 0  Alternatively,
448 In addition, this view is further supported by TRIPS Articles 7-8, which also
references the importance of balance. See TRIPS, supra note 7, arts. 7-8.
449 Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 31, 5(b).
450 The complexity of Article 31 also may be compounded by the waiver of one
provision that was crafted primarily to benefit countries without adequate manufacturing
capacity to make generic versions of patented products under compulsory licenses-a
situation that does not apply to Thailand despite some confusion in the press. See A
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objections to compulsory licensing can mask fears that any drugs
produced under such a license might be exported to high-income
countries and under-cut profits in economically significant
markets. 5' Some suggest that pharmaceutical companies
misrepresent facts in their quest to secure maximum patent rights
and accompanying revenues,452 although a less cynical view may
be that PhRMA simply believes TRIPS reflects its initial
negotiating positions-especially given that TRIPS was the
brainchild of companies including PhRMA.4 53  While
pharmaceutical companies are an easy target for criticism, the
positions of governments or individual government officials that
mirror the position of pharmaceutical companies are less clearly
explained. A cynical response would be that governments are
subject to industry capture and especially influenced by industry
positions on issues outside of their traditional expertise, such as
intellectual property.454 This view may in fact be the case but even
if that is true it is not helpful to diffusing current and continuing
conflict.
Another possible explanation is that the debate over
compulsory licensing simply reveals a fundamental fault line in
the TRIPS agreement that must be addressed. All parties
acknowledge that TRIPS was an agreement of compromise; this
recognition inherently means that despite agreement on the final
Gathering Storm, supra note 260, at 72 (suggesting that there will be a "gold rush for
generics firms" based on the waiver for countries without domestic manufacturing in the
same discussion as Thailand's licenses without indicating that the waiver is not relevant
to Thailand).
451 However, fears of diversion of products to high-income countries appear to be
more fiction than fact. See, e.g., Kevin Outterson & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Market-Based
Licensing for HPV Vaccines, 27 HEALTH AFF. 130, 136-37 (Jan/Feb 2008) (noting that
amounts of illegal diversion have been overstated and that there is no empirical evidence
to suggest that antivetroviral drugs supplied to developing countries have become a
widespread problem).
452 See, e.g., Abbott & Reichmann, supra note 31, at 937 n. 69 (suggesting that
comments in the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal that suggest that TRIPS is not
intended to cover heart disease is "continuing evidence that PhRMA's advertising and
lobbying influence will seek to distort the plain language of the TRIPS Agreement and
Doha Declaration when it suits their purpose").
453 See DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 381, at 68-73 (discussing role of
pharmaceutical giant Pfizer in setting the stage for the creation of TRIPS); SELL, supra
note 291, at 1-2, 37-55 (discussing the role that twelve corporate executives representing
pharmaceutical, entertainment, and software industries had in crafting TRIPS).
454 See generally SELL, supra note 291, at 43-55 (describing entire negotiations of
TRIPS as the result of successful lobbying by a handful of powerful companies and that
intellectual property experts from the private sector were pivotal in influencing the
government because the government was not generally familiar with this area).
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language of TRIPS, parties did not have uniform views on
TRIPS.455 In other words, even though compulsory licensing is
permitted under TRIPS, that requirement has not changed strongly
held beliefs that compulsory licensing is either a fundamental right
or fundamentally wrong.456
The current problems related to the Thai compulsory licenses
may in fact reveal a problem with the negotiation of TRIPS. Most
agree that the patent and other intellectual property standards
under TRIPS could never have been reached in a stand-alone
international agreement because developing countries had nothing
to gain from such an agreement; in fact, including such issues in
the WTO framework was considered a savvy strategy to secure
agreement because developing countries wanted greater access to
wealthy markets provided through the WTO regime.457 While this
negotiating strategy was successful in concluding TRIPS, it has
not changed fundamental attitudes on patents.458
The current controversy over compulsory licensing may also
indicate the difficulties of imposing global norms for issues
typically within national discretion. Prior to TRIPS, nations had
the option of providing no patent protection and could do so to
improve access to low-cost drugs.459 While nations can no longer
deny patents under TRIPS, their perspective on the importance of
patents as opposed to healthcare is likely no different. Arguably, a
WTO panel could settle a dispute regarding the extent to which
national health care priorities, such as a national plan to provide
access to essential medicines, should be considered in authorizing
compulsory licenses. 46° However, a panel ruling is not likely to
455 Some have previously noted that diverse views during TRIPS negotiations were
resolved by intentional ambiguity, such that each side could claim a win. See, e.g.,
WATAL, supra note 101, at 7 (noting that conflicts were resolved by "constructive
ambiguity").
456 Along similar lines, TRIPS likely has not modified beliefs about international
exhaustion of patent rights. See, e.g., SELL, supra note 291, at 139-50 (discussing
fervent opposition to TRIPS after its implementation).
457 See supra note 56 and accompanying text (noting that conclusion of TRIPS did
not necessarily reflect consensus on its substantive points). See also ROGER NORMAND,
BACKGROUND, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES 34 (2000)
(noting that "many developing countries objected to TRIPS entering the WTO system
yet lacked the resources, expertise, and political will to withstand the pressure from
developed countries").
458 See id.
459 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
460 See, e.g., Barbosa et al., supra note 57, at 104-03 (suggesting that WTO panels
could consider and balance a variety of interests).
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alter fundamental perspectives on the role of patents, as well as the
government's role in promoting public health, just as the
conclusion of TRIPS has not necessarily altered fundamental
beliefs concerning patent rights or the right to public health.46 In
particular, it is possible that the competing interpretations of
TRIPS reflect divergent perspectives on the role of patents that
were negotiated around without reaching consensus under TRIPS,
such that continued conflicts are inevitable. If so, understanding
competing perspectives is just as important as attempting to
provide proper legal interpretations of TRIPS provisions.
The controversy concerning the Thai licenses may reflect two
fundamentally competing visions of patents on a spectrum of
perspectives. The perspectives range from a conception of patents
as a near absolute property right to a view of patents as a mere
privilege granted by the state that is inherently subject to
limitations.462  These two extremes are bookends to a vast
spectrum of more nuanced positions.463 However, examining the
most radical positions may be informative in identifying a
fundamental tension underlying current positions concerning
TRIPS that do not seem to mesh with proper legal interpretations.
The dichotomy of perspectives can easily be seen from the
controversy concerning Thailand's compulsory licenses. On one
side of the spectrum are statements regarding the potential evils of
compulsory licensing to long-term innovation, as well as
accusations that a compulsory license is akin to stealing.464 On the
461 See generally Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, A
Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219, 226-29 (1997) (noting
research that suggests laws alone do not change behavior if laws are not in accordance
with personal beliefs).
462 This novel framework of competing patent visions is proposed without prejudice
to more traditional discussions of patents based primarily on property versus liability
rules. Both frameworks may co-exist and complement each other. For more information
on the property versus liability rule distinction, see for example, Mark Lemley, Should
Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REv. 783 (2007). Under
this framework, a compulsory license would be appropriate as a liability rule. See id. at
834-35. However, the property versus liability rule distinction nonetheless fails to
address the fundamental issue of how to achieve consensus surrounding which type of
rule to adopt. See id. at 841. On the other hand, the framework of competing patent
visions better explains the problem.
463 For example, even though public statements may fall at one or the other extreme,
the positions of individual actors may change depending on the situation; for example, a
patent owner enforcing its own patent may espouse a view of patents as akin to an
absolute property right yet argue that someone else's patent should be invalid when
defending against patent infringement.
464 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (providing a number of references that
characterize Thailand's actions as theft or stealing).
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other side of the spectrum are statements that suggest compulsory
licensing, as well as other exceptions to patent rights, are
inherently appropriate because unlike human rights, including the
right to health, patent rights are a mere economic tool.
Reconciling the existence of these perspectives under TRIPS
may be difficult. On one level, the current language in TRIPS
may be flexible enough to simultaneously support competing
interpretations. For example, Article 7 may be relied upon by both
patent proponents as well as public access advocates. Article 7
can be read to suggest that TRIPS should be interpreted in "a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations. 465 At the same time, Article 7
can also support the point of view that "protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights," including patents, will
necessarily "contribute to promotion of technical innovation ... to
the mutual advantage of producers and users" without any need to
provide for balancing of rights other than what already exists in
the agreement.466 Similarly, Article 8 can seem to support an
argument to permit member states to take measures necessary to
"protect public health and nutrition,, 467 but the commentary
regarding public health could also be considered superfluous
because Article 8 also states that any measures must be "consistent
with the provisions of this Agreement. 4 68 However, the differing
perspectives may inevitably lead to differing interpretations on the
scope of exceptions: To those that see patents as a privilege that
must give way to more important human rights, the TRIPS
language in Article 31 should be read broadly.469 On the other
hand, to those that believe patents are an absolute property right,
any exceptions to patent rights, even if legal, may be viewed as
inappropriate.47 °  For example, to absolute property right
465 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 7.
466 Id.
467 See id. art. 8.
468 Id.
469 See, e.g., TEN BURNING ISSUES-GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS, supra note 10,
at 4 (noting that the compulsory licenses reflect a government commitment to place the
"right to life" above commercial interests); see also Report of the High Commissioner,
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, 52d Sess., Item 4 of the Provisional Agenda, Impact of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/Cn.4/Sub.2/2001/13, 66 (June 27, 2001) (encouraging states to read TRIPS Article
31 to enhance the promotion of the right to health).
470 See supra note 1 (describing Thailand's actions as inappropriate and akin to
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advocates, the literal words of Article 31 may be de-emphasized in
favor of the belief that compulsory licenses should only be
imposed in exceptional circumstances.47'
While some might advocate simply relying on a proper
interpretation of TRIPS, the reality of retaliatory actions suggest
that a legalistic interpretation alone is an inadequate solution, not
only for Thailand, but also for continuing questions about the
proper balance between patents and public health. In addition,
even if a country were to directly challenge Thailand, a WTO
panel decision is unlikely to quell long-held perspectives on
patents. It may instead simply direct attention and activity
towards other forums where those perspectives can be imposed on
other parties, such as free trade agreements.
A full exploration of competing patent perspectives is beyond
the scope of this article but seems vital ground for further analysis.
Accordingly, considering the role of competing perspectives under
TRIPS, as well as how such perspectives can be changed, if at all,
will be the subject of a separate article. For example, the existing
TRIPS provisions may arguably support two competing
perspectives of TRIPS such that tension is inevitable. Moreover,
some perspectives may be difficult to change; literature from the
field of cognitive psychology suggests individuals may continue to
cling to beliefs that defy new evidence.47 On the other hand, a
historical view of patents indicates that perspectives can change.473
stealing).
471 This was illustrated by the misinterpretation of whether an emergency is required
in the case of the Thai licenses. See supra notes 245-247 and accompanying text; see
also Patent Remedy, supra note 5 (suggesting that compulsory licenses should be
limited, but ignoring the text of TRIPS).
472 See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson et al., Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of
Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1037, 1037-48 (1980); Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A Disconfirmation
Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PYCHOL. 5, 5-24 (1996);
Helen Harton & Bibb Latane, Information-and Thought-Induced Polarization: The
Mediating Role of Involvement in Making Attitudes Extreme, 12 J. Soc. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY 271, 272-94 (1997); Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098-108 (1979); Arthur G. Miller et al., The
Attitude Polarization Phenomenon: Role of Response Measure, Attitude Extremity, and
Behavioral Consequences of Reported Attitude Change, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PYCHOL. 561, 561-73 (1993).
473 For example, the United States has arguably moved more strongly to patents as
privileged property. See generally Adam Mossoff, Patents as a Constitutional Private
Property: The Historical Protection of Patents under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L.
REv. 689, 715-20 (discussing the history of patents protection as a privilege under the
takings clause of the constitution). In addition, on the international scale, perspective to
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A tougher question, however, may be whether they should change
and whether TRIPS should require such a change.
Once competing patent perspectives are further delineated and
explored, a return to considering not only the policy implications
of compulsory licenses but also how to accommodate differences
under TRIPS may be appropriate. For example, if TRIPS
fundamentally reflects two competing perspectives of patents but
panel decisions generally only embrace one perspective, future
panelists could take corrective action. In addition, perhaps an
understanding of competing perspectives will help currently
warring parties better understand their divergent views, such that
they can work towards a solution that better accommodates both
sides.
VII.Conclusion
Thailand's aggressive use of compulsory licenses has provided
an excellent opportunity to evaluate the scope of compulsory
licensing under TRIPS Article 31, as well as problems outside the
WTO/TRIPS system. While this article is unlikely to reduce
criticism of Thailand's compulsory licensing, it hopefully helps to
clarify the appropriate interpretation of TRIPS, as well as identify
future issues in need of true clarification. For example, contrary to
what is reported in the popular press and by patent owners, no
national emergency is required to issue a compulsory license-a
country can issue one on grounds of public non-commercial use.
However, an important open question is what constitutes public
non-commercial use since if construed broadly a license could
almost always be granted without initially consulting with the
patent owner. Similarly, although there is a popular perception
that only drugs to treat epidemics such as AIDS are subject to
compulsory licensing, an appropriate interpretation of TRIPS
readily reveals that there are no restrictions on the type of drug
that may be licensed. In addition, despite the desire of patent
owners to limit compulsory licenses to very limited circumstances,
the actual TRIPS provision only requires that licenses be limited in
compulsory licenses for least developed countries softened after substantial focus on this
issue by NGOs and popular press in connection with South Africa's AIDS epidemic.
See, e.g., Emily S. Saslow, Guest Editorial, Compulsory Licensing and the AIDS
Epidemic in South Africa, 13 AIDS PATIENT CARE AND STDs 577, 578-80 (1999); see also
supra note 291 and accompanying text (providing additional explanation for this change
in perspective).
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scope and duration to the stated purpose. Granted, this may seem
very broad and perhaps needs further inquiry, but, at a minimum,
recognizing the current exaggerations of patent owners is a useful
first step.
This article aims to provide a better understanding of TRIPS,
as well as underlying issues which will help position global
discussions to focus more fruitfully on remaining points of
ambiguity. There are some notable issues for interpretation of
TRIPS, such as what constitutes adequate remuneration, and
public non-commercial use. Continued exploration of the
underlying reasons for competing interpretations of TRIPS
requirements is important to any long-term resolution of
competing claims by patent owners and public health advocates in
the global arena.
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